MacDonald v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Dist. Com'n
| Decision Date | 23 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-P-1049,91-P-1049 |
| Parties | Francis G. MacDONALD, Jr. v. COMMISSIONER OF The METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Gabriel O. Dumont, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.
Thomas F. McKenna, Boston, for defendant.
Before DREBEN, FINE, and IRELAND, JJ.
In this action the plaintiff, Francis G. MacDonald, Jr., is seeking reinstatement to his former position as a Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) police officer. The defendant, the MDC commissioner, claims that he successfully followed the procedures set forth in G.L. c. 32, § 16, 1 to have MacDonald involuntarily retired. MacDonald claims that the State Board of Retirement (board) erred in allowing his voluntary retirement on the basis of ordinary disability alone where the commissioner had applied to the board, pursuant to statute, for his involuntary retirement for accidental disability. Ordinary disability retirement is less advantageous to MacDonald than accidental disability retirement would have been. A further complication arises from the fact that the board misinformed MacDonald as to the proper avenue of review of its decision. 2 On cross-motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the commissioner on both points. With considerable misgivings about the board's confusing and misleading communications to MacDonald, 3 we affirm.
The undisputed material facts presented to the judge were as follows. MacDonald became an MDC police officer on December 29, 1969. On January 31, 1986, the commissioner filed an application with the board stating, among other things, that MacDonald was permanently disabled from further service in that he was suffering from "a major mental disorder ... bordering on a psychotic condition" and requesting his retirement for "accidental disability." In accordance with the requirements of G.L. c. 32, § 16(1)(a ), MacDonald was provided with a copy of the application, which included a summary of the facts relied upon, as well as copies of statutes setting forth his procedural rights before the board and his right to judicial review in the District Court.
At MacDonald's request, the board held a hearing on April 24, 1986. MacDonald presented no evidence to counter the commissioner's claims and, on June 5, 1986, the board issued a "certificate" to the effect that MacDonald met the requirements for retirement for accidental disability. 4 The "certificate" was premature, however, because there had been no review by a regional medical panel as required by G.L. c. 32, § 6(3)(a ). 5 Such a review took place subsequently. The panel found unanimously that MacDonald was permanently disabled and unable, therefore, to perform the duties of a police officer. The panel also found, however, that the disability was not causally related to his police work.
On June 1, 1987, the board notified MacDonald in writing that it was required as a result of the decision of the panel to deny the request for accidental disability retirement. Noting, however, that MacDonald was found by both the panel and the board to be permanently disabled and that he was a veteran with at least ten years of creditable service, the letter informed him that he was entitled to ordinary disability retirement benefits. Forms to effectuate such a retirement were enclosed. Finally, the letter informed MacDonald that if he were aggrieved by the board's decision he could appeal to the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) within fifteen days. That information was erroneous. Pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 16(3), any appeal would be to the District Court. See Bagley v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 397 Mass. 255, 258, 490 N.E.2d 1177 (1986); Campana v. Directors of Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 399 Mass. 492, 496 n. 12, 505 N.E.2d 510 (1987).
MacDonald did not fill out the ordinary disability retirement forms. Instead, he filed an appeal of the denial of the request for accidental disability retirement with CRAB. He neglected, however, to notify the commissioner of the appeal, and on November 1, 1990, without opposition from MacDonald, CRAB dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. No appeal was ever taken to the District Court.
MacDonald contended, in support of his motion for summary judgment, that, because the board denied the request for accidental disability retirement, he had the right to be reinstated in his former position. He based that claim on a statement made by a representative of the board in the course of the hearing before the board and on the language of the statute. The judge reviewed the statutes and the procedural history of the case and concluded that, although errors were made by the board, MacDonald was not entitled to reinstatement.
1. MacDonald's claim that he is entitled by statute to reinstatement. We briefly summarize the statutory background of the dispute. Apart from "superannuation" retirements, there are two types of retirements for which a State employee may apply: "ordinary disability" under G.L. c. 32, § 6; and "accidental disability" under G.L. c. 32, § 7. The requirement for favorable regional medical panel review as a prerequisite for either type of retirement is set forth in G.L. c. 32, § 6(3)(a ), and the section specially requires a determination for a § 7 retirement that the disability "might be the natural and proximate result of the accident or hazard undergone" in the performance of his duties. See note 5, supra.
In G.L. c. 32, § 16, the Legislature provided a mechanism by which a head of a department may seek the involuntary retirement of a State employee. To do so, according to § 16(1)(a), he "may file with the board on a prescribed form a written application for such retirement." Certain employees, of whom MacDonald was one, have the right in the event of such an application to a hearing before the board. The board may grant the department head's request for the employee's involuntary retirement. However, according to the language principally relied upon by MacDonald in G.L. c. 32, § 16(1)(c ), "[i]f the board finds that [the employee] should not be retired, he shall continue in his office or position without loss of compensation ... as though no such application had been made."
The commissioner filed an application specifically for MacDonald's accidental disability retirement. MacDonald contends that, under the statutes, that application could result in one of two alternatives: his accidental disability retirement or his reinstatement. To require MacDonald's retirement for an ordinary disability, MacDonald contends, a new involuntary retirement application would be necessary.
We think that is an incorrect interpretation of G.L. c. 32, § 16(1)(c ). It is true that G.L. c. 32, § 16(1)(a ), requires the commissioner to choose between the two types of retirement when filing his application. However, the commissioner, through his application, was necessarily seeking a determination from the board both that MacDonald was permanently disabled and that the disability was causally related to his work. By choosing an application for accidental disability retirement, which would have afforded MacDonald a more generous pension than ordinary disability retirement, the commissioner sought to benefit MacDonald. The underlying assumption, however, was that the commissioner had determined that MacDonald could no longer function as a police officer because of his permanent disability. It would have been unreasonable for MacDonald to have assumed, as he stated he did, that if he should be found to be permanently disabled, but not as a result of his MDC police work, that he could resume his employment. The board having decided, after the opportunity for a hearing on the issue, that an employee is permanently disabled, it would be wasteful and irrational to require a department head to reapply to the board for the employee's involuntary retirement on the basis of ordinary disability. Thus, it is not surprising that G.L. c. 16(1)(c ), provides for automatic reinstatement after a board decision only if the board finds the employee should not be retired. There was no finding by the board that MacDonald should not be retired. Neither the logic of the statutory scheme, nor the specific language of G.L. c. 32, § 16(1)(c ), supports MacDonald's claim of entitlement to reinstatement.
Nor were any of the statements made at the hearing 6 inconsistent with our analysis of the statutes or sufficient to create a reasonable belief on MacDonald's part that denial of accidental disability retirement would have resulted in his reinstatement. To the extent that the meaning of the statement relied upon is comprehensible, it suggests that if MacDonald should be found to be not disabled, "he is still Officer MacDonald." That statement would be consistent with the interpretation of the statute which we adopt.
2. The consequence of the board's misinformation about the proper avenue for review. The board, through its executive secretary, notified MacDonald by letter of its decision that he was permanently disabled but not entitled to accidental disability retirement. In the same letter he was offered an ordinary disability retirement. That decision was reviewable in the District Court within thirty days of the "certification." We assume the letter was made on the basis of a "certification" issued by the board in the regular course of its proceedings although the letter does not expressly so state. No such appeal was filed in the District Court. Instead, based on information contained in the decision letter from the board, MacDonald took an appeal to CRAB. The board's mistake was inexplicable and serious, and we assume MacDonald relied upon it. Nevertheless, we conclude that the error does not affect the rights of the parties. 7
A timely appeal to the District Court would not have provided MacDonald...
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