MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells

• Decision Date: 01 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-103.,02-103.
• Parties: MacDONOUGH-WEBSTER LODGE NO. 26, Free and Accepted Masons v. Michael and Laurie WELLS and Mark and Tammy Denison
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

834 A.2d 25

MacDONOUGH-WEBSTER LODGE NO. 26, Free and Accepted Masons v. Michael and Laurie WELLS and Mark and Tammy Denison

No. 02-103.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

August 1, 2003.

George T. Faris, IV of Law Offices of George Faris, IV, Shelburne, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert J. Perry of Perry, Schmucker & Goldsborough, South Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.

Present: AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE¹, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.

JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1. This dispute arises out of competing claims to ownership of land at the boundaries of a parcel owned and occupied by plaintiff MacDonough-Webster Lodge No. 26, Free and Accepted Masons. The Masons appeal both the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the lodge property qualifies for the charitable use exception to Vermont's adverse possession statute and the trial court's decisions on the merits finding that the Masons' neighbors, the Wells and the Denisons, had acquired certain strips of land located at the boundary of the Masons' property through adverse possession. We affirm in part and reverse in part. ¶ 2. The Masons brought a trespass action asking the court for a declaratory judgment fixing the boundaries of their property to stop certain uses by their neighbors. Their neighbors filed counterclaims contending that they have acquired title to some of the Masons' land by adverse possession. The Masons moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that 12 V.S.A. § 462, which exempts lands held "for a public, pious or charitable use" from claims of adverse possession, applied and shielded the Masons' property against their neighbors' claims. The neighbors also filed motions for partial summary judgment. The lower court found that § 462 was not triggered by the Masons' use of the lodge property, and granted partial summary judgment to the neighbors. Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court held that the Masons' neighbors had established, through adverse possession, title over several strips of land at the boundaries of their property and acquired a prescriptive easement for the use of the Masons' driveway.

I. The Exemption for "public, pious, or charitable use"

¶ 3. We begin by considering the threshold issue of the application of the charitable use exception to the Masons. We review the Masons' appeal from the superior court's grant of partial summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is granted only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bacon v. Lascelles, 165 Vt. 214, 218, 678 A.2d 902, 905 (1996). "[T]he nonmoving party is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences." Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 628, 587 A.2d 975, 979 (1991). We agree with the trial court that 12 V.S.A. § 462 does not protect the Masons' property from adverse possession claims, but we apply a slightly different rationale.

¶ 4. In rendering its decision on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court relied on our holding in Jarvis v. Gillespie, 155 Vt. 633, 641-44, 587 A.2d 981, 987-88 (1991). In Jarvis, we considered whether 12 V.S.A. § 462 automatically applies to any parcel of land owned by a municipality, no matter whether the land was open for a public use. We held that under some circumstances a fact finder could determine that a municipal property is not "given to a public use" and, in such case, the land would not be exempt by § 462 from a claim of adverse possession. Id. at 642-43, 587 A.2d at 987-88. Following Jarvis, the legal question as framed by the trial court in the case at bar became whether the Masons' primary use of their property benefitted the public, such that the land could be considered "given to a public use" in the Jarvis sense. On the facts alleged by the Masons, the lower court found that although the Masons use their property for some charitable uses, the principal use of the Masons' property is to benefit Lodge members, leaving the Masons subject to adverse possession claims.

¶ 5. We agree with the trial court's conclusion, but because the rules we enunciated in Jarvis applied to publicly owned property while the Masons' claim lies under the "charitable use" exception in 12 V.S.A. § 462, we clarify the relationship between public and charitable uses based on our interpretation of the statute and its legislative history. Section 462 exempts properties "given, granted, sequestered or appropriated to a public, pious or charitable use, or to lands belonging to the state" from Vermont's fifteen-year statute of limitations on ejectment actions, established by 12 V.S.A. § 501. This Court has interpreted the language of § 462 in the context of pious uses and public lands. See Chittenden v. Waterbury Ctr. Cmty. Church, 168 Vt. 478, 485-88, 726 A.2d 20, 25-27 (1998) (upholding "pious use" provision against an establishment clause challenge); In re .88 Acres, 165 Vt. 17, 19-20, 676 A.2d 778, 780 (1996) (applying § 462 to property dedicated to use for a town school); Jarvis, 155 Vt. at 642,587 A.2d at 987 (applying § 462 to municipal lands); Davis v. Union Meeting House Soc'y, 93 Vt. 520, 526, 108 A. 704, 707 (1920) (holding that predecessor statute to § 462 exempts lands held for pious use from susceptibility to adverse possession claims); Hazen v. Perkins, 92 Vt. 414, 420, 105 A. 249, 251 (1918) (applying predecessor statute to § 462 to public waterways). Application of § 462's "charitable use" language, however, presents a question of first impression.

