Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, COCA-COLA

• Decision Date: 05 May 1960
• Docket Number: COCA-COLA,No. 20845,20845
• Citation: 114 S.E.2d 517,216 Ga. 61
• Parties: MACONBOTTLING CO. v. Mrs. Marvin CHANCEY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 517

114 S.E.2d 517

216 Ga. 61

MACON COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. v. Mrs. Marvin CHANCEY.

No. 20845.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 5, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The charge complained of was abstractly correct, was an accurate statement of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and was adjusted to the pleadings and evidence in this case.

2. It is not sufficient to carry the case to the jury for the plaintiff, in an action for damages resulting from drinking from a bottle containing a foreign substance in the beverage, to prove that the defendant bottled and placed in the hands of a retailer the bottled drink, and that a foreign substance was in it when the plaintiff drank from it; but there must be evidence to authorize the jury to find that the bottle was in the same condition when the plaintiff drank from it as when it left the manufacturer's control.

3. There was sufficient evidence to authorize the jury to find that the tobacco was in the bottle at the time the bottling company delivered it to the retailer from whom the plaintiff purchased it.

This case is here on grant of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in the case of Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 101 Ga.App. 166, 112 S.E.2d 811. The petition seeks damages for personal injuries resulting from the plaintiff's allegedly drinking a Coca-Cola containing a cigar butt, which had been bottled and placed in a store-keeper's hands for sale to the public by the defendant.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals pointed out numerous decisions of that court involving tort actions for damages resulting from the unexplained explosions of bottles containing Coca-Cola or other beverages, and the unexplained presence of foreign substances in the contents of such bottles, which appeared to it to be in conflict, one line of cases holding that '* * * the case may be submitted to the jury on the question of the negligence of the bottler of a beverage such as Coca-Cola sold in a bottle or other sealed container where the proof shows no more than the actual presence of the foreign substance in the beverage at the time it was purchased and consumed by the plaintiff,' and another that there must be evidence from which the jury could infer that the bottle was in the same condition when it left the bottler's possession as it was when it exploded or was found to contain a foreign substance. The court based its affirmance on its conclusion that it is sufficient to carry the case to the jury where the proof shows no more than that the defendant bottled the drink and that the foreign substance was in it when the plaintiff opened it. In view of apparently conflicting opinions of the Court of Appeals on this issue, and there being no ruling of this court on the question, and because we did not agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, certiorari was granted.

Miller, Miller & Miller, Popper & Popper, Macon, for plaintiff in error.

S. Gus Jones, Neal D. McKenney, Jones & McKenney, Durward B. Mercer, Macon, for defendant in error.

MOBLEY, Justice.

1. In the petition for certiorari, exception is made to the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the following charge: 'I charge you that where something unusual happens with respect to a defendant's property, over which the defendant has control, an inference may arise that the injury was due to the defendant's negligence. The inference which may in some cases arise from an unexplained occurrence, which has worked an injury to another, that the defendant who had in charge the instrumentality which was the direct cause of the injury was guilty of negligence, may or may not be drawn by the jury, but, like a fact of negligence or no negligence, the inference which the jury may be authorized to draw is peculiarly an inference of fact, and is peculiarly for the jury to determine under all the surrounding facts and circumstances as you find them to have existed at the time and place of this alleged occurrence.

'I charge you further that where an event is unusual and extraordinary in its nature, and there is nothing to indicate an independent efficient cause, but the peculiar character of the event is sufficient within itself to indicate that it must have been brought about by negligence upon the part of someone, and where the most reasonable and probable inference that can be rationally drawn from the happening of such an event is that it would not and could not have taken place had not the company charged with the manufacture of the instrumentality causing the injury alleged to have followed such an event been guilty of the particular acts or omissions set forth by the plaintiff, as constituting the actual cause, then the jury, in your judgment and discretion, would be authorized to apply the rule of evidence known as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in determining whether or not the accident must have been thus occasioned.'

Code § 38-123 provides: 'In arriving at a verdict, the jury, from facts proved, and sometimes from the absence of counter evidence, may infer the existence of other facts reasonably and logically consequent on those proved.' The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is embraced in this section and its application authorized by it. Cochrell v. Langley Mfg. Co., 5 Ga.App. 317, 322, 63 S.E.244. The section is a codification of the rules laid down in Brown v. Matthews, 79 Ga. 1, 8, 4 S.E. 13, 15, where Justice Bleckley, speaking for the court, said, 'Frequently among the facts best proven is one which no witness has mentioned in his testimony, such fact being an inference from other facts'; and in White v. Hammond, 79 Ga. 182, 4 S.E. 102, 103, where the court said: 'In construing and applying testimony, reasonable inferences and deductions may be made, and conclusions may be reached that lie quite beyond the mere letter of the evidence'; and in Beall v. State, 68 Ga. 820(1), and Castleberry v. City of Atlanta, 74 Ga. 164(2), where the court held that the jury might make inferences from the facts proved.

While, as stated by Judge Hill in Cochrell v. Langley Mfg. Co., 5 Ga.App. 317, 322, 63 S.E 244, 247, supra, the maxim res ipsa loquitur 'has been a prolific inspiration to much useless and wasted juridic erudition,' and there is confusion as to the subject among the courts of this country, as further pointed out by Judge Hill, 'Practically * * * the doctrine is simply a rule of circumstantial evidence which permits an inference to be drawn from proved facts. It furnishes a working basis for reasonable hypothetical conjecture, and gives scope for legitimate reasoning by the jury.'

Judge Jenkins, speaking for the court, said in Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Danneman, 25 Ga.App. 43(1), 102 S.E. 542: '* * * where the event is unusual and extraordinary in its nature, and there is nothing to indicate an external cause, but the peculiar character of the accident is sufficient within itself to indicate that it must have been brought about by negligence on the part of some one, and where the most reasonable and probable inference which can be rationally drawn from the happening of such an event is that it would not and could not have taken place, had not the person charged with furnishing or maintaining the instrumentality causing the accident been guilty of the particular acts or omissions set forth by the plaintiff as constituting the actual cause, then the jury is authorized to apply the rule of evidence known as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in determining whether or not the accident must have been thus occasioned (Central Railway Co. v. Blackman, 7 Ga.App. 766, 68 S.E. 339(5)); and if the jury should decide that it had been thus brought about, and should further determine that such causal acts or omissions on the part of the defendant constituted negligence, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. Augusta Railway & Electric Co. v. Weekly, 124 Ga. 384 (52 S.E. 444 ). The contention of plaintiff in error in this case that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot have application, unless, in the opinion of the jury, the circumstances are such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis as to the cause of the accident save the alleged negligence of the defendant, is met under the foregoing rule. Just as in civil cases facts are proved by a mere preponderance of evidence, so in the application of this doctrine, if in the opinion of the jury the most reasonable and most probable inference which can be drawn from the nature and character of such an extraordinary event is that it would not and could not have happened, had not the defendant been guilty of the particular conduct charged, then there has been an exclusion in their minds of every other reasonable hypothesis, not by evidence, but by virtue of the peculiar nature and character of the event speaking for itself.'

In Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842, 47 S.E. 329, 330, this court said: 'The maxim res ipsa loquitur is simply a rule of evidence. The general rule is that negligence is never presumed from the mere fact of injury, yet the manner of the occurrence of the injury complained of, or the attendant circumstances, may sometimes well warrant an...