Mahers v. State, s. 88-579

• Decision Date: 22 March 1989
• Docket Number: 88-281,Nos. 88-579,s. 88-579
• Citation: 437 N.W.2d 565
• Parties: Ronald MAHERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. Stephen C. LEONARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 565

437 N.W.2d 565

Ronald MAHERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

Stephen C. LEONARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

Nos. 88-579, 88-281.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 22, 1989.

Raymond E. Rogers, Acting State Public Defender, for appellant Mahers.

Raymond E. Rogers, Acting State Public Defender, and B. John Burns, Asst. State Public Defender, for appellant Leonard.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Gordon E. Allen, Deputy Atty. Gen., John M. Parmeter, and Suzie A. Berregaard, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

These cases present a common issue: the extent to which an inmate has the due process right under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing.

Ronald Mahers and Stephen C. Leonard, while inmates, were each charged with infractions of prison disciplinary rules. Mahers apparently wanted to call three other inmates as witnesses at his disciplinary hearing to assist with his defense. Leonard, on the other hand, wanted to call prison employees who had prepared the disciplinary complaints against him. Each was denied the opportunity to call these witnesses, and the prison disciplinary committee subjected each to discipline for rule violations. Each exhausted administrative appeals and applied to the district court for postconviction relief, which was denied. Mahers and Leonard have separately appealed these denials to this court.

In addition to the witness issue, Mahers argues that the committee's decision in his case was not supported by sufficient evidence, and Leonard argues that the committee failed to hold or continue his hearing within the required length of time.

In Mahers' case, we hold that the denial of postconviction relief must be reversed because he was not allowed to call his requested witnesses. In Leonard's case, however, we affirm the district court's decision.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A. Mahers. On December 19, 1986, at 10:10 p.m., Mahers was in his cell at the Iowa State Penitentiary when a correctional officer allegedly observed a fire in the cell and told Mahers four times to put it out. Mahers apparently did so after the fourth order from the officer. Mahers, however, claims he had been asleep since 7:00 p.m. on that night and was still asleep when the guard first spoke to him.

Mahers was charged with violations of three rules: rule 23 (disobeying a lawful order), rule 27 (obstructive or disruptive conduct), and rule 39 (safety and sanitation). The prison disciplinary committee held a hearing. The only evidence presented against Mahers was apparently a written statement from the officer who had allegedly observed the fire. No physical evidence of the fire was preserved or presented.

Upon Mahers' request, statements had been taken from two other inmates, Blair and Hill, and these statements were considered at the hearing. A third inmate, Swanson, had refused to give a statement to the investigating officer.

Blair's statement said that he had asked Hill to wake Mahers at 11:30 p.m. on the night in question so that Mahers would not miss a television program and so that Blair could talk to him. According to Blair, Hill was unable to wake Mahers until about 11:50. Hill's statement was consistent with Blair's.

It is not clear from the record that Mahers actually requested that Blair and Hill be called as witnesses at the disciplinary hearing; he may only have asked the disciplinary committee to take more complete statements from them. The committee, however, did neither. Regarding Blair's original statement, the committee's written decision says that it is irrelevant that Mahers was asleep after the time of the alleged fire. The decision also says that Hill's statement could not be understood and that Swanson would not comment.

The committee found that Mahers had violated the rules in question. As punishment, he received fifteen days of disciplinary detention, loss of thirty days of good time, and six months of administrative segregation.

After exhausting his administrative appeals, Mahers applied to the district court for postconviction relief. The court denied his application, and Mahers has now appealed. He asserts that his rights under a prison rule and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment were violated by the committee's refusal to call the requested witnesses. He also contends that the evidence against him was not sufficient.

B. Leonard. On February 1, 1987, at 9:50 a.m., while Leonard was working in the penitentiary kitchen, a food service worker who was not an inmate requested that Leonard help prepare trays. Leonard allegedly replied, "No, I'm not going to help." Soon after, he refused another request from the same food service worker. This worker and another one who was apparently present submitted disciplinary reports concerning this incident.

On February 2 at 7:30 a.m., Leonard was served with the disciplinary reports and placed in summary segregation. On February 4 at 11:00 a.m., he was served with a notice that his disciplinary hearing would be continued. This hearing was held on February 6.

The disciplinary committee considered the written reports of the food service workers but denied Leonard's request that they be called as witnesses. The committee stated in writing that the workers should not be called because their testimony, with Leonard's questioning, would have amounted to cross-examination.

The committee found that Leonard had violated prison rule 23 (disobeying a lawful order). As punishment, he was given ten days of disciplinary detention, loss of sixteen days of good time, and "invocation of any summary disposition."

After exhausting his administrative appeals, Leonard applied to the district court for postconviction relief. The court denied his application, and he has now appealed to this court. Leonard asserts that the refusal to call his requested witnesses violated his rights under a prison rule and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He also argues that the committee failed to either hold or continue his hearing within "two working days," which is required by a prison rule when summary action has been taken.

II. Scope of Review.

In considering the constitutional issues concerning the right to call witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the case de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Iowa 1979); see also Wilson v. Farrier, 372 N.W.2d 499, 501-02 (Iowa 1985) (sufficiency of evidence as due process issue). Regarding the time limit issue, we only examine the district court's decision to correct errors of law. State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 1975).

III. The Right to Call Witnesses at a Disciplinary Hearing.

In Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1979), we discussed in detail prisoners' due process rights at a disciplinary hearing. These rights are mandated by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). " 'In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.' ... 'Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.' " Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 756 (quoting Wolff ).

But we went on to say that "[o]n the other hand, occupants of penal institutions, although prisoners, are persons, and they are not beyond the pale of the Constitution. Prison officials must not permit a disciplinary proceeding against such a person to be a mere gesture or a sham. The person has a liberty interest protected by the due process clause." Id. Specifically, a prisoner has a due process right at a disciplinary hearing to call witnesses and present written evidence. Id. at 757. This right, however, is not unlimited. The prisoner should be allowed to " 'call witnesses ... in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.' " Id. (quoting Wolff ).

Following the Supreme Court's suggestion in Wolff, we have recommended, without actually requiring, that the authorities offer reasons for refusing a prisoner's request to call witnesses: "If the officers refuse to call witnesses, they would be well advised to indicate their reason in their decision; otherwise they run increased risk that their refusal may appear unjustified under the particular circumstances." Id. at 759.

Under Wolff, however, the prisoner does not have a due process right to confront or cross-examine witnesses. Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 758 (citing Wolff ). The Supreme Court reasoned that " '[c]onfrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to institutional interests. If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the inmate were allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable havoc inside the prison walls.' " Fichtner, 285 N.W.2d at 758 (quoting Wolff ).

We explained in Fichtner that a prisoner "may question the evidence against him to the extent that he may personally respond to the contents of the report and produce evidence in support of his position." Id. at 759. We recognized, however, that Wolff does not give a prisoner the right to be confronted by opposing witnesses. Id.

Hence, an inmate has a due process right under some circumstances to call witnesses. In addition, prison rule III(D)(6) provides that an inmate "shall be permitted to offer evidence supporting his case, including ... the calling of witnesses." This rule was clearly intended to effectuate the rights of prisoners mandated by Wolff and Fichtner.

We think the key to resolving the witness issues in these cases is the status...