AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety

• Decision Date: 21 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1735,87-1735
• Citation: 434 N.W.2d 401
• Parties: AFSCME/IOWA COUNCIL 61 and the Estate of Tom Gott, Appellees, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY and Dr. Thomas Bennett, State Medical Examiner, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 401

434 N.W.2d 401

AFSCME/IOWA COUNCIL 61 and the Estate of Tom Gott, Appellees, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY and Dr. Thomas Bennett, State Medical Examiner, Appellants.

No. 87-1735.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 21, 1988.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Gary L. Hayward, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Michael E. Hansen, Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and SNELL, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

Defendants, the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the state medical examiner, Dr. Thomas Bennett, appeal the district court order granting summary judgment to plaintiff, Estate of Tom Gott, in this mandamus action under Iowa Code chapter 22 (1987), the Iowa Public Records Act. The estate and Gott's union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Iowa Council 61, also a plaintiff, cross-appeal the district court order denying summary judgment to AFSCME. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I

On April 13, 1987, the State obtained a nontestimonial identification order for a blood sample to be taken from Tom Gott, an officer at the correctional institution for women at Mitchellville, Iowa. The order, obtained pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 810, was based on the allegation by an inmate, Teresa Cline, that Gott had sexually abused her on the night of March 14, 1987. The purpose of the order was to compare Gott's blood type with the blood type of a semen stain found on Cline's bedding. Pursuant to the order, Gott was required to report to Charter Hospital in Des Moines on April 17 at 11:00 a.m.

On April 14, 1987, Gott was discharged from his position at the correctional institution as a result of Cline's allegation. He was reportedly despondent for the next several days. On the morning of April 17, when the blood tests were scheduled, Gott left his home in Mitchellville and drove to a nearby park, where he fatally shot himself in the head. Although no autopsy was performed on Gott, the medical examiner's office obtained a blood sample from Gott's body. This sample was turned over to the Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI), which proceeded to perform the tests for which the chapter 810 order was obtained. In a subsequent application by the State for a blood sample from another correctional officer, Tracy Conner, it was disclosed Gott's blood type did not match that of the stain on Cline's bedding. The lab reports themselves, however, were not and have not been made public.

On June 17, 1987, AFSCME requested Dr. Bennett to send it "copies of all reports concerning any blood tests and blood comparisons" run on Gott. AFSCME considered these reports necessary for its prosecution of the grievance concerning Gott's discharge. On July 7, 1987, AFSCME sent a similar letter to the DPS. This letter also requested production of the reports on behalf of Gott's estate. The response of Dr. Bennett, through counsel, was that the lab reports were confidential investigative records, which were not subject to examination upon request. Dr. Bennett later stated he had not been involved in the Gott investigation and, as a result, had never had custody of the records requested. The response of the DPS, the acknowledged custodian of the lab reports at issue, was also that the records requested were confidential investigative records.

In response, AFSCME and Gott's estate filed this action on July 24, 1987, for a writ of mandamus, pursuant to Iowa Code section 22.5. All parties thereafter moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion of Gott's estate, but denied the motions of all of the other parties.

II

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c); Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1984). The burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact is upon the moving party. Colonial Baking Co. v. Dowie, 330 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 1983).

A

The district court granted summary judgment to Gott's estate as against Dr. Bennett, as well as the DPS. However, our review of the record reveals a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Bennett was ever involved in the Gott investigation or had custody of the lab reports at issue. We conclude summary judgment as against him was inappropriate.

B

The record does not reveal a genuine issue of fact regarding the involvement of the DPS, Gott's estate, and AFSCME in this case. Resolution of the appeal by the DPS and of the cross-appeal by Gott's estate and AFSCME therefore depends on our interpretation of the relevant sections of Iowa Code chapters 22 and 810.

