Cates v. Cates, 73368

• Decision Date: 19 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 73368,73368
• Citation: 819 S.W.2d 731
• Parties: Rochelle M. CATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry D. CATES, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 731

819 S.W.2d 731

Rochelle M. CATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry D. CATES, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 73368.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Nov. 19, 1991.

Stephen L. Shepard, Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Rob J. Aiken, Springfield, for defendant-respondent.

ROBERTSON, Chief Justice.

Here we consider whether the remarriage of a former spouse terminates an obligation to pay the remaining monthly installments of a lump sum maintenance award when the decree of dissolution and the separation agreement are silent on that issue. The trial court sustained the husband's Motion to Quash Garnishment, holding that the wife's remarriage terminates the husband's obligation to continue payment. The Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed. We granted transfer to resolve the conflict that appears throughout appellate decisions, of which the southern district's opinion in this case and Mika v. Mika, 728 S.W.2d 280 (Mo.App.1987), are representative. We have jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The Circuit Court of Greene County dissolved the marriage of Larry and Rochelle Cates on May 24, 1988. The trial court's decree found "[t]here is a necessity to award maintenance in gross to Petitioner [Rochelle], in the amount of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred ($7,800) Dollars, payable at the rate of Three Hundred Twenty Five ($325) Dollars per month ... as more specifically set out in the Property Settlement and Separation Agreement" and ordered Larry to pay accordingly. The decree approved and incorporated the Property Settlement and Separation Agreement (separation agreement), finding that agreement "fair and not unconscionable."

The separation agreement stated in pertinent part:

5. Maintenance. Husband acknowledges certain obligations to Wife that have arisen from the marital relationship, and the parties, after giving due consideration to all relevant factors for the award of maintenance, including those set forth in RSMo. 453.335, the difference in earning power between them, the need for maintenance and the benefits that would have accrued to Wife from the continuation of the marriage, agree that the Wife is entitled to maintenance. Accordingly, Husband shall pay to Wife, as maintenance in gross, the sum of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred ($7,800.00) Dollars, payable at the rate of Three Hundred Twenty Five ($325.00) Dollars per month....

* * * * * *

The parties acknowledge that the above described maintenance provisions are intended to constitute "alimony" within the meaning of Section 71(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ... thus constituting gross income to Wife and a deductible expense to Husband....

* * * * * *

This support obligation is not related to the division of property and is not intended in any way to constitute a form of payment for any rights or interests of the Wife.

The maintenance hereinbefore provided shall be deemed contractual in nature, not subject to modification by the Court and subject to modification by the parties in writing.

Rochelle remarried on June 1, 1989. Larry stopped his monthly maintenance payments. Rochelle attempted to garnish Larry's earnings. Larry filed a Motion to Quash Garnishment, which the trial court sustained. This appeal followed.

II.

A.

Mika v. Mika, 728 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Mo.App.1987), holds that monthly payments made pursuant to a maintenance in gross award are not terminated on the remarriage of the receiving spouse:

The trial court awarded the wife periodic maintenance payments of $2,450.00 a month for the next ten years. This type of an award is the equivalent of a lump sum award or an award in gross and is nonmodifiable. [Citations omitted.] The award also survives remarriage or death.

[Emphasis added.] In Nelson v. Nelson, 720 S.W.2d 947 (Mo.App.1986) (Nelson II ), the court considered whether an award of maintenance in gross payable in installments may terminate on death or remarriage. The court said:

It is evident that the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance term of § 452.370.2 is meant to be understood in terms of maintenance § 452.335. The temper of that statute, as we note, is that support shall not continue beyond actual dependency.... In terms of the purpose of maintenance within the integral Dissolution of Marriage Act, therefore, the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance can only mean reasonably that the death or remarriage of a dependent spouse terminates the obligation of the other spouse to pay the installments....

Id. at 954. [Emphasis in original.] The southern district relied on Nelson II in reaching its decision in this case.

