Mahoney v. L. L. Sheep Co.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1958
• Docket Number: No. 2830,2830
• Citation: 333 P.2d 712,79 Wyo. 293
• Parties: Phillip S. MAHONEY, Appellant (Appellant below), v. L. L. SHEEP COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee (Appellee below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 712

333 P.2d 712

79 Wyo. 293

Phillip S. MAHONEY, Appellant (Appellant below), v. L. L. SHEEP COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee (Appellee below).

No. 2830.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 16, 1958.

Murane & Bostwick, Edward E. Murane, Casper, for appellant.

W. J. Wehrli, Casper, for appellee.

Before BLUME, C. J., and HARNSBERGER and PARKER, JJ.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court.

This case relates to conflicting applications for rental of several nonadjoining tracts of State grazing land. ¹ The L. L. Sheep Company, hereafter referred to as the company or appellee, had for many years occupied 11,670.11 acres of Taylor grazing land in the immediate area of its stock-raising operations. Prior to 1955 the company had made application for transfer of this Taylor land to State ownership; and when the acreage was transferred, the company applied to the Commissioner of Public Lands to lease it. Other ranchers in the area also applied to lease a portion of it, Phillip S. Mahoney requesting 7,017.44 acres. The commissioner awarded the company a lease for 9,040.71 acres and Mahoney 1,669.40, ² and both parties appealed. The land board approved the commissioner's decision, and Mahoney appealed to the district court, which issued judgment affirming the board's decision. Mahoney presents this appeal, urging that the judgment is contrary to the evidence and to the law in that there was a grave abuse and illegal exercise of the board's discretion. His view stems principally from two contentions: (1) that an inexperienced commissioner gave weight to various matters which rightly had no bearing upon the granting of the lease and the board blindly followed the commissioner, thereby gravely abusing its discretion; (2) that the board's decision is a patent violation of § 24-115, W.C.S.1945, since the statute provides that the board shall grant the lease to the applicant holding title to the lands nearest those for which application has been made, whereas the board instead of considering the location of each applicant's land arbitrarily awarded the lease on some other basis.

In arguing the inexperience of the commissioner and pointing out the error which allegedly ensued because of this, appellant lists the reasons which the commissioner gave for granting of the leases:

"In awarding these leases, I have been governed primarily by the preceding reports of the inspector[s] and assessor; and also by the following facts and conditions:

"1. actual need for the land;

"2. accessibility;

"3. the amount of deeded land owned;

"4. no applicant has a legal preference right as a former lessee;

"5. LL Sheep Company made application for transfer of this land to State ownership;

"6. LL Sheep Company paid all advertising costs in the amount of $327.90.' (Emphasis supplied.)'

Appellant begins his discussion of these reasons by merely saying that the commissioner did not follow the recommendation of one of the inspectors who said:

'Both of these parties own and run a great number of livestock. It looks like this tract should be divided in these two ranches.'

We doubt if this matter can be brushed aside so casually. The commissioner said it was a primary reason for his decision, and there is nothing to show to the contrary. It was one way of pointing out conflicting equities between the company and Mahoney. The fact that the commissioner's division was not equal or that he did not cut each piece in the middle does not mean that the recommendation was ignored.

Appellant argues the commissioner's numbered reasons at some length, and we will consider them in the order listed, bearing in mind that the commissioner's decision related to other applicants as well as the parties before us.

1. Actual Need for the Land. This admittedly is normally an important consideration but has little actual bearing on the present litigation because the two parties here both need the area under application.

2. Accessibility. This too while important in a consideration of all applicants was not determinative as far as these two were concerned since the land adjoined both.

3. The Amount of Deeded Land Owned. Ownership of land in the area of that to be leased is not a consideration which is legally persuasive per se, but undeniably it does constitute an equity. We have often said that the legislature meant to make it the policy of the State in leasing its land to recognize existing equities of the applicants. See Stauffer v. Johnson, 71 Wyo. 386, 259 P.2d 753, 763; and Kerrigan v. Miller, 53 Wyo. 441, 84 P.2d 724, 729. To list the amount of land as a factor here, if an error at all, is not seriously out of line if we interpret his reason as stated in the light of ordinary parlance.

4. No Applicant Has a Legal Preference. The fact that none of the parties had a legal preference admittedly was a proper item for consideration even though it could not be determinative.

5. L. L. Sheep Company Had Made Application for Transfer of This Land to State Ownership. This factor had no bearing on the standing of the company except that it tended to indicate prior use of the sought land by that applicant. It bore upon the question of the standing to be accorded to one who was in a sense seeking a renewal. This then if literally construed was an equity which we would be reluctant to rule out as a consideration available to the commissioner. See Sullivan Co. v. Meer, 58 Wyo. 90, 125 P.2d 168, 173.

6. L. L. Sheep Company Paid All Advertising Costs in the Amount of $327.90. This item should have constituted no basis for award of the lease except as it might possibly connote to the commissioner the company's prior occupancy of the land.

Appellant insists that the board 'blindly followed the recommendation of the commissioner' and thereby adopted his reasons. It is true that we indicated in Sullivan Co. v. Meer, supra, the propriety of presuming the board to have adopted the commissioner's reasons where record showed none by the board. However, we doubt if this rule should apply where as in the present case a full hearing was had and a transcribed record of all the proceedings made and available. Even if we should assume that the reasons of the board were those of the commissioner, we think they are not so untenable as to constitute an abuse or illegal exercise of discretion.

Appellant's second basis of challenge to the judgment is that the board in addition to blindly following the commissioner patently violated § 24-115 which reads:

'If two or more qualified applicants shall offer the same annual rental for the same lands, and such offers are the highest offers received and are equal and above the minimum rental fixed by the board, and no preference exists in the old lessee, or if such old lessee does not exercise such preference, the board shall grant the lease to the applicant holding title to lands nearest to the lands applied for. * * *' He says the granting of the lease to the applicant holding title to the nearest lands is mandatory and insists that since the State lands in the present case adjoined areas occupied by both parties the State lease must be divided equally between the two. Let us examine his thesis.

Although the two parties did not initially offer the same annual rental, the company later agreed to meet any bid, and the figure to each of the parties was ten cents per acre, so that from this aspect the matter might fall within the mentioned provision; however, the statute contains no direction to the board with relation to the method of division of State land under circumstances such as presented here. Thus, the interpretation which appellant urges can be based only on speculation of what the legislature intended. We indicated in State ex rel. Fawcett v. Board of County Com'rs of Albany County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188, that the intention and meaning of the legislature must be determined from the language of the statute itself and not from conjecture aliunde. See also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 322. It should be noted in that connection that we are obligated to construe all statutes on this subject in pari materia, Mustanen v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 50 Wyo. 462, 62 P.2d 287; and such interpretation should apply as to the date of enactment, State ex rel. R. R. Crow & Co. v. Copenhaver, 64 Wyo. 1, 184 P.2d 594. Ch. 108, S. L. of Wyoming, 1929, the source of § 24-115, contained a section immediately preceding it (as amended now § 24-113, W.C.S.1945) which gave preference to persons holding title to lands 'in the vicinity of the land applied for'....