Madison Ed. Ass'n v. Town of Madison
| Decision Date | 17 January 1978 |
| Citation | 384 A.2d 361,174 Conn. 189 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2631 MADISON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION v. TOWN OF MADISON et al. |
Robert G. Oliver, New Haven, with whom were Philip N. Costello, Jr., and Bruce H. Campbell, New Haven, for appellant (named defendant).
Martin A. Gould, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.
This appeal was taken by the defendant town from a judgment of the Superior Court in New Haven County which declared that an agreement negotiated between the plaintiff education association and the Madison board of education was binding on the board and the town because the town failed to reject it within thirty days after a signed copy of the contract was filed with the town clerk.
The facts in the case are not in dispute and the basic issue is a relatively simple one. On May 6, 1976, a collective bargaining agreement between the Madison board of education and the Madison Education Association to be effective during the 1976-1977 school year was filed with the Madison town clerk. A warning of a special town meeting to act upon the agreement was issued and duly published and that meeting was held on June 3, 1976, to take action on proposed rejection of the agreement. At that meeting, a petition for a machine vote was presented and approved by vote of the meeting, the machine vote being set for June 16, 1976. On June 16, 1976, a machine vote was taken on the question of whether to reject the agreement and the motion to reject the agreement was carried. The defendants took the position that the agreement was, accordingly, rejected and unenforceable. The plaintiff association, however, maintained that since the vote to reject the agreement took place more than thirty days after the filing of the agreement, the attempted rejection was invalid and ineffective and the association was entitled to enforcement of the terms of the agreement. It brought the present declaratory judgment action in which the court sustained its position and it is from that judgment that the present appeal has been taken.
Despite the ingenious arguments advanced by counsel for the defendant town, we conclude that the question before the trial court and now before this court on appeal is a relatively simple one clearly answered by the explicit provisions of the governing statute § 10-153d of the General Statutes as it was then in effect, revised to 1975. 1 This statute provided for collective bargaining between boards of education and teachers and the execution of a written contract incorporating the provisions of any agreement reached which the board of education should "file forthwith" with the town clerk. It then provided, in relevant part: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Anderson v. Ludgin
...v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128.' " Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110, 374 A.2d 133, 136 (1976); Madison Education Assn. v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361 (1978). The defendants, however, claim that § 9-167a embodies an unwritten distinction between administrative and l......
-
Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc.
...it; we are confined to effectuating the intention which is expressed in the words used by the legislature. Madison Education Assn. v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361 (1978); Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110, 374 A.2d 133 (1976); United Aircraft Corporation v. Fusari, 163 Conn. 40......
-
State v. Miranda
...("we are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words [the legislature] has used"); see Madison Education Assn. v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361 (1978). There has been no affirmative expression of legislative intent linking the failure to enact the facilitator abuse......
-
Aaron v. Conservation Commission of Town of Redding
...room for construction. See Johnson v. Personnel Appeal Board, 174 Conn. 519, 521-22, 391 A.2d 168 (1978); Madison Education Ass'n v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361 (1978). The general principle that a statutory term is to be given the meaning it has "according to the commonly app......