Maas v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n
| Decision Date | 13 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D20-253,2D20-253 |
| Citation | 325 So.3d 1024 |
| Parties | Becki Ruth MAAS, Appellant, v. HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-7, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Becki Ruth Maas, pro se.
Nancy M. Wallace, Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; and William P. Heller, Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
HSBC Bank USA, National Association, brought a foreclosure action against Becki Ruth Maas. During the nonjury foreclosure trial, Maas altered the original note that HSBC sought to enter into evidence. The trial court subsequently entered a final order finding Maas in direct criminal contempt of court and ordering that she be confined to the county jail for five days. Maas now challenges that order on appeal, and because the record before us does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to commit a contemptuous act, we reverse.
At trial, during the testimony of the bank's representative, counsel for the bank handed the original note to Maas for her to examine it as a pro se litigant before it was offered into evidence. While she "possessed" the note, Maas took out a pen and drew a line through her signature on the note.1 She maintains that pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code § 3 -604a, this was proper and effectively canceled her debt.
Section 673.6041(1), Florida Statutes (2019), is the equivalent of UCC § 3 -604a and provides in relevant part that "[a] person entitled to enforce an instrument, with or without consideration, may discharge the obligation of a party to pay the instrument ... [b]y an intentional voluntary act, such as ... striking out of the party's signature." § 673.6041(1)(a)(3) (emphasis added). Maas maintains that she was the "person entitled to enforce" the note. Section 673.3011(1) defines "[t]he term "person entitled to enforce" an instrument" to include "[t]he holder of the instrument."
Maas argues on appeal that because she "openly quoted UCC3-604(a) [sic] when she struck her signature there was no intent on her part to commit a criminal act." This argument is based on her mistaken belief that when the note was handed to her in open court, she became the "person entitled to enforce" the note because at that time she was the "holder" of the note. Her confusion stems from the definition of "holder" set forth in section 671.201(21)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), as "[t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession." Maas maintains that when she was handed the note in court, she was "the person in possession" of the note and therefore was the holder and was "entitled to enforce" the note, giving her the right to cancel the debt by the "intentional voluntary act" of striking out her name on the note. See § 673.6041(1)(a)(3). She, of course, was mistaken as she signed the note as the borrower and thus was the "maker" of the note. See § 673.1031(1)(e) (). The note was merely handed to her for the purpose of inspecting it as a pro se litigant prior to the bank moving it into evidence. As such, the trial court is correct that Maas had no authority to alter the note.
However, marking through her name on the note—which is the only behavior of Maas cited by the trial court in its contempt order—did not amount to direct criminal contempt in this case because the record establishes that Maas mistakenly believed that she could lawfully do so pursuant to the UCC. "A finding of direct criminal contempt may be based upon either a violation of an order of the court or an act which is facially contemptuous." Smith v. State , 954 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). There was no order at issue here, so Maas’ conduct had to be facially contemptuous to warrant holding her in direct criminal contempt. See id.
Forbes v. State , 933 So. 2d 706, 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citations omitted); see also Turner v. State , 283 So. 2d 157, 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). "Contempt is "[a]n act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity." " Haas v. State , 196 So. 3d 515, 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (alteration in original) (underlined emphasis added) (quoting Garcia v. Pinellas County , 483 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ); see also Ex parte Crews , 127 Fla. 381, 173 So. 275, 279 (1937) ().
As such, it is not enough that the act was calculated to occur; "[t]here must be proof that the accused intended to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice" in performing the act. Forbes , 933 So. 2d at 712 (emphasis added). "Intent is an essential element of contempt," State v. Diaz de la Portilla , 177 So. 3d 965, 973 (Fla. 2015), and "[o]ne's intent to act in contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt," Riley v. State , 293 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
Our dissenting colleague acknowledges that intent is an essential element of contempt but cites Wilson v. Joughin , 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182, 182, 183 (1932), a 1932 Florida Supreme Court opinion involving the contemptuous act of jury tampering, to support the proposition that "the Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that where the act charged clearly constitutes contempt, a denial under oath of a contemptuous intent in committing the act does not require a discharge." In response, we would first point out that Maas’ actions in the instant case are distinguishable from the "clearly contemptuous" actions of the appellant in Wilson , 141 So. at 182-83, who tracked down a juror on the street, had the juror brought over to his car, and told the juror, "It would be best to give [the defendant] life and not execute him."
We would also note that the "assertion that "a disclaimer of intent to be contemptuous is not sufficient to deprive a trial judge of the power to punish contempt" is true, but only if a finding of intent is supported by the facts." Sewell v. State , 443 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (emphasis added). Maas is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning that she does not have the burden to prove a lack of contemptuous intent and that each element of the offense, including intent, must be supported by the evidence. See Forbes , 933 So. 2d at 712.
But more importantly, it is not our conclusion here that Maas' striking through her signature on the original note was not contemptuous because she denied a contemptuous intent under oath. Rather, we conclude that the facts of this case do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Maas struck through her signature on the original note with the intent to embarrass the court or to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice.
Although Maas’ action was certainly shocking and may have angered the court, the record establishes that she did it in an effort to legally cancel her debt pursuant to her misunderstanding of statutory provisions. Such is insufficient to constitute criminal contempt. See Via v. State , 633 So. 2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (); McRoy v. State , 31 So. 3d 273, 274, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (); see also Murrell v. State , 595 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ( ).
The dissent makes the conclusory statements that Maas’ "actions were calculated to hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice and to lessen the court's authority over her" and that "she clearly had calculated her action with the intent to hinder or obstruct the court by defacing the note to accomplish her improper objective" but points to nothing in the record to support these conclusions.2
Although the dissent is correct that the act of striking her name was intentional, the intent necessary to support a finding of direct criminal contempt is not the intent to actually do the physical act. The intent necessary is the intent that the act itself will embarrass the court or that it will hinder or obstruct the administration of justice. In other words, the act itself without a contemptuous intent is not enough to support a finding of direct criminal contempt. See, e.g. , Woods v. State , 987 So. 2d 669, 677-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (), disapproved of on other grounds by Plank v. State , 190 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2016) ; M.J. v. State , 202 So. 3d 112, 114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (...
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