It is not disputed the lab reports at issue are "public records," as defined by Iowa Code section 22.1:

"[P]ublic records" includes all records, documents, tape, or other information, stored or preserved in any medium, of or belonging to this state or any county, city, township, school corporation, political subdivision, or tax-supported district in this state, or any branch, department, board, bureau, commission, council, or committee of any of the foregoing.

The question is whether they are exempt from disclosure to Gott's estate or AFSCME by virtue of Iowa Code section 22.7, which provides in pertinent part:

The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized to release such information:

....

5. Peace officers' investigative reports, except where disclosure is authorized elsewhere in this Code.

Iowa Code § 22.7(5) (1987).

The first issue to be resolved in this regard is whether the lab reports are "investigative reports," as is asserted by the DPS. We are persuaded they are. There is no dispute the analysis of Gott's blood was made as part of the investigation of Cline's allegation of sexual abuse. We believe this fact is sufficient to qualify the lab reports as "investigative reports."

The next issue to be resolved is the proper interpretation of the subsection's phrase, "except where disclosure is authorized elsewhere in this Code." Iowa Code § 22.7(5). The DPS contends this phrase refers only to provisions elsewhere in the Code that provide for disclosure to the general public and not to provisions that provide for disclosure limited to specific persons or organizations. Gott's estate asserts it has a right to the lab reports under section 810.15, which provides:

Within ten days after the nontestimonial identification procedure, the order shall be returned to the issuing court. The court, the prosecuting attorney, and the person who was the subject of the order shall be furnished with a written report of the results of any tests or comparisons utilizing the evidence obtained in the authorized procedures. This report shall be disclosed promptly after it becomes available unless the court directs that disclosure be delayed. [Emphasis added.]

Gott's estate contends this section constitutes the requisite "disclosure ... authorized elsewhere" in the Code. AFSCME asserts that if any type of disclosure is authorized elsewhere in the Code, such as to Gott's estate under section 810.15, section 22.7(5) requires disclosure of the lab reports to AFSCME or to anyone who requests them.

Our interpretation of sections 22.7(5) and 810.15 is guided by the following well-settled principles. Our goal in construing statutes is to ascertain legislative intent. We consider the spirit of the statute as well as the words, so that a sensible, workable, practical, and logical construction is given. Emmetsburg Ready Mix Co. v. Norris, 362 N.W.2d 498, 499 (Iowa 1985); Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263, 265-66 (Iowa 1980). In doing so, we take account of the object sought to be accomplished and the problems sought to be remedied by the statute, and arrive at a construction that will best effect its purpose. Shell Oil Co. v. Bair, 417 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Iowa 1987); Shidler v. All American Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Iowa 1980). When more than one statute is pertinent to the inquiry, as here, we consider the statutes together in an attempt to harmonize them. State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1987); Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 376 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1985).

We have previously stated the exemptions of section 22.7

are narrowly tailored to specific circumstances in which the public interest would not be served by disclosure of information contained in the records and in which disclosure could cause substantial adverse impact upon an individual. The exemptions are thus applicable only within the framework of "every citizen's" general right to examine public records under chapter .

Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n v. City of Des Moines, 313 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1981) (discussing the predecessor statute of chapter 22). In that case, the commission did not seek inspection of the records at issue as a "citizen" under the public records act; instead, inspection was sought pursuant to the agency's statutory investigative and subpoena powers. Accordingly, the exemptions to disclosure did not apply to the agency's subpoena duces tecum. Id.

Analogously, Gott's estate sought inspection in this case not as a general right of citizenship, but rather under a right allegedly granted by section 810.15. AFSCME, however, sought inspection as a general right, but relied on the alleged section 810.15 right of Gott's estate to overcome the exemption of section 22.7(5). We believe a reasonable interpretation of the language of section 22.7(5) should take into account the different bases for these parties' claims under chapter 22. Accordingly, we read the language in section 22.7(5) regarding "disclosure ... authorized elsewhere" in the Code as referring to disclosure to the party seeking inspection. Thus, Gott's estate could obtain copies of the lab reports if it...