Madison v. Graham, 1:21-CV-4908 (LTS)
| Decision Date | 01 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-4908 (LTS) |
| Parties | MALCOLM MADISON, Plaintiff, v. ETTA GRAHAM, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, CYRUS VANCE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
ORDER TO AMEND
Plaintiff appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his rights while he was residing at the Fort Washington Men's Shelter (the “Shelter”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) on June 1, 2021, Defendant Etta Graham, the Shelter's Director, failed to protect him from an attack by another Shelter resident; (2) the New York City Police Department 33rd Precinct (“NYPDâ€) targeted him; and (3) Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance (“Vanceâ€) failed to investigate Plaintiff's complaint regarding the alleged assault, as well as his treatment at the Shelter and by the NYPD.
By order dated June 21, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
Plaintiff brings this action against both private and public individuals and entities. Plaintiff names as Defendants Graham, the Shelter's Director; the NYPD; and District Attorney Vance. In his complaint, Plaintiff does not state which constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated. However, in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Plaintiff seeks money damages.
The Court considers the complaint in the context of the following three sets of allegations. First, Plaintiff claims that on June 1, 2021, at the Shelter, Defendant Graham failed to protect him when he was attacked by a man with a sock that had a lock in it. (EFC No. 2, at 5.) Due to this attack, Plaintiff received four stitches to his head (Id. at 6, 10-18.) Second, Plaintiff sues Vance because Plaintiff reported the attack to Vance, who failed to investigate the attack. (Id. at 6-7.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that he reported to Vance that he was being targeted by the Shelter and the NYPD because he is a Black Muslim man, with both a criminal history and mental health issues. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Vance did not act on these reports and that since the last time he saw Vance, he “almost lost [his] life 2 times, and [ ] [has] been assaulted 2 times.” (Id.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that the NYPD has been targeting him because of his race, religion, mental health issues, and criminal history. (Id.)
Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ().
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the NYPD with the City of New York. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert.
Plaintiff brings claims against Vance based on his alleged failure to prosecute the individual who assaulted Plaintiff and to investigate other alleged crimes reported by Plaintiff. But Plaintiff cannot direct prosecuting attorneys to initiate a criminal proceeding against anyone because prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). Nor can Plaintiff initiate the arrest and prosecution of an individual in this Court because “the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.” Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981). Accordingly, the Court dismisses all claims brought against Vance for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).[1]
Because Plaintiff brings claims against government actors, the NYPD, and District Attorney Vance, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
Plaintiff's allegations against the NYPD, construed as brought against the City of New York, fail to state a claim. As set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to bring claims against the City of New York.
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Finally, the violation of state law, without more, does not give rise to a claim under section 1983. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) (); Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1985) ().
Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City of New York because he does not provide enough facts about the NYPD's alleged targeting of him based on his race, incarceration history, [2] his religion, and his mental health history. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants him leave to amend his complaint to add facts in support of his claim against the City of New York regarding this alleged targeting. Plaintiff must provide specific facts about the targeting, any City policy or custom that he claims was the cause of the targeting, and the harm the targeting caused Plaintiff.
Because Plaintiff alleges that officers from the...
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