Madden v. Jeffes

• Decision Date: 05 October 1984
• Citation: 482 A.2d 1162,85 Pa.Cmwlth. 414
• Parties: Dale S. MADDEN et al., Petitioners, v. Glen R. JEFFES, Commissioner for Bureau of Corrections et al., Respondents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 1162

482 A.2d 1162 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 414 Dale S. MADDEN et al., Petitioners,
v.
Glen R. JEFFES, Commissioner for Bureau of Corrections et
al., Respondents. Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted on Briefs July 3, 1984.
Decided Oct. 5, 1984.

Page 1164

[85 Pa.Cmwlth. 415] Dale S. Madden and Wilmer B. Gay, petitioners, pro se.

Sheila M. Ford, Allen C. Warshaw, Deputy Attys. Gen., Chief, Sp. Litigation, Pittsburgh, for respondents.

Before CRAIG, PALLADINO and BARBIERI, JJ.

CRAIG, Judge.

Plaintiffs Dale Madden and Wilmer Gay are serving life sentences at the State Correctional Institute at Pittsburgh (SCIP), and are on the Board of Directors of Pennsylvania Association of Lifers (PAL), a nonprofit organization incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania for the purpose of advancing rehabilitation and other constructive programs in the state correction system.

Following a theft of PAL assets, the defendant prison officials suspended all PAL activities and confiscated all PAL assets. Although the record does not clearly establish exactly what "suspension" of PAL activities entailed, we gather that the prison officials prohibited inmates from conducting any corporate [85 Pa.Cmwlth. 416] business, but did not actually order the dissolution of the corporation.

Plaintiffs have filed this complaint in mandamus, addressed to this court's original jurisdiction, seeking an order to compel defendants to (1) lift the suspension of PAL activities, (2) refund an estimated $700 per month in lost revenues for each month of suspension, (3) refrain from enforcing any prison rules in conflict with PAL's corporate charter in the absence of a security problem. The named defendants are Glen Jeffes, the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections, Ronald Marks, the former commissioner, George Petsock, Superintendent of SCIP, the Commonwealth Bureau of Correction and SCIP.

This matter is currently before us on preliminary objections of the defendants, who challenge our subject matter jurisdiction over the action and otherwise demur to the plaintiffs' complaint. ¹

We must, of course, first address the question of our original jurisdiction, governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a), which provides in part:

(a) General Rule--the Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity ....

[85 Pa.Cmwlth. 417] That jurisdictional criterion applies to mandamus actions. Mallard Associates v. Pennsylvania Department of Health, 64 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 208, 439 A.2d 866 (1982).

In Staley v. Commonwealth, 33 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 22, 380 A.2d 515 (1977), we held that, for jurisdictional purposes, the commissioner of the Commonwealth Bureau of Corrections is an "officer." Therefore, we have original jurisdiction over the actions against the defendants who are named as having acted in their official capacity as commissioners of the Bureau of Correction. ²

Page 1165

We also held in Staley that the superintendent of a state correctional institution, who is not charged with the requisite kind of statewide policymaking responsibility, Mickens v. Jeffes, 71 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 68, 453 A.2d 1092 (1983), is an employee rather than an officer. Accord Bass v. Cuyler, 36 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 74, 387 A.2d 964 (1978). However, the claim against Superintendent Petsock is ancillary to the claims against Commonwealth parties and, therefore, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c), we may also exercise original jurisdiction over that claim despite the superintendent's status as employee. Tokar v. Department of Transportation, 480 Pa. 598, 391 A.2d 1046 (1978).

[85 Pa.Cmwlth. 418] The requirements for stating a cause of action in mandamus to compel performance of a ministerial act are familiar. Petitioners must establish that they have a clear legal right, that the respondents have a corresponding legal duty, and that there is no other adequate or appropriate remedy at law. Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417, 211 A.2d 503 (1965). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and will not lie to compel the performance of discretionary acts except where the exercise or non-exercise of discretion is arbitrary, fraudulent or based upon a mistaken view of the law. South Whitehall Township v. Department of Transportation, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 558, 316 A.2d 104 (1974).

The defendants argue that the prisoners had no right to establish PAL initially, and therefore that the defendants had no corresponding duty to insure its continued...