Macneil v. Trambert

• Decision Date: 18 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2-09-0873.,2-09-0873.
• Citation: 342 Ill.Dec. 314,401 Ill.App.3d 1077,932 N.E.2d 441
• Parties: David F. MacNEIL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael TRAMBERT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

401 Ill.App.3d 1077

932 N.E.2d 441

342 Ill.Dec. 314

David F. MacNEIL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Michael TRAMBERT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-09-0873.

Appellate Court of Illinois,Second District.

June 3, 2010.

As corrected June 18, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Douglas c. Tibble, Brooks, Tarulis, Schaffer & Tibble, LLC, Naperville, IL; Robert C. Aument, Timothy M. Schaum, Daspin & Aument, LLP, Chicago, IL, for David F. MacNeil.

Ronald D. Menna Jr., David W. Inlander, Fischel & Kahn, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Michael Trambert.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, David F. MacNeil, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against defendant, Dr. Michael Trambert, pursuant to sections 2-301 and 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-619(a)(1) (West 2008)), for lack of in personam jurisdiction. On appeal, MacNeil argues that the trial court erred in finding that section 2-209(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a) (West 2008)) does not confer personal jurisdiction over Trambert. We affirm.

In November 2008, Trambert listed a 2007 Toyota Land Cruiser (the vehicle) for sale on the Internet website, eBay. On November 27, the auction of the vehicle ended and Trambert was notified by e-mail that MacNeil was the successful bidder. The terms of the eBay contract included a “Shipping” clause, which read “Buyer responsible for vehicle pick-up or shipping.” The contract also indicated “Santa Barbara, CA, United States” as the “Item location.” On December 3, MacNeil communicated with Trambert by e-mail, informing him that a cashier's check drawn on an Illinois bank was being sent via FedEx to MacNeil's agent in California. In the same e-mail, MacNeil requested a bill of sale made to “142 High Country LLC, Telluride, CO 81435.”

On December 5, 2008, MacNeil and Trambert communicated via e-mail regarding the mileage on the vehicle. On December 8, MacNeil's agent inspected the vehicle in California and accepted delivery. During the inspection, MacNeil was on the telephone with his agent. On the same day, Trambert delivered title and possession of the vehicle to MacNeil's agent in return for full payment delivered by the agent. At MacNeil's direction, his agent delivered the vehicle to Colorado a short time later. On December 27, Trambert received an e-mail from MacNeil indicating that the vehicle had been delivered to Telluride, Colorado.

MacNeil paid a total of $38,100 for the vehicle. When MacNeil personally inspected the vehicle, he discovered that it did not have a satellite radio or DVD screens in the headrests.

On February 9, 2009, MacNeil, an Illinois resident, filed a complaint in small-claims court in Du Page County, Illinois, claiming breach of contract in that the eBay description of the vehicle stated that it had DVD screens in the headrests of the front seats and a satellite radio system. MacNeil alleged that the cost of the two items was $2,546. On April 24, 2009, Trambert filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to sections 2-301 and 2-619(a)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-619(a)(1) (West 2008)), alleging that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Trambert argued that he did not have the necessary minimum contacts with Illinois to support the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.

On July 28, 2009, the trial court granted Trambert's motion to dismiss, finding that “the mere formation of an on-line contract in the defendant's limited e-mail and telephonic correspondence with the Illinois plaintiff regarding that contract * * * are by themselves insufficient to establish minimum contacts with Illinois, and the defendant did not purposely direct any eBay sales * * * specifically toward Illinois residents or use Ebay to establish the regular business in Illinois.” The trial court also found that the “Effects Doctrine cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction because analysis only applies to intentional tort [ sic ]” and not to the breach-of-contract action.

Plaintiff timely appealed the trial court's order granting Trambert's motion to dismiss.

ANALYSIS

Initially, we note that although Trambert has not filed an appellee's brief, the record is short and we may decide the merits of the appeal under the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). See People v. Cosby, 231 Ill.2d 262, 285, 325 Ill.Dec. 556, 898 N.E.2d 603 (2008).

The issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Trambert pursuant to section 2-209(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a) (West 2008)). MacNeil asserts that personal jurisdiction over Trambert is proper because Trambert transacted business in Illinois and entered into a contract substantially connected with Illinois.

A plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for jurisdiction when seeking jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Bolger v. Nautica International, Inc., 369 Ill.App.3d 947, 949, 308 Ill.Dec. 335, 861 N.E.2d 666 (2007). When, as here, the trial court decides the issue of personal jurisdiction based solely on documentary evidence, our standard of review is de novo. Bolger, 369 Ill.App.3d at 949-50, 308 Ill.Dec. 335, 861 N.E.2d 666, citing Keller v. Henderson, 359 Ill.App.3d 605, 611, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930 (2005). A reviewing court addressing a challenge to personal jurisdiction must resolve in favor of the plaintiff any conflicts in the pleadings and affidavits (Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill.App.3d 49, 56, 258 Ill.Dec. 628, 756 N.E.2d 902 (2001)); however, a plaintiff's prima facie case for jurisdiction can be overcome by a defendant's uncontroverted evidence that defeats jurisdiction.

Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 611, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930. If we decide that a plaintiff has made a prima facie case for jurisdiction over a defendant, we must then determine if a material evidentiary conflict exists. Viktron Ltd. Partnership v. Program Data, Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d 111, 116, 259 Ill.Dec. 706, 759 N.E.2d 186 (2001). If a material conflict does exist, then we must remand the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary proceeding. Viktron Ltd. Partnership, 326 Ill.App.3d at 116, 259 Ill.Dec. 706, 759 N.E.2d 186.

Section 2-209(c) of the Code provides that a court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2008). In other words, section 2-209(c) of the Code is coextensive with the due process requirements of the Illinois and United States Constitutions and, therefore, provides an independent basis for a court to exercise jurisdiction. Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., 357 Ill.App.3d 381, 387, 293 Ill.Dec. 150, 827 N.E.2d 1031 (2005). Accordingly, our analysis will focus on whether MacNeil has established that federal and Illinois due process requirements have been met. Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 612, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930 (stating that, because section 2-209(c) of the Code and due process requirements are coextensive, it is “wholly unnecessary” for a court to consider whether a defendant performed any of the acts enumerated in the Code).

For personal jurisdiction to satisfy federal due process requirements, a defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state so that maintaining suit there would not offend “ ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” Spartan Motors, Inc. v. Lube Power, Inc., 337 Ill.App.3d 556, 560, 272 Ill.Dec. 74, 786 N.E.2d 613 (2003), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278, 283 (1940). Stated differently, once a court decides that a defendant has purposely established minimum contacts with a forum state, those contacts should be considered in light of other factors to determine whether asserting personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 543 (1985). The minimum-contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction must be based on some act by which a defendant purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within a state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Spartan Motors, 337 Ill.App.3d at 560, 272 Ill.Dec. 74, 786 N.E.2d 613. The purposeful-availment requirement exists to ensure that an alien defendant will not be forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum solely as a result of random or attenuated contacts or the unilateral act of a consumer or third person. Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 613, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930, citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d at 542. Finally, a court engaging in a federal due process analysis must consider whether (1) the nonresident defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state such that there was “fair warning” that the nonresident defendant may be haled into court in that state; (2) the action arose out of or was related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (3) it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum state. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471-77, 105 S.Ct. at 2181-84, 85 L.Ed.2d at 540-44.

In addition, the “minimum contacts” necessary for personal jurisdiction depends on whether the forum asserts general or specific jurisdiction. Keller, 359 Ill.App.3d at 613, 296 Ill.Dec. 125, 834 N.E.2d 930. In his complaint, MacNeil averred that he saw advertisements for the vehicle only on eBay, and the record is devoid of evidence that Trambert's general business contacts with Illinois were continuous and systematic. Thus, MacNeil could not establish general jurisdiction. See McGill v. Gigantex...