Maddick v. Deshon
| Citation | 296 S.W.3d 519 |
| Decision Date | 10 November 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 70335.,WD 70335. |
| Parties | Joseph Lee MADDICK, Respondent, v. Roberta (Sue) Ann DESHON, (Formerly Roberta (Sue) Ann Maddick), Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jennifer S. Wagner, Esq., Liberty, MO, for appellant.
Scott L. Campbell, Esq., Platte CityMo, for respondent.
Before: ALOK AHUJA, P.J., and JAMES M. SMART, JR. and LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JJ.
Roberta DeShon (formerly Maddick) appeals the trial court's judgment granting Joseph Maddick's motion to modify the decree dissolving their marriage to expressly terminate Mr. Maddick's maintenance payments to Ms. DeShon upon her remarriage. The judgment is affirmed.
Respondent Joseph Maddick ("Husband") and Appellant Roberta DeShon ("Wife") were married in July 1983. Their marriage was dissolved in October 2003. The judgment included a provision requiring Husband to pay Wife periodic, modifiable maintenance of $500 per month.
A year later, the parties entered into a stipulation to modify the judgment. The parties agreed that the child of the marriage had become emancipated. The parties also agreed that Wife's expenses had increased. The stipulation also provided:
The parties agree that the periodic modifiable maintenance should be increased to the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) per month, effective September 1, 2004, for a period of seven (7) years as non-modifiable contractual maintenance.... The maintenance obligation herein should terminate upon Respondent's death.
(Emphasis added.)
On October 26, 2004, the court entered a modified judgment setting forth the stipulation. The court then decreed:
That the Petitioner shall pay to Respondent the sum of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) per month for non-modifiable contractual maintenance. Said payments shall commence September 1, 2004, for a period of seven (7) years as non-modifiable contractual maintenance.... Said maintenance obligation shall only terminate upon the death of Respondent or September 30, 2011, whichever occurs first.
(Emphasis added.)
Wife remarried on September 29, 2007. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed a motion to again modify the dissolution decree. He alleged that Wife's remarriage constituted a substantial and continuing change of circumstances, and sought to have his maintenance obligation terminated as of the date of Wife's remarriage.
After hearing evidence in September 2008, the circuit court entered its Judgment Modifying Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. The court sustained Husband's motion to terminate maintenance after finding "that there was no written agreement or court order extending [Husband's] obligation to pay maintenance past the date of [Wife's] remarriage."
Wife appeals.
As in any court-tried case, the judgment will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or misapplies the law. Tucker v. Tucker, 124 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Mo.App.2004) (citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)).
The issue in this case is whether the parties' written stipulation or the October 2004 modified judgment rebuts the statutory presumption, created by § 452.370.3,1 that maintenance terminates upon the receiving spouse's remarriage. Wife contends that the unambiguous language of both the stipulation and the modified judgment rebuts the statutory presumption and obligates Husband to continue paying maintenance despite her remarriage. Alternatively, Wife argues that the language in the stipulation was ambiguous, and that the court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence that would have resolved the ambiguity.
Section 452.370.3 provides in relevant part:
Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.
This section "creates a rebuttable presumption that the obligation to pay statutory maintenance terminates upon the remarriage of the receiving party or the death of either party." Cates v. Cates, 819 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Mo. banc 1991).
Wife claims that the § 452.370.3 presumption was sufficiently rebutted here, because: (1) the judgment specifically stated that only two events would result in termination of the contractual, non-modifiable maintenance, and neither of those events (the expiration of time or Wife's death) has occurred; and (2) the parties' stipulation specified the events that would terminate maintenance, and remarriage was not one of them. We disagree.
Wife emphasizes that the modified judgment expressly sets forth the "only" two events which would terminate Husband's maintenance obligation. She argues that the court expressly provided the exclusive circumstances which would terminate Husband's maintenance obligation, and thereby excluded Wife's remarriage as a termination event. Thus, according to Wife, the judgment "expressly provides" that maintenance will not terminate upon her remarriage.
Wife's argument is not without force. The trial court's modified judgment purports to specify the "only" events which will terminate Husband's obligation to pay maintenance. By expressly (and seemingly exhaustively) cataloguing the circumstances in which maintenance will terminate, and including in that listing only one of the three termination events listed in § 452.370.3, it is at least arguable that the court "expressly provided otherwise" than the presumptive statutory scheme (under which maintenance terminates on the death of either spouse, or the recipient spouse's remarriage).
We do not write on a blank slate, however. Despite the appeal of Wife's argument, we believe it is foreclosed by controlling Missouri decisions construing § 452.370.3. While none of those cases involves language of a decree purporting to identify the "only" circumstances in which maintenance will terminate, their reading of § 452.370.3 requires a decree to expressly extend maintenance beyond remarriage before the statutory presumption is defeated. Giving the language of those cases its plain meaning, a decree must expressly and affirmatively provide that maintenance continues beyond the events listed in § 452.370.3, or else the occurrence of those events will terminate the paying spouse's obligations.
Thus, in Cates, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted § 452.370.3 to provide that the statutory presumption is rebutted "by a decree of dissolution expressly extending the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance beyond the death of either party or the remarriage of the receiving party." 819 S.W.2d at 734 (emphasis added); id. at 736 ().
Two years later, the Supreme Court interpreted Cates as holding that, "[b]ecause the decree and separation agreement did not address the effect of remarriage, this Court ... concluded that the statute should control and that the payments should terminate." Glenn v. Snider, 852 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Mo. banc 1993) (emphasis added).
Later appellate decisions repeat Cates' reading of § 452.370.3: a dissolution decree must expressly provide that maintenance continues beyond the receiving spouse's remarriage or the death of either spouse in order to defeat the statutory presumption:
• "To rebut the presumption of termination, the parties must clearly and expressly state in writing or the court's dissolution decree must expressly state that the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance extends beyond the death of either party." Estate of Mackie, 261 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Mo.App. W.D.2008).2
• "Cates and subsequent cases discussing the `unambiguous language' of section 452.370.3 clearly put `careful drafter[s]' on notice that if the parties so intend, section 452.370.3 requires that the parties must state such intent in writing or the court's decree must expressly provide the maintenance obligation extends beyond remarriage or death." Tucker v. Tucker, 124 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) ().
• "Where the decree and separation agreement are silent with respect to the effect of remarriage on the maintenance obligation, no further inquiry into the intent of the parties concerning maintenance is permitted; the statute controls and the obligation is terminated." Reeves v. Reeves, 890 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo.App. E.D.1994) ().3
As we read these plain (and repeated) holdings, in order to rebut the statutory presumption that maintenance terminates upon the receiving spouse's remarriage, a dissolution decree must expressly refer to the receiving spouse's possible future remarriage, and must expressly provide that maintenance payments shall continue beyond that contingency.
Although not dispositive, this reading of § 452.370.3 is confirmed by the uniform statute from which the Missouri provision is derived, and by cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted similar provisions. The relevant language of § 452.370.3 is adopted from § 316(b) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A Part II U.L.A. 102 (1998). The comment to § 316(b) makes clear that the statutory presumption will only be defeated by an affirmative statement in a dissolution decree extending maintenance beyond remarriage or death:
Subsection (b) authorizes the parties to agree in writing or the court to provide in the de[c]ree that maintenance will continue beyond the death...
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