Mafrige v. Ross
| Decision Date | 27 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. D-2997,D-2997 |
| Citation | 866 S.W.2d 590 |
| Parties | Stevens F. MAFRIGE, Ronald Kormanik, Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C., Petitioners, v. James E. ROSS and J. Douglas Sutter, Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
The finality of judgments for purposes of appeal has been a recurring and nagging problem throughout the judicial history of this state. In this case we address the issue of whether the inclusion of "Mother Hubbard" language or its equivalent in an order granting summary judgment makes an otherwise partial summary judgment final for appeal purposes. 1 We conclude that it does.
Attorneys James Ross and Douglas Sutter filed this lawsuit in state court against twelve other attorneys and insurers after a $13 million personal injury judgment was entered against Ross and Sutter's client in federal court. 2 They alleged various causes of action including malicious prosecution, slander, libel, conspiracy, and negligence, all arising out of the conduct of the federal litigation and two related legal malpractice suits filed against them. Three groups of defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment against each plaintiff. Two groups of defendants filed single motions for summary judgment against both plaintiffs. The trial court granted all eight motions by signed separate orders with language exemplified by the following:
It is ... therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant ... should in all things be granted and that Plaintiff ... take nothing against Defendant.
Ross and Sutter appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, 834 S.W.2d 385, 394, holding that because some of the motions for summary judgment failed to address one or more of the causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs, and because the trial court refused to sever the claims against individual defendants, the summary judgments were interlocutory and therefore not appealable. 3 After a lengthy review of the relevant case law, 4 the court of appeals resigned itself to "continue to wade through this muddy area determining whether to dismiss the appeal or to reverse and remand based on whether the trial court used a Mother Hubbard clause in the order granting summary judgment." Id. at 393.
In order to be a final, appealable summary judgment, the order granting the motion must dispose of all parties and all issues before the court. 5 Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959). If the order does not dispose of all issues and all parties, it is interlocutory and therefore not appealable absent a severance. Id. at 201. No one disputes that granting a motion for summary judgment on causes of action not addressed in the motion is reversible error. Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex.1979); TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a. Rather, the issue is whether such a summary judgment, which purports to be final by the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language or its equivalent, should be treated as final for purposes of appeal.
The confusion over a Mother Hubbard clause's effect on the finality of orders granting motions for summary judgment appears to flow from two decisions by this court: Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.1982), and the analysis and application of that decision in Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.1984).
In Schlipf, the plaintiffs sued Exxon for royalties and prejudgment interest, and moved for summary judgment on all of their claims. The trial court granted the claim for royalties, but denied the claim for prejudgment interest. The judgment rendered stated:
the relief herein granted Plaintiffs, ... is in satisfaction of all of their claims and causes of action ... and all claims and/or causes of action herein asserted by all parties herein and not herein granted are hereby in all things denied and concluded; ....
The issue on appeal was whether that judgment was interlocutory and thus not appealable because it failed to expressly dispose of the claim for prejudgment interest. This court agreed with the court of appeals in that case, holding that the judgment rendered was final in that it expressly disposed of all parties and issues. We also noted that the judgment used the Mother Hubbard language suggested by this court in North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex.1966), and emphasized that such language was helpful to make clear a trial court's intent to render a final judgment. 644 S.W.2d at 454.
Two years later we wrote that a Mother Hubbard has "no place" in a partial summary judgment and should not be used. Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 704. In Teer, only two of three defendants moved for summary judgment, but the judgment ordered that plaintiffs " 'recover nothing' " from all three defendants and that all three defendants were " 'discharged.' " Id. at 703.
We held that the judgment was interlocutory because it did not dispose of all parties and that the court of appeals erred by assuming jurisdiction of the partial, and therefore interlocutory, judgment. We also stated that the Mother Hubbard language from North East Independent School District was limited to conventional trial on the merits, after which one presumes that the court intended to dispose of all parties before it and all issues raised by the pleadings. Instead of dismissing for want of jurisdiction, however, or directing the court of appeals to do so, this court proceeded to sever the nonmoving party and...
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...Id. at 492 (emphasis added); see also, Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex.1994) (citing Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex.1993)); Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986). "In the absence of a special statute ......
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...To be appealable, Bradford's summary judgment must dispose of all parties and all issues before the trial court. See Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex.1993). Such a judgment may result, in cases like the present, from a valid severance order. The summary judgment awarding Bradford d......
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Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
...writ in Mafrige v. Ross to resolve the inherent problems in determining finality of summary judgments for purposes of appeal. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993). There we recognized that determining finality had "been a recurring and nagging problem throughout the judicial history of this state." M......
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...based on a lack of causation due to Swinehart's inability to establish a constructive trust in the underlying suit. See Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (holding summary judgment should be rever......