Mainstay Fisheries, Inc. v. N. Waterfront Assocs., L.P., C.A. No. NC-2009-0382

• Decision Date: 04 November 2016
• Docket Number: C.A. No. NC-2009-0382
• Parties: MAINSTAY FISHERIES, INC. AND RICHARD F. MUDD, SR. v. NORTHERN WATERFRONT ASSOCIATES, L.P. and NORTHERN WATERFRONT ASSOCIATES CO., LLC v. KANE AND KANE, INC.; EAST PASSAGE REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATES, L.P.; MT. HOPE MARINE CONTRACTORS, INC.; MICHAEL VIERA; SHELTOW I, INC.; JOHN SHELTON; CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY; AND CAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

MAINSTAY FISHERIES, INC. AND RICHARD F. MUDD, SR. v. NORTHERN WATERFRONT ASSOCIATES,L.P. and NORTHERN WATERFRONT ASSOCIATES CO., LLC v. KANE AND KANE, INC.; EAST PASSAGE REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATES, L.P.;

MT. HOPE MARINE CONTRACTORS, INC.;

MICHAEL VIERA; SHELTOW I, INC.;

JOHN SHELTON; CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY;

AND CAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION

C.A. No. NC-2009-0382

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS NEWPORT, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

November 4, 2016

DECISION

STONE, J.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Mainstay Fisheries, Inc.'s (Plaintiff) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Requests for Jury Instructions on the issue of the duty of care owed to Plaintiff by Defendants Northern Waterfront Associates, L.P. and Northern Waterfront Associates, Co., LLC (jointly, Defendants). In response, Defendants filed a timely objection. This Court heard arguments from the parties on October 3, 2016.¹ Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasoning set forth in further detail below, the Plaintiff's Motion is denied.

IBackground

The following facts are undisputed by the parties. Plaintiff is a Rhode Island corporation which at all times material hereto had a principal place of business in Portsmouth, Rhode Island. Plaintiff Richard F. Mudd, Sr. is a resident of Tiverton, Rhode Island and was the sole shareholder and officer of Plaintiff. The F/V KISMET, a 65-foot, single-crew, offshore, wooden lobster boat, was built in 1981 and was owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff Richard F. Mudd, Sr. was the Captain of the F/V KISMET. Throughout its service, the F/V KISMET was operated as an offshore lobster/gillnet² fishing vessel for Plaintiff.

Defendant Northern Waterfront Associates, L.P. is a Delaware Limited Partnership with a principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Defendant Northern Waterfront Associates, Co., LLC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company and is the general partner of Northern Waterfront Associates, L.P. Defendant Northern Waterfront Associates, L.P. was the owner of the Mount Hope Marine Terminal Dock (the Pier) in Portsmouth, Rhode Island at all relevant times. Defendant/Third-Party Defendant John Shelton (Mr. Shelton) is a resident of Tiverton, Rhode Island and the President of Defendant/Third-Party Defendant Sheltow I, Inc. (Sheltow). Sheltow consisted of a tugboat, the HOPE, and a barge, which were used for tasks like taking fresh water out to vessels. Sheltow was doing business out of the Pier until it could locate a more permanent base of operations.

Sheltow had purchased a crane and other equipment from Defendant Mt. Hope Marine Contractors. On July 3, 2007, Mr. Shelton was on the Pier working on the crane. On that day, there was a great deal of activity happening on the Pier; there were adolescents in the area preparing a bonfire,³ there were individuals walking on the beach, including Sarah Edelstein (Ms. Edelstein), and there were laborers working, including Mr. Shelton and Mike Kelly (Mr. Kelly). According to Mr. Shelton, both he and Mr. Kelly worked on the Pier until approximately 4:00 pm. At that time, Mr. Shelton left for a meeting in Tiverton, Rhode Island.

Sometime later that evening, the Pier caught fire. Mr. Viera and Ms. Edelstein—two eyewitnesses—were talking when Mr. Viera observed smoke on the Pier, in the vicinity of the pump and crane. Ms. Edelstein proceeded to take pictures, fully documenting the fire from its onset. At some point, the F/V KISMET, which was docked on the Pier, caught fire and drifted out into the waters surrounding the Pier. The F/V KISMET became a total loss from the damages sustained in the fire. As a result, on July 24, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging negligence on the part of various defendants in Newport County Superior Court.