¶ 6. When construing a statute, our obligation is to identify and implement the intent of the Legislature. Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999). In cases where the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of the statute. DJ Painting, Inc. v. Baraw Enters., 172 Vt. 239, 247, 776 A.2d 413, 420 (2001). In cases where the plain meaning of the words is not obvious, we look to the "whole of the statute and every part of it, its subject matter, the effect and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law." Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 170 Vt. 167, 171, 744 A.2d 422, 426 (1999) (internal quotations omitted). We favor interpretations of statutes that further fair, rational consequences. See Braun v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 167 Vt. 110, 117, 702 A.2d 124, 128 (1997) (statutes construed with presumption "that the Legislature does not intend an interpretation that would lead to absurd or irrational consequences"). In circumstances where the purpose and significance of a statute are unclear, we look to the statute's legislative history to "shed light" on its meaning. Sagar, 170 Vt. at 172, 744 A.2d at 426; see also Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 257-65, 692 A.2d 384, 391-95 (1997) (reviewing the "specific historical and legal origins" of the right to education in Vermont).

¶ 7. Section 462 dates back to the so-called quieting act of 1785, passed to address the widespread problem of defective land titles held by early Vermont settlers. 3 Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont 341 (E. Walton ed., 1875) (hereinafter 3 Records of the Governor and Council). The act set up a remedy whereby those with legal title had to pay for the land improvements made by ejected settlers. See "An Act for Settling Disputes Respecting Landed Property," June 17, 1785, reprinted in 14 State Papers of Vermont 17-20 (J.A. Williams ed., 1966) (hereinafter 14 State Papers).

¶ 8. We have not been able to identify any records discussing why the legislature of 1785 chose to include the following exception to the rules for the resolution of conflicting land claims: "[p]rovided always... that this act shall not extend to any persons settled on Lands granted or sequestered for public, pious, or charitable uses." Id. at 20. This exemption clause survives today in 12 V.S.A. § 462. The Vermont formulation is a variation on the traditional common law rule that protects public landowners at all governmental levels against adverse possession claims. See In re .88 Acres, 165 Vt. at 19-20, 676 A.2d at 780 ("Section 462 ... is Vermont's version of the generally accepted, common-law rule that a claim of title or right by adverse possession does not lie against public lands. The principal policy consideration behind this rule is that it would be injurious to the public to allow adverse possession of lands dedicated to public use.") (citations omitted); 16 R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 91.11[1]-[2], at 91-78 to 91-83 (M. Wolf ed.2001) (providing an overview of the common law prohibition on adverse possession against governmental entities). This case requires us to examine the relationship between the traditional common law "public use" exemption and § 462's "charitable use" clause.

¶ 9. An 1866 Missouri law adopted the "public, pious, and charitable" language from Vermont's quieting act. See Dudley v. Clark, 255 Mo. 570, 164 S.W. 608, 612 (1914) (noting that the statutory language came from Vermont's law). The Missouri version provides that "[n]othing contained in any statute of limitations shall extend to any lands given, granted, sequestered or appropriated to any public, pious or charitable use, or to any lands belonging to this state." Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.090 (2002). Because of the parallel language, the Court may properly consider the Missouri court's construction of the statute. See State v. Weller, 152 Vt. 8, 13, 563 A.2d 1318, 1321 (1989) ("Where there are similar statutes in other states, we look for guidance in the interpretations of those statutes.").

¶ 10. We find the Missouri Supreme Court's explanation of the policy behind their version of the law particularly persuasive. In Dudley v. Clark, the court noted:

Prior to [the enactment of § 516.090,] this state had, through its statutes, adopted the public policy of allowing the limitations to run against the state and municipalities. It was found to be a

...