Macias v. State, 90-0632

Decision Date28 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 90-0632,90-0632
Citation16 Fla. L. Weekly 114,572 So.2d 22
Parties16 Fla. L. Weekly 114 Jose MACIAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

David M. Lamos, Fort Pierce, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a corrected sentence increasing the length of mandatory minimum time to be served by appellant. We reverse. Jose Macias pled guilty to trafficking in cocaine. The state advised the court that the defendant had performed substantial assistance. On February 5, 1990, at sentencing, the court adjudicated defendant guilty, and noted that his conviction would normally carry a fifteen year mandatory minimum. The court sentenced the defendant to ten years in prison with three years minimum mandatory plus ten years probation and a $100,000 fine.

On February 9, 1990, the state filed a motion for clarification of sentence, stating that it had requested a mandatory minimum of ten years. It noted that the court sentenced defendant to ten years, but did not specify that it was to be served as the mandatory minimum. It requested the court to clarify that the ten year sentence was in fact a ten year mandatory minimum. On February 12, 1990, seven days after Macias began serving his sentence, the court held a hearing on the state's motion. Sixteen days after the trial court entered the original sentence, it signed an order nunc pro tunc to February 5, 1990, changing the sentence to ten years minimum mandatory.

In Cherry v. State, 439 So.2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the trial court imposed a sentence of three years, appellant began serving the sentence, and the trial court subsequently imposed a five year sentence. This court held that the trial court could not vacate the previous, legal sentence, and consequently remanded the case for reinstatement of the previous sentence.

This court noted in Cherry that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) permits a court to correct an illegal sentence at any time, and rule 3.800(b) allows revision of a legal sentence, but only insofar as it reduces the sentence. Although the prosecutor's opinion regarding the suggested sentence is important, the trial judge has the final decision on sentencing once the court has been advised that the defendant provided substantial assistance. In Cherry, this court concluded that once the statutory minimum had been properly eliminated, and the trial judge's discretion properly exercised, the original sentence was legal. Hence rule 3.800(a) did not authorize a motion to increase the sentence.

This court also pointed out in Cherry that in addition to lacking authority under the rules, an increase of a lawful sentence is expressly prohibited by case law and constitutes...

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7 cases
  • Gartrell v. State, 91-0545
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 25, 1992
    ...defendant to nine years imprisonment. The increase of a legal sentence upon resentencing constitutes double jeopardy. Macias v. State, 572 So.2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). See also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b) (revision of a legal sentence allowed but only insofar as it reduces the sentence). Howeve......
  • People v. Sandoval
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • June 11, 1998
    ...solely to conform to or clarify its original intent. See United States v. Naas, supra; Borum v. United States, supra; cf. Macias v. State, 572 So.2d 22 (Fla.App.1990) (trial court impermissibly increased sentence when, sixteen days after original sentence, it attempted to correct its oversi......
  • Gonzalez v. State, 91-1861
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 21, 1992
    ...double jeopardy. Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So.2d 857 (Fla.1973); Hinton v. State, 446 So.2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)."); Macias v. State, 572 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("[A]n increase of a lawful sentence is expressly prohibited by case law and constitutes double jeopardy."); Berry v. State,......
  • Evans v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 19, 1996
    ...Such a sentence would constitute double jeopardy. Id.; see also Hinton v. State, 446 So.2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Macias v. State, 572 So.2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). In Hill v. State, 652 So.2d 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the trial court failed to orally pronounce a ten-year mandatory minimum ......
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