Mahaffey v. Ahl, 19987

• Decision Date: 08 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 19987,19987
• Citation: 264 S.C. 241,214 S.E.2d 119
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Harold A. MAHAFFEY, a minor under the age of (14), by his guardian ad litem, Lillian Myrtle Roberson, Respondent, v. Eugene J. AHL and Sidney Ahl, Appellants.

Page 119

214 S.E.2d 119

264 S.C. 241

Harold A. MAHAFFEY, a minor under the age of (14), by his guardian ad litem, Lillian Myrtle Roberson, Respondent, v. Eugene J. AHL and Sidney Ahl, Appellants.

No. 19987.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 8, 1975.

Sinkler, Gibbs, Simons & Guerard, Charleston, for appellants.

Young, Clement & Rivers, Charleston, for respondent.

NESS, Justice:

Harold A. Mahaffey, a minor nine years eight months of age was injured when his Honda-mini-bike and a truck collided at an offset street intersection in a residential area in the city of North Charleston, South Carolina. The truck was being operated at the time for Sidney Ahl by Eugene J. Ahl. This action was instituted by the guardian ad litem of the minor for damages alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver and the owner of the truck. The defendants denied that they were negligent and charged that Harold A. Mahaffey was guilty of contributory negligence such as to bar recovery of damages. A jury verdict resulted in a substantial damage award to the plaintiff. The defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied by the court. On appeal the defendants-appellants contend, as they did below, that the evidence was not sufficient to establish a submissible case for the jury; that as a matter of law the plaintiff-resondent, Harold A. Mahaffey, was guilty of contributory negligence barring recovery of damages; that the court erred in denying motions for a directed verdict and for judgment non obstante veredicto; and that the court erred in admitting evidence of the driver's prior driving record in response to the allegation of the plaintiff of negligent entrustment of the vehicle by the defendant, Sidney Ahl, to his nephew, Eugene Ahl.

It is alleged in the complaint that on or about July 25, 1972, at about 3:00 p.m., the plaintiff was operating a Honda-mini-bike in a westerly direction on Oregon Avenue at the intersection of Oregon Avenue with Ranger Drive in the City of North Charleston, and that the defendant, Eugene J. Ahl, was operating a 1967 Ford panel truck owned by Sidney Ahl with the express permission and consent of Sidney Ahl, and as agent and servant of Sidney Ahl, in a southerly direction on Ranger Drive when the two vehicles collided at the intersection. It was also alleged that Eugene J. Ahl failed to maintain a proper lookout, failed to sound his horn and failed to have his automobile under proper control and was operating it at an excessive rate of speed; it was further alleged that Sidney Ahl was negligent in entrusting his automobile to Eugene J. Ahl whom he knew or should have known was habitually an unsafe driver. The plaintiff also plead and relied upon the last clear chance doctrine. The answer of the defendants contained first a general denial and then alleged contributory negligence on the part of the minor in various particulars.

The case came on for trial before the Honorable John Grimball, and a jury, at the April, 1974 term of the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County and resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondent against the appellants in the sum of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars actual damages.

The appellants, at appropriate stages of the trial, moved for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment non obstante veredicto, and alternatively for a new trial, on the ground that neither respondents' evidence nor the entire evidence was sufficient to support the reasonable inference that the injuries to the respondent were caused by the negligence of the defendants and on further grounds which will hereinafter be discussed.

It is elementary that in considering whether the court below erred in refusing the several motions made by the appellants upon the ground that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the appellants, we must view the evidence and the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in a light favorable to the respondent. If more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the case must be submitted to the jury. Cantrell v. Carruth, 250 S.C. 415, 418, 158 S.E.2d 208 (1967).

It appears from the evidence considering the same in the light most favorable to the respondent, that he had previously owned a mini-bike, but had received this small Honda on the Christmas preceding the accident, and that he was familiar with the Honda and knew how to ride it. On the day of the accident, plaintiff was operating the minibike with a passenger on the back down Oregon Avenue and intended to slant across the intersection and proceed down Martha Drive. He knew that there was a stop sign at the intersection of Oregon and Ranger but this stop sign is set back several feet from the intersection. As he approached the stop sign, he was going two or three miles per hour and was either in first or second gear, and did not come to a complete stop at the stop sign, but was coasting. The hedges at the intersection blocked his view to the right. It appears it was necessary for him to pull out into Ranger Drive in order to see, and that as he did so he saw the truck operated by the defendant Eugene Ahl coming from his right, but that he was only five or fix feet away from the Ahl vehicle when he saw it and he was unable to stop his mini-bike. He then testified that he observed the defendant's head turned to the left in the direction of some children playing on the side of the road. The plaintiff testified that the horn on the truck never blew, but that the truck was not going too fast, and the defendant's truck was in its proper lane of travel, and that when he saw the truck, he tried to turn, but couldn't. He concluded that if he had heard a horn blow, he may have been able to get out of the way. The Ahl vehicle left no skid marks.

Defendant's driver testified that he did not see the plaintiff until after the collision. However, he subsequently testified that 'when I first saw him--he was approximately six to eight feet away,--I got my brakes applied--before I got the truck stopped, I had already hit him.' (Transcript, Folio 525.)

It is axiomatic in this State that issues of negligence and proximate cause may be resolved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Negligence is a relative term to be decided upon the facts of each particular case and because its existence turns on the facts it is normally a question left to the jury; before it can be determined as a matter of law that one has not committed a negligent act the truth of all the credible evidence tending to sustain the claim of negligence must be assumed and all favorable inferences of fact fairly deducible therefrom tending to establish negligence drawn. The test of legal sufficiency is whether the evidence serves to prove a fact or permits an inference of fact that would enable an ordinarily intelligent mind to draw a rational conclusion therefrom in support of the right of the plaintiff to recover.

We feel the jury's conclusion of actionable negligence on the part of the defendant driver was correctly bottomed on his failure to keep a proper lookout and maintain his vehicle under proper control. The minor plaintiff observed the defendant driver's head turned away from the road ahead and this testimony was buttressed by the defendant driver's admissions and utterances after the accident that 'Oh, my God, I just didn't see them (the...