IIStandard of Review

As a threshold matter, this Court will address whether maritime or state law is applicable to Plaintiff's motion. We previously held that maritime law would govern all substantive issues relating to Plaintiff's claims, while procedural matters would be decided according to the law of Rhode Island. See Mainstay Fisheries, Inc. v. N. Waterfront Assocs., L.P., 2016 WL 878739 (R.I. Super. Mar. 2, 2016). "Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a procedural device that, in the proper circumstances, plays an appropriate role in separating thewheat from the chaff in the litigation process." Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Ctr., Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 557 (R.I. 2009); see also Sharkey v. Prescott, 19 A.3d 62, 66 (R.I. 2011) (explaining the procedural rule's utility in identifying issues appropriate for trial); Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91 (R.I. 1996) (clarifying that the purpose of the summary judgment procedure was to identify issues for trial, not to resolve the issues); Benner v. J.H. Lynch & Sons, Inc., 641 A.2d 332, 334-35 (R.I. 1994) (addressing whether summary judgment was the appropriate procedural vehicle for determining whether discovery rules apply). Thus, state law governs the standard of review, and the well-settled procedure for deciding summary judgment motions will guide this Court's analysis.

"Summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should be applied cautiously." Sjogren v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I. 1997) (citation omitted). This Court will grant a party's motion for summary judgment only if it finds, "'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]'" Pereira v. Fitzgerald, 21 A.3d 369, 372 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I. 2006); see also Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 (R.I. 2009). "It is important to bear in mind that the 'purpose of the summary judgment procedure is issue finding, not issue determination.'" Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 391 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Indus. Nat'l. Bank v. Peloso, 121 R.I. 305, 307, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313 (R.I. 1979)). The trial justice views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing from that evidence all reasonable inferences in support of the nonmoving party's claim but without resolving any factual disputes. Holliston Mills, Inc. v. Citizens Trust Co., 604 A.2d 331, 334 (R.I. 1992).

"[T]he nonmoving party carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and 'cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Classic Entm't & Sports, Inc. v. Pemberton, 988 A.2d 847, 849 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996)). "Rather, the nonmoving party must affirmatively assert facts that raise a genuine issue to be resolved." Hydro-Mfg. Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 954 (R.I. 1994); see also Super. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

IIIAnalysis

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of duty, arguing that Defendants, as the owners of the Pier, were obligated to comply with the Rhode Island Fire Safety Code (the Fire Safety Code) and NFPA 307. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to the Fire Safety Code and NFPA 307, this Court should impose seven specific statutory duties upon the Defendants. Additionally, Plaintiff requests jury instructions regarding the applicability of the Fire Safety Code and NFPA 307.

AStatutory Duty

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that "in an admiralty action in state court, issues which would be considered 'substantive' are governed by federal maritime law." King v. Huntress, Inc., 94 A.3d 467, 499 (R.I. 2014). As the issue of liability is decidedly substantive, general maritime law will control. In deciding whether Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court will consider Plaintiff's Motion in light of federal precedent on maritime negligence. See Pereira, 21 A.3d at 372 (explaining summary judgment should only be grantedif the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); see also La Esperanza de P.R., Inc. v. Perez y Cia. de P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating a negligence cause of action in admiralty invokes maritime negligence principles and not those of the common law). When necessary, the Court will supplement with state law. See Fairest-Knight v. Marine World Distribs., Inc., 652 F.3d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that state law may supplement federal maritime law when the latter is silent on a specific issue or where a local matter is at issue).

The Court begins with a brief overview of the law on maritime negligence. "'Admiralty jurisdiction brings with it a body of federal jurisprudence, largely uncodified, known as maritime law.'" Fairest-Knight, 652 F.3d at 98 (quoting Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 625 (1st Cir. 1994)). In the absence of statute, "the judicially-developed norms of the general maritime law, 'an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules,' govern actions in admiralty." La Esperanza de P.R., 124 F.3d at 16 (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986)). "[N]egligence causes of action in admiralty invoke the principles of maritime negligence, [and] not those of the common law." Id. at 17 (citing to Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953)). However, when precedent is otherwise lacking, courts rely on general negligence principles to decide issues. See Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903, 910 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972) ("it has long been held that even though admiralty suits are governed by federal substantive and procedural law, courts applying maritime law may adopt state law by express or implied reference or by virtue of the interstitial nature of federal law").

Maritime negligence...