Maas v. Cornell University
| Decision Date | 11 December 1997 |
| Parties | , 123 Ed. Law Rep. 819, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 10,818 James MAAS, Appellant. v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Michael E. Rosman, Center For Individual Rights, Washington, D.C. and David A. Stoll, New York City, and Lo Pinto, Schlather, Solomon & Salk, Ithaca, for appellant.
Nelson E. Roth, Cornell University, Ithaca, for respondent.
Before CARDONA, P.J., and MIKOLL, CASEY, YESAWICH and CARPINELLO, JJ.
Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Rumsey, J.), entered October 30, 1996 in Tompkins County, which partially granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and dismissed the first, second, third, sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action in said complaint.
Plaintiff, a tenured psychology professor in defendant's College of Arts and Sciences (hereinafter the College), was accused of sexually harassing four female undergraduate students. The complaints were reviewed under procedures entitled "Procedures to Handle Accusations of Sexual Harassment against Faculty Members of Cornell University's College of Arts and Sciences" (hereinafter the Procedures). The College faculty, of which plaintiff is a member, approved the Procedures on April 24, 1991.
After the College's Senior Sexual Harassment Counselor determined that the complaints against plaintiff had merit, hearings were held before the College's Professional Ethics Committee. The Committee unanimously found that plaintiff "repeatedly behaved both unprofessionally and inappropriately in his relationship with [three of] these students and that in effect this behavior constituted sexual harassment" and that plaintiff "committed harassment of a more manifestly sexual and egregious sort" with the fourth student. The Committee recommended, inter alia, that plaintiff's relationship with students be conditioned and that its finding of sexual harassment be taken into account for a five-year period in determining increases in plaintiff's salary and any honors or assignments for which he might be considered.
The College's Dean sustained the Committee's determination, modifying in some respects the recommended sanctions, and plaintiff's subsequent administrative appeal to the Provost was rejected. Plaintiff commenced this plenary action alleging, as relevant here, six causes of action. Defendant's preanswer motion to dismiss the complaint on numerous alternative grounds was partially granted, prompting this appeal.
If, within the four corners of a complaint, factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, a motion to dismiss will fail (see, Fourth Branch Assocs. Mechanicville v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 235 A.D.2d 962, 964, 653 N.Y.S.2d 412; see also, Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17). While Supreme Court may have erred in its factual assessment of when the period of limitations began to run for the purposes of a CPLR article 78 proceeding, the court correctly dismissed the six causes of action.
In his first cause of action, plaintiff seeks a declaration that the College was without authority under defendant's charter, bylaws or Campus Code of Conduct 1 to create its own sexual harassment procedures. Because the documentary evidence in the record resolves all factual issues as a matter of law and definitively disposes of this cause of action (see, Unadilla Silo Co. v. Ernst & Young, 234 A.D.2d 754, 755, 651 N.Y.S.2d 216), Supreme Court did not err in dismissing it (see, CPLR 3211[a][1] ). Although plaintiff strenuously argues that defendant's Code of Conduct provides the exclusive mechanism for the resolution of all sexual harassment claims, thereby precluding the College from adopting its own rules and regulations, the documentary evidence in the record, particularly the Code of Conduct itself, negates this argument. The Code of Conduct plainly states that its "Regulations and the penalties imposed hereunder shall not be deemed exclusive of and shall not preclude resort to any applicable * * * other University regulations and procedures " (emphasis supplied). The Code of Conduct also contains a provision entitled "Dual Jurisdiction", which states:
Should any complaint of * * * a violation [of the Code of Conduct] be made to a supervisor, department head or the Judicial Administrator, or should a supervisor or department head accuse an employee or faculty member of a violation which involves conduct clearly arising in the course of employment, determination of guilt or innocence shall be made by the appropriate University administrative authority or department head who shall also assess penalties and/or remedies where appropriate (emphasis supplied).
These provisions demonstrate quite clearly that the Code of Conduct is not the exclusive means by which sexual harassment complaints are to be reviewed. Moreover, upon our review of the other documentation in the record, particularly defendant's bylaws, it is equally clear that the College acted within the confines of its authority in establishing the Procedures.
Plaintiff's second cause of action seeks recovery for breach of an alleged contract. Even...
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