Maestas v. State, 13-96-310-CR

Decision Date12 February 1998
Docket NumberNo. 13-96-310-CR,13-96-310-CR
PartiesPatricia MAESTAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Richard B. Gould, McAllen, for Appellant.

Theodore C. Hake, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Rene Guerra, Dist. & County Atty., Edinburg, for Appellee.

Before DORSEY, FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr. and YANEZ, JJ.

OPINION

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., Justice.

A jury found appellant, Patricia Maestas, guilty of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 1 and the trial court assessed her punishment at ten years' confinement. The trial court also found that the offense involved the use of a deadly weapon. By nine points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and that her trial counsel did not provide effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

On October 23, 1993, Jose Vicente Garcia, John January, Felipa Maldonado, and appellant were drinking at a park in Weslaco. Appellant and Garcia were romantically involved and lived together in a small apartment in Mercedes, which was rented and inhabited by Garcia's mother. After leaving the park, Maldonado and appellant dropped Garcia and January at a Mercedes bar. Approximately one hour later, the women found the men at a different bar. January left with Maldonado, but appellant remained with Garcia because she did not want to return to his mother's apartment. Later, they moved to yet another bar.

Upon entering the establishment, Garcia approached a table where a woman sat alone, and he began a conversation with her in Spanish. Appellant did not understand Spanish and did not know the gist of the conversation. The woman was subsequently identified as Maria Victoria Cantu. Garcia and appellant then went to another table. Garcia told appellant that he felt sorry for Cantu because she was all alone and had no place to stay. Appellant suggested to Garcia that the woman stay with them. Cantu was invited to their table, and appellant then asked her to stay at their apartment.

At closing time, appellant, Garcia, and Cantu walked to the Garcia apartment. The next morning, Maria Cantu was found lying dead in a field near the apartment complex. She had been brutally beaten, stabbed, and strangled. Appellant was subsequently indicted for murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found appellant not guilty of murder, but found her guilty of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment.

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

By her first point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. When we review a legal sufficiency of the evidence point of error, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 46-47 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Arceneaux v. State, 803 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 616 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Sutherlin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Vela v. State, 771 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd). We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a "hypothetically correct jury charge" for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

Appellant was indicted under a two-count indictment. Count one alleged that appellant murdered Maria Cantu by strangulation, and count two indicted appellant for the aggravated assault of Cantu with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife. The jury was authorized to convict appellant under count one, if it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was a party 2 to Cantu's strangulation death. Appellant was acquitted of this charge.

The jury was also authorized to convict appellant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the assault or acted as a party while Garcia assaulted Cantu. The jury returned a general verdict, finding appellant guilty of aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment.

When a general verdict is returned and the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt under any of the allegations submitted, the verdict will be upheld. Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 931 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The State need only have sufficiently proven one of the allegations to support the verdict of guilty. Id. Therefore, we will review the record for evidence to support a finding that appellant was guilty either as the primary actor or as a party to the assault. See id.

In order to prove that appellant was the primary actor in the assault of Cantu, the State had to establish, pursuant to the charge, that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused bodily injury by stabbing Cantu with a knife in a manner which could cause death or serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1994). After reviewing the jury charge, we conclude it is the correct charge for the case. See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239-40.

Based on appellant's statement to police, the record reflects that appellant believed Garcia wanted to have sex with Cantu to get back at appellant, because Garcia had overheard appellant call her ex-husband "babe" during a telephone conversation. Upon arriving at the apartment with Cantu and Garcia, appellant went to take a shower. When appellant returned to the living room, she found Garcia, naked, sitting on a couch where Cantu, apparently dressed, was lying.

According to appellant's statement, she left the room, but Garcia brought her back and made her sit on a nearby chair. Apparently under the impression that Cantu knew who had killed his brother, Garcia began to beat and strangle her in an attempt to force her to answer his questions. Appellant then retrieved a knife from the kitchen at Garcia's behest and took it into the living room. However, appellant did not remember giving the knife to Garcia, or that he stabbed Cantu with it.

Felipa Maldonado testified appellant told her a similar story, but Maldonado remembered appellant saying that Garcia had cut Cantu. According to Maldonado, appellant said she had seen Garcia and Cantu kissing during the walk to the apartment. Appellant also told Maldonado that Garcia and Cantu were "making out" when she got out of the shower.

According to her statement, appellant remembers Garcia helping Cantu up off the floor and asking where all the blood was coming from. Garcia then took Cantu into the shower, and appellant cleaned up the blood. After she cleaned blood from herself, and while Garcia was in the shower, appellant searched Garcia's pants pockets, took money, and left the apartment. She hid in a ditch near the apartments until approximately 5:30 a.m., when she went to the home of Maldonado and January and asked to stay with them for awhile. Later in the morning, appellant told the couple about the previous night's events, claiming Garcia killed Cantu, and she asked for their help. The couple agreed to take appellant to the McAllen, Texas bus station.

Officer Jaime Vasquez, of the Mercedes Police Department, testified that a knife with a black taped handle was retrieved from under a couch in the Garcia apartment approximately eight days after Cantu's murder. The knife was immediately sent to the McAllen Police Department for fingerprint analysis. W.L. Miller, Jr., a McAllen Police Department fingerprint examiner, testified that black tape was a good surface from which to lift prints. However, he was only able to lift one latent print from the black tape on the handle. He determined the print matched appellant's right thumb print.

After the knife was analyzed for prints, it was sent to the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Lab in McAllen, Texas. Alejandro Madrigal, Jr., a serologist, testified that much of the blood testing in this case was inconclusive because the lab was unable to determine Cantu's blood type, due to contaminated blood samples and because samples were not available from Garcia and appellant. Madrigal agreed the autopsy report indicated that Cantu's blood type was O positive. Although the knife tested positive for the presence of human blood on both sides of the blade, Madrigal was not able to identify from which human the blood came. Madrigal further testified that a blouse worn by appellant when she arrived at the home of Maldonado and January, and subsequently turned in to the police by the couple, tested positive for an O-type blood antigen.

Dr. Ruben Santos, a forensic pathologist, testified Cantu was stabbed in her vagina, the stab wound was consistent with that caused by a knife, and the knife retrieved from the Garcia apartment could have caused Cantu's wound. Dr. Santos also testified the knife was capable of causing serious bodily injury and that because of the unusual nature of the wound, it had to be intentional.

Maldonado testified appellant appeared scared and nervous and claimed to be frightened that Garcia would find her. However, testimony also reflects Garcia did not attempt to find appellant subsequent to her leaving the apartment and that appellant did not call police for help. Instead, appellant wanted Maldonado and January to drive her away from the Mercedes area. The couple took appellant to the McAllen bus station where she contacted her sister in Colorado and asked for money to fly out of McAllen. Appellant's sister cooperated with Mercedes police and convinced appellant that arrangements had been made for a flight to Colorado. ...

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    • May 16, 2002
    ...see also Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 909 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (citing Causey, 834 F.2d at 1184-85); Maestas v. State, 963 S.W.2d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998), aff'd, 987 S.W.2d 59, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 834, 120 S.Ct. 93, 145 L.Ed.2d 79 (1999) (holding that although officer......
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    ...see also Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Causey, 834 F.2d at 1184-85); Maestas v. State, 963 S.W.2d 151, 158 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1998), aff'd, 987 S.W.2d 59, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 834 (1999) (holding that although officers were investigating defend......
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    ...the defendant presents a different version of the facts does not render the evidence insufficient. See Maestas v. State, 963 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1998), affirmed, 987 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). By its verdict, the jury chose to believe the State's testimony and ......
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