Patrick v. State
Decision Date | 28 June 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 71105,71105 |
Citation | 906 S.W.2d 481 |
Parties | Jessie Joe PATRICK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appellant was convicted of murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit burglary. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.03(a)(2). After the jury returned an affirmative finding on both of the special issues submitted under Article 37.071(b)(1) and (2), V.A.C.C.P., the trial court imposed the death penalty. Appellant raises thirty-one points of error in this case which is before us on automatic, direct appeal. We will affirm.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at both the guilt/innocence and punishment phases; therefore, we will review the relevant facts. On July 8, 1989, the eighty-year-old victim was found murdered in the bedroom of her Pleasant Grove home. Her throat had been slashed, she had several fractured ribs, and there were bruises to her head, arms, chest, legs, and vaginal canal. A forensic examination revealed the presence of spermatozoa in her vaginal canal. An officer who had been at the scene testified that Redd had been sexually assaulted.
The bathroom window, which had been forced open, appeared to be the point of entry. The bedroom had been ransacked, and although the victim was known to keep large amounts of money in her purse, no money was found in the house. A bloody sock impression was found on the floor of the bedroom.
A blood stained rock was later discovered in appellant's yard just two houses south of the victim's residence. After receiving written consent from appellant's girlfriend to search the home which she shared with the appellant, officers discovered appellant's bloody sock, some bloody toilet tissue, and a pair of jeans with suspicious stains. Blood from appellant's sock was consistent with the blood type of the victim. A DNA gene amplification test matched the DNA from blood on the sock and rock with the victim's blood. Hair samples found at the scene were consistent with appellant's hair. A forensic dentist identified teeth marks on the victim's arm as belonging to appellant. The murder weapon, a knife found at the crime scene, was also identified as the only knife that appellant owned.
A palm print was lifted from the bathroom window of the victim's bathroom and was identified as that of the right palm of the appellant. Appellant's fingerprint expert testified that he could not form an opinion either way as to whether the print was made by the appellant because there was not enough of the print taken from the window. On rebuttal the State's fingerprint expert also identified the print as appellant's.
On the day of the murder, appellant purchased an automobile for $850 cash. Appellant then fled the State. He was arrested on July 22, 1989, in Jackson, Mississippi. While in custody appellant gave three inconsistent explanations for his possession of the money used to buy the car and leave the state. None of the explanations admitted receiving the money or taking the money from the deceased.
In points of error one and two, appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to prove his guilt. When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence this Court must decide "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (emphasis in original).
In point of error one, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed murder in the course of committing burglary. Appellant concedes that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to prove that he murdered the deceased. We agree and hold that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the Jackson standard with respect to the murder. However, appellant argues that the State must also prove that the murder was committed during the course of robbery. Appellant, citing Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), argues that the State must show a nexus between the commission of the murder and the underlying theft: i.e, the intent at the time of or prior to the murder to obtain or maintain control over the property. However, in that case, as in the others cited by appellant, the appellant was charged with capital murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery. The indictment and application paragraph of the charge in appellant's case requires a finding of murder in the course of burglary. We hold that any rational trier of fact could have found from the evidence that appellant entered the deceased's residence without her consent, murdered her, and committed theft or sexual assault. Such is sufficient to prove capital murder in the course of committing burglary. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 30.02(a)(3).
Alternatively, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he entered the deceased's house without her effective consent. In particular, he argues that the only evidence to show he entered without effective consent is the palm print found near the apparent point of entry. He argues that the evidence showed he had been in the victim's house prior to the capital offense, which would not rule out the reasonable hypothesis that the palm print was made at a time other than during the commission of the offense. 1 We disagree. First, the evidence showed that appellant had been to the victim's residence, but no evidence showed he had ever been inside the residence prior to the date of the murder. In fact, appellant's girlfriend testified that appellant had never been in the residence. Second, the window had been forced open. Third, the forensic evidence--palm print, hair sample, blood match, DNA amplification test--places appellant inside the residence at the scene of a murder. Fourth, money was missing from the residence, appellant purchased a car with a large sum of money on the day of the murder, and then appellant fled town. From these facts, the jury evidently concluded that appellant had entered the residence without the victim's consent and found any alternative hypothesis unreasonable. We are of the opinion that a rational trier of fact could have come to the same conclusions. Point of error one is overruled.
In point of error two, appellant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he had the specific intent to cause the victim's death. He points to the testimony of the Dallas County Medical Examiner, who testified that, had the victim had medical attention, she would have had "a great chance" to live. The medical examiner also testified that a younger person could have survived the wounds, but an eighty-year-old woman would not.
Appellant was charged, pursuant to V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.02(a)(1), with intentionally causing the death of Mrs. Redd. Both parties agree that the statute requires a showing that the appellant intended the result of his conduct. Lugo-Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72, 80 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). It may also be inferred from the extent of the injuries and the relative size and strength of the parties. Lindsey v. State, 501 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 944, 94 S.Ct. 1953, 40 L.Ed.2d 296 (1974). The State correctly points out that the requisite intent could be inferred by any rational jury from several items of evidence. The jury could have determined that: appellant entered the deceased's residence with a deadly weapon, a butcher knife; he was thirty-one years old and 153 pounds, while the victim was eighty years old and weighed 130 pounds; appellant slashed the deceased's throat, broke several of her ribs, inflicted several bruises and lacerations, and caused a subscapular hemorrhage. All of these circumstances could have been found by a rational trier of fact to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to bring about the victim's death. Point of error two is overruled.
In point of error three, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's affirmative answer to the first special issue, which asks whether appellant, beyond a reasonable doubt, caused the death of his victim deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result. Article 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. We have addressed this issue many times. Our standard of review for the special issues is the same standard we use for reviewing the evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of a capital murder conviction: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could find all of the elements of the special issues beyond a reasonable doubt. Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 338-340 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988). The jury is entitled to consider all the evidence submitted during guilt/innocence. Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271, 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
Appellant's argument hinges on the fact that we have yet to supply the bench and bar with a definition of "deliberately." Instead, we have only offered some guidance on the issue, including the observation that "deliberately" is something more than intentional but less than premeditation. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974, 112 S.Ct. 2944, 119 L.Ed.2d 568 (1992). Appellant contends that the evidence,...
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