Maddox v. State

• Decision Date: 12 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. SC03-2110.,SC03-2110.
• Citation: 923 So.2d 442
• Parties: Robert E. MADDOX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

923 So.2d 442

Robert E. MADDOX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC03-2110.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 12, 2006.

Rehearing Denied March 2, 2006.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Anthony c. Musto, Special Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Chief-Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision in Maddox v. State, 862 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.¹ For the reasons more fully expressed below, we disapprove the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Dixon, and approve the result reached by the Second District Court of Appeal in Maddox.

Facts

The instant action arises from the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Maddox v. State, 862 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), affirming the circuit court's conviction of the petitioner (Maddox) and certifying conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The facts of the instant case, summarized in Judge Davis's opinion below, are as follows:

A Polk County Deputy Sheriff stopped Maddox for an improper lane change. Upon being asked for his driver's license and proof of insurance, Maddox advised the deputy that he did not have his license or proof of insurance with him. The deputy then asked for his name and date of birth, in response to which Maddox said his name was Nathaniel Lewis Maddox and his date of birth was November 1, 1980. Based on this information, the deputy issued two citations in the name of Nathaniel Lewis Maddox — one for improper lane change and the other for failure to produce proof of insurance. When Maddox was hesitant to sign the citations, the deputy advised that failure to sign was a criminal offense. Maddox then signed the citations.

During the traffic stop, a second deputy arrived on the scene. The owner of the car, who had been riding in the front passenger seat, gave permission for the deputies to search the vehicle. During the search, the second deputy found an identification card that identified Maddox as Robert Edwin Maddox. A license check for Robert Edwin Maddox showed that his driver's license was suspended. The deputy retained possession of the two traffic citations issued to Nathaniel Maddox and issued a citation to Maddox charging him with driving while his licensed was suspended. Maddox initially refused to sign this citation but agreed to after the deputy issued him a subsequent citation for refusing to sign a citation. Later, while in custody, Maddox volunteered that Nathaniel Maddox was his brother. Accordingly, Maddox was charged with two counts of forgery for signing the citations issued in the name of Nathaniel and two counts of uttering a forged instrument.

Maddox went to trial on the forgery and uttering counts, as well as on one count of giving false information to a police officer and one count of driving while license suspended. He was found guilty as charged.

Maddox, 862 So.2d at 783-84. Maddox appealed his convictions to the Second District Court of Appeal.

The Second District affirmed Maddox's convictions and sentences without comment but wrote to specifically address his contention that the forged traffic citations were inadmissible pursuant to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2001). See id. at 783. The district court determined that the trial court did not err in allowing the forged traffic citations into evidence. See id. at 784. In support of its holding, the district court noted that "the purpose of the statute is to protect the person to whom the citation is issued." Id. The district court stated that the person to whom the citations were actually issued in the present case, Nathaniel Maddox (Maddox's brother), was not on trial for either of the infractions underlying those forged traffic citations, nor was Maddox himself on trial for those violations. See id. Further the district court found that when the deputy issuing the citation learned that Maddox was not Nathaniel Maddox the deputy "withdrew the charges . . . and retained the documents as evidence of the criminal offense of forgery." Id. Therefore, the district court determined that the charges were no longer pending against anyone and, as a result, the documents relating to those charges "were not `citations' as contemplated by the statute, but rather were documentary evidence of Maddox's criminal conduct." Id. Accordingly, the district court held that section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes did not apply to the present case and certified conflict with the First District's decision in Dixon. See Maddox, 862 So.2d at 784.

Analysis

In analyzing the conflict that exists between the decision here and that of the First District in Dixon, it is helpful to consider a brief summary of the material facts presented to the First District in Dixon. The factual predicate in Dixon was essentially identical to that in the present case:

Upon being stopped by a police officer following the commission of several traffic infractions, [Dixon] provided a false name to the officer. That name was placed on the traffic citation, which [Dixon] signed using the false name. When it was learned that [Dixon] gave a false name, he was charged with forgery under section 831.01 and driving without a valid driver's license.

812 So.2d at 595-96. However, contrary to the decision of the district court in the present case, the First District in Dixon determined that the language of section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000),² was unambiguous and for that reason was not subject to any judicial interpretation or construction whatsoever. See id. at 596. Therefore, the district court in Dixon simply determined without elaboration that the language contained in section 316.650(9) — that "traffic citation[s] `shall not be admissible evidence in any trial'" — required the exclusion of forged citations in the State's prosecution for forgery. Id. (quoting § 316.350(9), Fla. Stat. (2000)).

Maddox urges this Court to approve and adopt the First District's approach and decision in Dixon and hold that the First District appropriately applied section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000), when it concluded that the language of the section is unambiguous and, therefore, not subject to judicial interpretation. Maddox continues that the plain meaning of the particular section makes it absolutely clear that citations simply should not be admissible in any trial under any circumstance. The outcome of this case necessarily turns on the application of principles of statutory construction with regard to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes. Turning to these principles, we note that we have previously held that "[i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation." Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.2000) (alteration in the original) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1992)). However, this Court has

also stated that related statutory provisions should be read together to determine legislative intent, so that "if from a view of the whole law, or from other laws in pari materia the evident intent is different from the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intent should prevail, for that, in fact is the will of the Legislature."

Id. (quoting Forsythe, 604 So.2d at 454); see also McGhee v. Volusia County, 679 So.2d 729, 730 n. 1 (Fla.1996) ("The doctrine of in pari materia requires the courts to construe related statutes together so that they illuminate each other and are harmonized."). Moreover, "a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion." Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).

The statute at issue here is found within chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes entitled "Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law." § 316.001, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). The stated purpose of this chapter of the Florida Statutes was outlined by the Legislature in section 316.002:

It is the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities.

§ 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). Additionally, when section 316.650 was originally enacted by the Legislature in 1971, the description of the bill expressly stated that it was

AN ACT relating to the regulation of traffic on highways; . . . to provide for a uniform traffic citation; requiring its statewide use; prescribing duties of traffic officers and chief administrative officers in connection with the issuance, distribution and maintenance of records. . . .

Ch. 71-321, preamble, at 1501, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). When section 316.650 is read in the context within the chapter in which it is found, its related statutory provisions, and the legislative history surrounding its passage, it is clear that a strict literal reading of the phrase "any trial," as suggested by Maddox and endorsed by the First District in Dixon, would inappropriately extend the effects of this statutory provision far beyond the scope of that which was intended by the Legislature when it originally enacted this section. It would extend far beyond cases in which the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle was an issue in controversy. In addition, we agree with Second...