It would serve little purpose to lay out the various decisions of the court of appeals on the issue presented in this case. The cases tend to turn on their individual factual idiosyncracies. For our purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the courts have not spoken uniformly on this issue, and Mika and Nelson II are representative of the conflict between the cases.

B.

Dissolution of marriage is a statutory action, unknown to the common law. The statutes relating to dissolution of marriage, Sections 452.300-.420, RSMo 1986, thus dictate the nature of the action, its breadth, the authority of the parties to agree, or the court to order, property settlement and support obligations and the manner in which decrees and agreements entered under the statute will be interpreted.

Specifically relevant to this case, Section 452.325, RSMo 1986, authorizes separation agreements. Section 452.335, RSMo 1986, outlines the factors that a court must consider before awarding a spouse maintenance. These factors form the basis of a trial court's determination of the conscionability of maintenance in a separation agreement. Section 452.370.2, RSMo 1986, ¹ creates a rebuttable presumption that the obligation to pay statutory maintenance terminates upon the remarriage of the receiving party or the death of either party.

Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.

The statutory presumption is rebutted by an agreement in writing that the obligation to pay statutory maintenance extends beyond remarriage or death. The presumption is also rebutted by a decree of dissolution expressly extending the obligation to pay future statutory maintenance beyond the death of either party or the remarriage of the receiving party.

In order to determine whether Larry's maintenance obligation in this case extends beyond Rochelle's remarriage, the first consideration is whether the maintenance award here is statutory maintenance. If so, the inquiry moves to consider whether monthly payments, not yet due on the maintenance award, are future payments. If both of these questions are answered affirmatively, the analysis next focuses on whether the trial court's decree of dissolution expressly provides for continued maintenance payments beyond remarriage or whether the written separation agreement extends Larry's obligation to make monthly payments beyond the time of Rochelle's remarriage.

1.

In 1973, the General Assembly adopted an act permitting dissolution of marriage in Missouri. Popularly dubbed a "no fault" divorce law, see generally, Krauskopf, Maintenance: Theory and Negotiation, 33 J.Mo.Bar (1977), the new act repealed Missouri's statutes permitting divorce and changed the philosophical moorings for support for a former spouse.

Under the new act, courts no longer award alimony; instead, courts award maintenance. The distinction is more than one of semantics.

Alimony served "as the equivalent of that obligation for support which arises in favor of the wife out of the marriage contract." Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066, 1067 (banc 1920) (Nelson I ). "In this limited sense [alimony] may be deemed an assessment of damages in [the wife's] favor for breach of the contract by the husband." Id. 221 S.W. at 1069.

Maintenance, on the other hand, proceeds from "the need for reasonable support by one spouse from the other after the disruption of the marriage." Nelson II, 720 S.W.2d at 952. Under the statute, the court can award maintenance only where the court finds that the receiving spouse "(1) [l]acks sufficient property ... to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) [i]s unable to support himself through appropriate employment." Section 452.335.1. [Emphasis added.] Thus, "maintenance issues for support and only for support--and then, until the dependent spouse achieves a reasonable self-sufficiency." Nelson II, 720 S.W.2d at 952.

In Doerflinger v. Doerflinger, 646 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. banc 1983), this Court determined that "Section 452.335 ... covers the full range of support payments to a spouse, maintenance for an indefinite term, maintenance for a limited period and maintenance in gross." Id. at 800. Thus, the Court concluded that "awards of maintenance in gross derive their origin in Section 452.335." Id. at 801.

The phrase "maintenance in gross" does not appear in the dissolution of marriage statutes. It appears that the legislature's failure to recognize "maintenance in gross" is not the product of an oversight. Section 452.080, which the General Assembly did not repeal, refers to alimony in gross and, we speculate, survived the 1973 amendments to permit enforcement of alimony judgments entered prior to the effective date of the laws relating to dissolution of marriage.

Because maintenance is founded on need, a maintenance award may extend only so long as the need exists. As the statute is cast, therefore, it would make little sense for the law to countenance a lump sum or "gross" award based on need which was not subject to modification. Thus, the dissolution of marriage statutes appear to contemplate a lump sum or gross...