Malinou v. Powers, No. 73-248-A

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JOSLIN
• Citation: 114 R.I. 399,333 A.2d 420
• Docket Number: No. 73-248-A
• Decision Date: 14 March 1975
• Parties: Martin S. MALINOU v. William E. POWERS, Chairman, et al. ppeal.

Page 420

333 A.2d 420 114 R.I. 399 Martin S. MALINOU
v.
William E. POWERS, Chairman, et al. No. 73-248-Appeal. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. March 14, 1975.

Page 421

[114 R.I. 406] Martin Malinou, pro se.

Richard J. Israel, Atty. Gen., W. Slater Allen, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

OPINION

[114 R.I. 400] JOSLIN, Justice.

This action for a declaratory judgment was brought in the Superior Court by Martin Malinou as a citizen of this state and a delegate to its 1973 Constitutional Convention. He seeks a judgment declaring invalid those provisions of P.L.1973, ch. 98, which purport to govern the convention's agenda and duration, and he also asks for reasonable compensation for services rendered both as a delegate to the convention and as an attorney in these proceedings. Named as defendants are the State of Rhode Island, its general officers, and the chairman of the convention. The plaintiff's principal contentions are, in substance, that the Legislature lacked authority to limit the convention's power to propose amendments to the constitution, that the limitations in issue, even if authorized, were not enacted in a manner permitted by In re Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935), and taat his rights as a delegate and the convention's deliberations were thereby impermissibly 'chilled.'

The case was heard in the Superior Court while the convention was sitting. In a decision announced prior to the convention's adjournment, the trial justice refused the request for a declaratory judgment for these reasons: the plaintiff lacked standing, the defendants were immune from suit, and the questions presented were premature because the convention's actual conduct indicated its effective disregard of the allegedly chilling restrictions. Consequently, he concluded that the plaintiff, in effect, was seeking an advisory opinion which the Superior Court was powerless to grant. In addition, he held on estoppel and immunity [114 R.I. 401] grounds that the plaintiff was not entitled to be paid for his services either as a delegate or as an attorney. The case is now here on the plaintiff's appeal.

The legislation in controversy authorized the Governor to call a special election between August 1 and August 10, 1973, to determine whether a constitutional convention should be convened to consider proposing amendments to the state's constitution in four specific areas. ¹ That question was submitted to the people on August 7, 1973, and they voted to hold a convention for the 'sole and limited purpose' of amending the constitution in the four areas permitted by the call legislation. In addition, they elected delegates, including plaintiff, to the convention thus authorized.

The call legislation also provided that the convention should conclude its business no later than October 4, 1973, that the delegates should receive no compensation for attending, and that those amendments receiving the convention's approval should be

Page 422

presented to the people at a special election to be called by the Governor between November 1 and November 15, 1973. Unlike the limitations placed on the convention's agenda, these latter provisions were neither required to be, nor were they in fact, submitted to the electorate.

Thereafter, pursuant to a proclamation issued by the [114 R.I. 402] Governor, the convention convened on September 4, 1973. During the sessions that followed, plaintiff and other delegates offered 91 proposals for altering the constitution, many of which went beyond the four areas opened to the convention by the General Assembly and the people. These proposals were referred to the various committees of the convention for review. Some were reported out of committee and considered by the full convention, while others, including some sponsored by plaintiff, were tabled. Subsequent to the trial court's decision, the convention adjourned sine die within the time limitation fixed by the call legislation. Prior thereto, however, it approved seven proposed amendments for submission to the people, and two of these-the proposals for changing the terms of office of the state's general officers and the manner of amending the state's constitution-went beyond the subject matter restrictions of the call legislation.

The primary question presented by this appeal is whether the legislative limitations on the agenda and duration of the 1973 Constitutional Convention were valid. The plaintiff argues that they impermissibly discouraged delegates from proposing, and the convention from considering, multiple amendments. He does not indicate, however, that any proposal of his or of nay other delegate was ruled out of order, and he does not deny that the convention finally adopted two resolutions, and entertained...