Johnston v. Volunteers of America Inc., KING-WILLIAMS
| Decision Date | 23 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | KING-WILLIAMS,No. 99-5132,99-5132 |
| Citation | 213 F.3d 559 |
| Parties | (10th Cir. 2000) DEBORAH JOHNSTON, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated; DIANA RUSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; BRIDGET A. AMES; RUSSELL APPLEGATE; LAJOYA A. BARNES; SHARON BATES; BETTY J. BAUCOM; HELEN BERRY; JIMMY BOSTIC; ALETA BRITT; ANGELINE C. BROOKS; SHAWNDA L. BROWN; DAWNA CAMPBELL; EDNA J. CRABTREE; PRISCILLA CRUME; SANDRA D. DEVILLE; TINA M. ENGLISH; LINDA HALL; PAT HARPER; ROSIE M. JONES; ALYSA L. KINNELL; THOMAS LAWRENCE, JR.; QUEEN E. LEWIS; MARIE A. MAXWELL; PATRICIA R. MCCARRELL; SEAN MCDANIEL; CHARLES W. MULANAX; LUGENA NWAIWA; TERRELL T. PALMER; LOVERL RAMSEY; YOLANDA RAMSEY; TRACY RICHARD; TILEQUA L. SAVAGE; MIRIAM SERWANGA; PATRICIA L. STALEY; MICHELLE L. TYMA, TERI VAUGHT; TERESA VEALES; ERNEST WALSTON; JERILD A. WALSTON; KARLA WALSTON; SANDRA WILKINS; LAKEESA GIBBONS; RHONDA D. WHEELER; KELLY J. KAULAY; TRACY EMERSON; DARREN J. HANNAH, CHRISTI G.; PAMELA J. BERRY; MICHAEL W. GRAHAM; KIMBERLY JONES, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant - Appellant. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Amicus Curiae |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 96-CV-1166-K) JoAnne Deaton (Michael F. Smith of Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable, P.L.L.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma; Richard Gann of Riggs Abney Neal Turpen Orbison & Lewis, Tulsa, Oklahoma with her on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant.
Steven R. Hickman of Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Mark Lawton Jones, Assistant Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, Department of Human Services, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed a brief for Amicus Curiae.
Before BALDOCK, McKAY, and ALARCN,* Circuit Judges.
Volunteers of America Oklahoma, Inc. ("the VAO") appeals from the order denying its motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims brought against it by its employees who work as Habilitation Training Specialists and Habilitation Training Specialist Managers ("Habilitation employees") in residences in the VAO's supported living program. The Habilitation employees filed a claim against the VAO seeking payment for working overtime. The VAO contends that it is exempt from paying not less than one and one-half times the hourly rate for work performed in excess of 40 hours a week to the Habilitation employees in the supported living program, pursuant to the domestic services exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 292 U.S.C. 213(a)(15). The district court denied the VAO's motion for summary judgment. It concluded that the domestic services exemption does not apply to Habilitation workers assigned to the supported living program because their services are not performed in private homes. Following the denial of the VAO's motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated to the amount of overtime wages, costs, and attorneys' fees to which the Habilitation employees would be entitled if the exemption did not apply. Thereupon, the district court entered its final judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1291. Because we conclude that the record shows that the Habilitation employees were not employed in private homes, we affirm the denial of the VAO's motion for summary judgment.
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") requires employers to pay their employees not less than one and one-half times the hourly rate for all hours worked over forty in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1).1 The FLSA exempts employers from the maximum hour requirements for "any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary)." 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(15). The regulations define domestic service employment as "services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed." 29 C.F.R. 552.3.
We must decide whether the Habilitation employees in the supported living program perform services in or about the private home of a developmentally disabled person "by whom he or she is employed." The Habilitation employees contend that they are entitled to overtime pay because they are employees of the VAO and not the employees of the individuals who are unable to care for themselves. They argue that 29 C.F.R. 552.3 limits the exemption to services performed in the private home of the individual who employs a Habilitation employee. The Secretary of Labor's regulations clearly provide, however, that domestic service employees "who are employed by an employer other than the family or household using their services" may also be exempt from the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. 552.109(a). The Habilitation employees assert that "any reliance upon 29 C.F.R. 552.109, an interpretation which does not have the effect of law, is misplaced."
We quite agree that we are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute that is unreasonable. In 213(a)(15), Congress expressly left it to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the terms in the statute by regulation. The Supreme Court has instructed that courts must defer to a federal agency's interpretation of a statute unless the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). The contention that the exception does not apply to domestic services employees who are not employed directly by an individual in need of care, or his or her family has been rejected by the courts that have been confronted with the same question. See Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 n.2 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (); Madison v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (). We are persuaded that the secretary's interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 213(a)(15). We hold that the fact that domestic service employees are not employed by the individual receiving care, does not alone exclude them from the exemption.
The VAO contends that the plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime payments because the Habilitation employees perform domestic/companionship services in the private homes of its clients in the supported living program.2 We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. See Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 1999). We must determine whether there was any genuine issue as to any material fact, and, if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law to the facts construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See id.
We must construe the domestic services exemption narrowly, "in light of the FLSA's broad remedial aims." Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 179 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999). The VAO bears the burden of proving that its employees fit "plainly and unmistakenly within the [exemption's] terms." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In construing the exemption narrowly we are required to give deference to the regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor. See id.
The VAO provides assisted living domestic services to developmentally disabled persons through two different programs. In the in-home program, the VAO's Habilitation employees perform services in the family home where the developmentally disabled person resides with his or her parents or other family member. The family member in the in-home program makes all the household management decisions such as the purchase of groceries, the arrangement of furniture, and the payment of rent and utilities. The VAO does not occupy rooms in the clients' family home for use as an office. If the VAO's services are terminated, the client remains in the family home.
In the supported living program, the client does not reside with a family member. The VAO typically selects a residence for the developmentally disabled person, and sets up shared living arrangements with other developmentally disabled persons. Up to three clients reside in the residences in the VAO supported living program. The VAO signs the lease, and typically pays the rent from the clients' trust accounts. In the supported living program, only the clients of the VAO may live together. The VAO usually selects the clients who will share the same residence, although the client has the right to request a change of roommate. If one of the clients terminates the VAO's services and chooses a different service provider than his roommate, one of them must leave the residence.
The Habilitation employees manage the residences in the supported living program. They buy the food, control access to it, and prepare the meals. The VAO also controls access to the residences in the supported living program. If the residence contains only one VAO client, and if the client or his guardian terminate the VAO's services, the client may remain in the residence pursuant to the terms of the lease or rental agreement. In these residences, the Habilitation employees may occupy a room in the residence to serve as an office and to house desks and file cabinets. The Habilitation employees who provide services in the supported living program also exercise control over their clients' daily...
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