Maghee v. State

• Decision Date: 09 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 04-1705.,04-1705.
• Citation: 773 N.W.2d 228
• Parties: Valentino MAGHEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

773 N.W.2d 228

Valentino MAGHEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 04-1705.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 9, 2009.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

This appeal presents two issues: (1) may an inmate whose work release has been revoked by the department of corrections challenge the revocation in a postconviction-relief action, and (2) does the inmate's death during the pendency of the appeal abate the cause of action or render the appeal moot. The district court dismissed the postconviction-relief action filed by the appellant, Valentino Maghee, ruling he should have challenged the department's revocation of his work release by a petition for judicial review filed under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003). Maghee appealed, but died prior to the filing of briefs. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis the case abated upon Maghee's death. This court ordered the motion submitted with the appeal.

Upon our review of the arguments of Maghee and the State, we determine Iowa's survival statutes, Iowa Code sections 611.20 and 625A.17 (2005),¹ prevent abatement of Maghee's cause of action and this appeal. On the other hand, Maghee's death renders his appeal moot. Nonetheless, we conclude the issue raised in this appeal should be addressed under the public —interest exception to the mootness doctrine, and therefore, we deny the State's motion to dismiss.

In considering the proper vehicle for Maghee's challenge to the revocation of his work release, we hold Maghee properly chose a postconviction-relief action to contest the revocation, and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing his petition. Notwithstanding our decision that the district court should not have dismissed Maghee's petition on this ground, we do not remand this case. The underlying issue— the propriety of the department's revocation of Maghee's work release—is moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies so as to justify additional proceedings in the district court. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court, but we do not remand the case.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Maghee was serving a prison sentence with the department of corrections. After being assigned to a facility in Marshalltown on work release, Maghee violated several rules governing his release. As a consequence, his work release was revoked, and he was transferred back to prison. Maghee filed an application for postconviction relief, challenging his transfer on several grounds. See Iowa Code § 822.2(5) (2003) (now codified at Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(e) (2009)) (providing person convicted of or sentenced for a public offense may commence a proceeding to obtain relief for certain specified claims, including a claim the person is "unlawfully held in custody or other restraint"). The district court dismissed his application on the State's motion, ruling Maghee should have contested the revocation of his work release under Iowa's Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003), rather than in a postconviction-relief action.

Maghee appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit. During the pendency of his appeal, Maghee died. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming the action had abated due to Maghee's death. This court ordered the State's motion submitted with the appeal and requested that the parties brief two additional issues: (1) whether abatement was required, and (2) whether it would be appropriate to apply the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We turn now to these issues.

II. State's Motion to Dismiss.

At common law causes of action ex delicto, or sounding in tort, for injuries to the person abated or were extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff or defendant.² See Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550, 553 (1868) (referring to the "doctrine of the common law and the distinction between injuries merely personal (which die with the person) and those which affect the estate or property rights, and therefore survive to and against the executor"); 1 Am.Jur.2d Abatement, Survival, & Revival § 51, at 137 (2005) ("At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong complained of affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the person is incidental. . . ."). In addition, suits abated at common law upon "the death of a natural party before trial or verdict." Shafer, 23 Iowa at 554.

If the cause of action was one that did not survive, death put a final end to the suit. If the cause was one that survived or could survive, the plaintiff or his executor was obliged to bring a new action against the defendant or his executor.

Id. Early in Iowa's existence as a state, the legislature enacted survival statutes to ameliorate the harshness of these common-law rules. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 1698, 2502 (1851). See generally Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 272, 132 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1965) ("To the extent that [the survival statute] saves an action from abatement it is in derogation of the common law.").

The 1851 Code provided for the survival of causes of action ex delicto: "Unless from the necessity of the case, no cause of action ex delicto dies with either or both the parties, but the prosecution thereof may be commenced or continued by or against their respective representatives." Iowa Code § 2502 (1851). By 1873, this statute had been expanded to apply to all causes of action without limitation: "All causes of action shall survive, and may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to same." Iowa Code § 2525 (1873). This statute is currently codified in nearly identical form in chapter 611 of subtitle 3 of Title XV, which deals with civil procedure: "All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same." Iowa Code § 611.20 (2005).

The 1851 Code also addressed the abatement of suits already filed: "Actions do not abate by the death, marriage, or other disability of either party . . . if from the nature of the case the cause of action can survive or continue." Iowa Code § 1698 (1851). The contemporary counterpart of this statute is also found in chapter 611 and states in relevant part: "Any action contemplated in sections 611.20 and 611.21 may be brought, or the court, on motion, may allow the action to be continued, by or against the legal representatives or successors in interest of the deceased." Iowa Code § 611.22 (2005). Importantly, the limiting phrase, "if from the nature of the case the cause of action can survive or continue," is no longer part of the statute.

It appears that, beginning with the 1873 Code, a special survival statute governed appellate cases. See Iowa Code § 3211 (1873). The original language of section 3211 has been carried forward to the current survival statute governing appellate court procedure, which provides: "The death of one or all of the parties shall not cause the proceedings to abate, but the names of the proper persons shall be substituted . . . and the case may proceed." Iowa Code § 625A.17 (2005). It is this statute upon which the appellant relies to resist the State's motion to dismiss this appeal.

A reading of the straightforward language of the current statutes would lead one to conclude that no civil claim or action abates upon the death of a party. Nonetheless, this court has long held that civil claims or actions personal to the decedent are extinguished by the decedent's death. See Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 1994) (holding death of adoptive parent abated action to vacate adoption notwithstanding section 611.20); AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety, 434 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Iowa 1988) (noting rule that cause of action "personal to the decedent" does not survive, but holding rule did not apply under circumstances of that case); State ex rel. Turner v. Buechele, 236 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1975) (holding survival statute did not prevent abatement of civil action "where the subject matter of the controversy [was] personal to the decedent"); Babbitt v. Corrigan, 157 Iowa 382, 383, 138 N.W. 466, 467 (1912) (acknowledging the predecessor statute to section 625A.17, yet dismissing appeal of suit seeking only "injunctional and penal" relief, noting death had enjoined the defendant). While the basis for this court-made exception is not entirely clear, it appears to have been carried over from Iowa's original survival statutes that provided for survival only "if from the nature of the case the cause of action can survive or continue," Iowa Code § 1698 (1851), or "[u]nless from the necessity of the case," the cause of action must die with a party, Iowa Code § 2502 (1851).

In Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa 189 (1862), this court considered the 1851 statute that saved claims from abatement "if from the nature of the case the cause of action can survive or continue." Barney, 14 Iowa at 192. In that case, a wife obtained a divorce decree dissolving her marriage. Id. at 191. The wife died shortly after entry of the decree, and the husband thereafter appealed. Id. We concluded that with respect to the dissolution of the marital relation the appeal could not proceed:

The marital relation is personal in its character, and a proceeding to dissolve this relation is personal.... From the nature of the case, in so far as this proceeding related to the divorce, the cause was ended by the death of the complainant. It could not be revived, because there was nothing to survive death itself having settled the question of separation beyond all controversy.

Id. at 193.

Notwithstanding the absence of qualifying language in later versions of the 1851 statutes, this court continued to apply this commonsense...