Mack v. Cultural Care Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11530-ADB |
| Parties | AMANDA MACK, Plaintiff, v. CULTURAL CARE INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff Amanda Mack ("Plaintiff") brings this putative class action against Defendant Cultural Care ("Defendant"), alleging that Defendant double charged Plaintiff and au pairs for travel costs associated with both international airfare and transitioning the au pairs from Defendant's training school to their host families. [ECF No. 24 ("Second Amended Complaint" or "SAC")]. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. [ECF No. 26]. For the reasons explained herein, the motion, [ECF No. 26], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
For purposes of this motion, the relevant facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Defendant operates an exchange program that connects au pairs from foreign countries with host families in the United States. [SAC ¶ 15]. On March 4, 2018, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Defendant would provide an au pair from China that would live in Plaintiff's home in Massachusetts and care for her children. [Id. ¶¶ 1, 23; ECF Nos. 24-1, 24-2]. The terms of the agreement were included in the Host Family Agreement, [ECF No. 24-1], and the fee arrangement for Defendant's services was set forth in the Host Family Financial Responsibility Agreement, [ECF No. 24-2], (together, "the Agreement"). According to the Agreement, the Program Fee for a new family seeking an au pair was $8,695.00 and the Domestic Transportation Fee was between $0.00 and $300.00, depending on the location of the host family. [ECF No. 24-2 at 3]. The Agreement did not provide any further definition of the Program Fee or the Domestic Transportation Fee. [ECF No. 24-2 at 3; SAC ¶¶ 30, 34].
Because the Program Fee and Domestic Transportation Fee were left undefined, Plaintiff looked to Defendant's website for more information. [SAC ¶ 35]. Regarding the Domestic Transportation fee, the website explained that "[t]he [D]omestic [T]ransportation [F]ee covers an au pair's transportation to their host family's home from the Au Pair Training School in NY." [Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis in original) (quoting Our Pricing, Cultural Care Au Pair, https://culturalcare.com/pricing (Plaintiff last visited July 10, 2019))]. Regarding the Program Fee, the website provided that the "Program [F]ee includes recruitment and screening, Training School, matching services, orientation, round-trip international airfare, travel medical insurance coverage and year-long support from your local childcare consultant." [Id. ¶ 36 (emphasis in original) (quoting Our Pricing, Cultural Care Au Pair, https://culturalcare.com/pricing (Plaintiff last visited July 10, 2019))]. The website's Frequently Asked Questions section further explained that "[t]he [P]rogram [F]ee covers [Defendant's] upfront costs—a portion of the recruitment, screening and preparation of your au pair; your au pair's training at the Au PairTraining School; host family and au pair orientations; international airfare; a full year of medical and travel insurance; training materials—and year-long support from Cultural Care office staff and your local childcare consultant." [Id. ¶ 38 (emphasis in original) (quoting Frequently Asked Questions, Cultural Care Au Pair, https://culturalcare.com/frequently-asked-questions/ (Plaintiff last visited May 21, 2019))]. Plaintiff therefore "believed that the [P]rogram [F]ee and [D]omestic [T]ransportation [F]ee . . . included the full amount of [an au pair's travel expenses]." [Id. ¶ 44].
Plaintiff paid the Program Fee and the Domestic Transportation Fee of $100.00 for the au pair's transportation from New York City to Plaintiff's home in Boston and the au pair successfully executed the duties set forth in the Agreement from July 2018 until June 2019. [SAC ¶¶ 31, 47-48; ECF No. 32 at 2; ECF No. 35 at 12].
Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Defendant had similar agreements with au pairs, who were also required to pay a program fee which allegedly "include[s]" and "cover[s]" the au pair's travel costs. [SAC ¶ 54]. Defendant's website for au pairs in China states that the cost includes travel costs from designated departure cities to the United States, as well as transportation costs from the training school to the host families' homes. [Id. ¶ 55]. The au pair websites for other countries provide similar arrangements. See [id. ¶¶ 56-59].
Plaintiff claims that Defendant misrepresented the nature of its fees and led Plaintiff to believe that she would be paying the au pair's travel costs in their entirety and that her au pair would therefore not be charged for her travel costs. [SAC ¶¶ 6, 39-40]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions constituted a breach of contract and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith, or, if the Court determines that there is no enforceable contract, unjust enrichment. [SAC ¶¶ 73-106]. Plaintiff additionally brings a claim under Massachusetts General LawsChapter 93A. [Id.]. At the root of Plaintiff's claims is the allegation that the Defendant either double charged her au pair for the same fee or misrepresented the nature of the fees, which in either case, "induced Plaintiff . . . to pay more than [she] would have reasonably paid for the [P]rogram [F]ee and [D]omestic [T]ransportation [F]ee." [Id. ¶ 7].
Plaintiff filed her original complaint on July 12, 2019. [ECF No. 1]. With the agreement of Defendant, [ECF No. 11 at 2], Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 14, 2019, [ECF No. 16]. Again, with the agreement of Defendant, [ECF No. 11 at 2], Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Compmlaint on September 30, 2019, [SAC]. Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on October 21, 2019. [ECF No. 26]. Plaintiff opposed on November 18, 2019, [ECF No. 32], and Defendant filed a reply, [ECF No. 35].
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019). "[D]etailed factual allegations" are not required, but the complaint must set forth "more than labels and conclusions," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and must contain "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory," Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The alleged facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
"To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability." Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A determination of plausibility is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. at 44 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible." Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011)). "The plausibility standard invites a two-step pavane." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45). First, the Court "must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited)." Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Second, the Court "must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a 'reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz, 676 F.3d at 224).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents outside of the pleadings, "'the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties,' making narrow exceptions to the general rule 'for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.'" Álvarez-Maurás v. Banco Popular of P.R., 919 F.3d 617, 622-23 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)).
Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because Plaintiff signed a release as part of the Agreement. [ECF No. 27 at 12-14]. Therefore, for each claim, the Court begins by considering whether Plaintiff has waived the claim.
The release clauses do not bar the Plaintiff's breach of contract claims. "Releases are a form of contract." A.J. Properties, LLC v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Mass. 2013). Because the parties agree that the Agreement included a choice-of-law provision that specified that the Agreement would be governed by Massachusetts law, the Court applies Massachusetts law in interpreting the Agreement. See [SAC ¶ 14; ECF No. 24-1]; see generally [ECF No. 27]. In Massachusetts, "in the absence of fraud a person may make a valid contract exempting himself from any liability to another which he may in the future incur as a result of his negligence or that of his agents or employees acting...
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