Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 63318-5,63318-5 |
| Citation | 131 Wn.2d 171,930 P.2d 307 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 42, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,540 Kathryn A. MAGULA, Respondent, v. BENTON FRANKLIN TITLE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner. |
Shea & Kuffel, Edward F. Shea, Timothy G. Klashke, Pasco, Jacqueline J. Shea, Bellevue, for respondent.
Kathryn Magula was discharged after 14 years of employment because of the alleged misconduct of her spouse, an independent contractor for the same firm. Although RCW 49.60.020 proscribes discrimination based on marital status and RCW 49.60.180 declares marital status discrimination to be an unfair practice, a definition of "marital status" did not appear in our Law Against Discrimination at the time of the events in this case. Magula contends marital status discrimination includes action against an employee based on the conduct of that employee's spouse. Magula's employer contends marital status discrimination is confined to action based on the institution of marriage itself.
In this case, we hold marital status discrimination may pertain to situations where the identity and conduct of the employee's spouse are involved. We affirm the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Benton County Superior Court for further proceedings.
1. Where an employee is discharged for reasons unrelated 2. Did the trial court properly grant Benton Franklin Title Insurance Co.'s (BFT) motion for summary judgment?
to the employee's performance and because of the alleged conduct of the employee's spouse, does such a discharge constitute marital status discrimination?
BFT hired Kathryn Magula in 1978. By 1991, she had become the head of the firm's escrow department. During this period, her husband, Pat Magula, provided janitorial services for BFT as an independent contractor.
In the fall of 1991, Kathryn Magula perceived tension in the office and the animosity of fellow employees. On November 20, 1991, she took escrow department employee Linda Hendler out to lunch and asked why their relationship was so tense and strained. Hendler told Kathryn it was the Magulas' fault another employee had been fired the month before and that Pat Magula was having or had had affairs with several women at the office. She also stated other employees thought he "did not live life by the rules." Clerk's Papers at 456. Kathryn was greatly distressed by this conversation, which she reported to her supervisor, BFT manager Greg Bowers. Bowers began to keep a diary of office events.
The next day, Hendler informed Bowers Pat Magula had made a threatening phone call to her, and had followed her and her daughter to school. Hendler's ex-husband, Jeff, told Bowers he was concerned for the safety of Linda and their children. Linda Hendler obtained a restraining order against Pat Magula.
Kathryn Magula admitted in her deposition there was animosity in the office during this period. She indicated the conversation with Hendler made their already strained relationship even worse. Bowers testified the conflict between Linda and Kathryn adversely affected their performance in the escrow department, although he did not record On December 9, 1991, Hendler reported to Bowers she was upset and unable to work because Pat Magula had telephoned her and made obscene suggestions. She also said her friends had seen comments freshly written on several men's restroom walls in clubs in the area stating she had HIV. Hendler attributed the graffiti to Pat Magula.
any specific incidents of Kathryn's negative office performance in his diary. Bowers told Kathryn, Linda, and Pat the situation was no-win for all concerned, and was adversely affecting BFT. He told them unless everyone could rise above the interpersonal conflict and work together, he would dismiss all parties involved. To ensure compliance with the restraining order Hendler had obtained against Pat Magula, Bowers also told Pat not to come to BFT any more.
Bowers believed this news was a "crushing blow" to the possibility Kathryn and Linda could work together. Clerk's Papers at 431. On December 10, he met with Pat Magula and said he "would not judge who is right or wrong" in the accusations, but he terminated BFT's contract with Pat. Id. at 62. Bowers met separately with Kathryn and Linda and terminated their employment because he did not think they could work together.
Kathryn sued BFT, asserting BFT breached express and implied promises of employment, committed the tort of outrageous conduct, or wrongfully discharged her in violation of public policy as set forth in RCW 49.60, including marital status discrimination under RCW 49.60.180. BFT moved for summary judgment, arguing its action did not involve marital status discrimination because the discharge did not turn on Kathryn's marriage or the identity of her spouse. However, BFT did not address the issue of whether Magula's discharge was a "business necessity" within the meaning of WAC 162-16-150. Kathryn argued marital status discrimination includes being discharged for the misconduct of a spouse, and admitted Pat Magula had engaged in misconduct. Report of Proceedings at 9-15.
The trial court granted summary judgment for BFT on all claims, stating firing someone because of the conduct of the spouse was not marital status discrimination. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's rulings on all other claims, but reversed and remanded as to the marital status discrimination claim, stating the evidence created an issue as to whether Ms. Magula was terminated based on her spouse's conduct:
The record discloses that the circumstances surrounding termination of Ms. Magula's employment related to allegations of misconduct by her husband. There are no allegations of misconduct by Ms. Magula. The evidence creates a genuine issue of fact whether Ms. Magula was discriminated against based on who her spouse was, his conduct or what he did.
Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Ins. Co., 79 Wash.App. 1, 4, 901 P.2d 313 (1995). We granted review. 1
A prima facie case of marital status discrimination requires a plaintiff to prove "(1) that the employer discriminated against her based on her marital status and (2) that this discrimination was not justified or excused by 'business necessity'." Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash.2d 483, 493, 859 P.2d 26 (1993), amended, 122 Wash.2d 483, 865 P.2d 507 (1994). Marital status must be a substantial factor in the employer's adverse employment decision. Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 127 Wash.2d 302, 310, 898 P.2d 284 (1995). The parties have focused solely on the definition of "marital status"; Magula has not addressed, nor has BFT argued at this point in the It is unlawful for any employer to discharge a person from employment "because of ... marital status." RCW 49.60.180. See also RCW 49.60.010, .020. The Legislature added marital status to the list of protected attributes in RCW 49.60 in 1973, but provided no definition of the term "marital status." Laws of 1973, ch. 141, § 10. In 1993, the Legislature defined "marital status," as "the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed." Laws of 1993, ch. 510, § 4.
case, whether Magula's termination was a "business necessity." 2
Prior to 1993, Washington law employed a broad definition of "marital status" under RCW 49.60. Although RCW 49.60 did not define "marital status," the Human Rights Commission promulgated WAC 162-16-150 in 1975, defining marital status discrimination. WAC 162-16-150(2) specifically provides:
In general, discrimination against an employee or applicant for employment because of (a) what a person's marital status is; (b) who his or her spouse is; or (c) what the spouse does, is an unfair practice because the action is based on the person's marital status.
(Emphasis added.) Generally, administrative agency interpretations of statutes are given great weight. Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 15, 846 P.2d 531 (1993) ().
Subsequent court decisions essentially adopted the view of the Human Rights Commission that marital status under RCW 49.60 involves conduct beyond the mere legal status of being married or single, and may include discrimination based on the status of being married or single and conduct of the employee's spouse. We held an antinepotism policy could constitute marital status discrimination and specifically approved the interpretation of "marital status" adopted by the Human Rights Commission in WAC 162-16-150 in Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 69, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978),:
We think the commission was justified in its interpretation of the policy and purpose of the act, when it concluded that the legislature did not intend to restrict its coverage to cases where the employer refuses to hire any married person--or any unmarried person. The fact that the commission was given broad policy formulation and rule making powers indicates a legislative recognition that all of the circumstances in which discrimination might exist and all of the forms which it might take were not then known and could not be anticipated, and that the diligence and expertise of an administrative agency were needed to achieve the purpose intended in the statute.
When read in the light of the entire statute, the provision which makes it an unfair practice to refuse to hire any person "because of such person's ... marital status" is broad enough in its import to cover the situation involved here.
Indeed, in Levinson v. Washington Horse Racing Comm'n, 48 Wash.App....
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