Mallard v. Tele-Trip Co., TELE-TRIP

Decision Date13 May 1981
Docket NumberTELE-TRIP,No. VV-252,VV-252
Citation398 So.2d 969
PartiesRobert A. MALLARD, Property Appraiser, Duval County, Florida, Appellant, v.COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Dawson A. McQuaig, Grady W. Martin and William Lee Allen, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Robert C. Gobelman and Jack W. Shaw, Jr., of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for appellee.

ERVIN, Judge.

The parties have asked us to determine whether an ad valorem tax on a leasehold interest of governmental property that is measured by income or volume of transactions assessed against an insurer or its agent by a local government is void, because this subject has been preempted by virtue of Section 624.520, Florida Statutes. Because we find that this statute does not preempt this type of tax, the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of the appellee, Tele-Trip Company, is reversed.

Tele-Trip entered into an air travel insurance concession agreement with the Jacksonville Port Authority, which is the corporate political entity that operates Jacksonville International Airport. Commencing December 1, 1977, the agreement permitted Tele-Trip to sell air travel insurance for a three-year period from an insurance counter and various machines at the airport.

Appellant, Robert A. Mallard, who is the Duval County Property Appraiser, informed Tele-Trip in 1978 that his office had determined the ad valorem tax assessment of the appellee's leasehold interest at the airport to be $83,000.00. After losing an appeal on this determination to the Duval County Property Appraisal Adjustment Board, Tele-Trip filed suit in circuit court. The appellee's contention was that it was exempt from any ad valorem tax based on Section 624.520(1), Florida Statutes (1971), which states:

624.520 Preemption by state.

(1) This state hereby preempts the field of imposing excise, privilege, franchise, income, license, permit, registration and similar taxes and fees, measured by premiums, income, or volume of transactions, upon insurers and their agents and other representatives, and no county, city, municipality, district, school district, or other political subdivision or agency in this state shall impose, levy, charge or require the same, subject however to the provisions of subsection (2).

Tele-Trip stated its argument was reinforced by appellant's admission that the assessment was based on a capitalization of Tele-Trip's assumed minimum income. The minimum income figure was derived by using Tele-Trip's annual rental paid to the Jacksonville Port Authority. The agreement provided that Tele-Trip would pay $10,000 per year or 17% of the gross sales derived from over-the-counter sales (whichever is greater), and in addition, pay 13% of the gross premiums on all machine insurance sales.

Tele-Trip advocated the view that the tax was measured by income or volume of transactions. Therefore, the tax was preempted by the statute set out above. 1 Tele-Trip cited the City of Opa-Locka v. Metropolitan Dade County, 247 So.2d 755 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1971), reh. denied, in which the court struck down an ad valorem tax on the leasehold interest of an insurance company at the publicly owned Opa-Locka Airport. 2 The tax in that case was computed in part by considering the annual rental amount being paid by the company. The trial judge below agreed with Tele-Trip and granted summary judgment. We reverse.

While the City of Opa-Locka case is factually very similar, it involved the assessment and collection of taxes for 1966, 1967 and 1968. The all-encompassing rule in that case is no longer applicable because the tax law of this state has changed considerably since that time. Article VII, Section 10(c), Florida Constitution of 1968, is indicative of the change in the law. This section provides for the taxation of leasehold interests held by private interests on certain capital projects constructed with funds from the sale of revenue bonds floated by a local governmental entity. The court in City of Opa-Locka, supra, never considered this constitutional provision, because the contested tax assessments involved were for years prior to the approval of Article VII, Section 10(c). See Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 275 So.2d 505, 517 n. 10 (Fla.1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting), reh. denied.

In reference to the case at bar, the most relevant change in the law, since the City of Opa-Locka decision, is evidenced by the tax statutes which were substantially amended by the legislature in 1971. As a part of the comprehensive alterations enacted into law, the legislature created Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, mandating the taxation of leasehold interests in real property, and Section 196.199(2), Florida Statutes, which provides an exemption from the taxation of leasehold interests in real property. See Laws of Florida, Chap. 71-133, §§ 11 and 16. Similarly, Section 624.520, Florida Statutes, was also created by transferring it from another section, as part of the 1971 statutory revision process. Therefore, City of Opa-Locka, supra, is not applicable to the case at bar.

Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes (1971), states that, unless expressly exempted by statute, "All leasehold interests in property of ... any political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state" shall be subject to taxation. "While subsection two does not expressly state that a lease from a governmental body is a real property interest for ad valorem tax purposes, this is a necessary conclusion which must be drawn since subsection two mandates that governmental leases, not used for public purposes, be taxed." First National Bank of Birmingham v. Department of Revenue, 364 So.2d 38, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), reh. denied, appeal dismissed 368 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1979); see also, St. John's Associates v. Mallard, 366 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), writ discharged, 373 So.2d 912 (Fla.1979).

The effect of this statute is to place the holders of leases of publicly owned real property on a parity with real property owners in the private sector. Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 375 So.2d 283, 285 (Fla.1979), reh. denied; Williams v. Jones, 326 So.2d 425, 430 (Fla.1975);, reh. denied (1976), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 803, 97 S.Ct. 34, 50 L.Ed.2d 63. Therefore, holders of leases of publicly owned lands are required to bear their fair share of the tax burden, unless specifically exempted. First National Bank of Birmingham, supra, at 40; Williams, supra, at 430. In Walden, supra, at 285, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the only exemption to Section 196.001(2), Florida Statutes, is specified in Section 196.199(2), Florida Statutes, which permits an exemption, if the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function. On appeal, Tele-Trip does not contend that it falls within this exception. The tax assessed against Tele-Trip is, therefore, not only proper; it is mandatory.

In our opinion, a review of the grammar and punctuation utilized by the legislature in Section 624.520(1), Florida Statutes (1971), seems to militate against the view advocated by Tele-Trip. The statute preempts the imposition of certain taxes and fees upon insurers and their agents. The list of taxes and fees includes "excise, privilege, franchise, income, license, permit, registration and similar taxes and fees, measured by premiums, income, or volume of transactions...." § 624.520(1), Fla.Stat. (1971). "(U)nder the 'doctrine of the last antecedent,' relative and qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote." Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 482 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 1973), reh. denied, 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 334.

In the statute at bar, it is apparent that the clause "measured by premiums, income, or volume of transactions" is a clause that qualifies or limits. Applying the "doctrine of the last antecedent," there can be little doubt that the clause applies only to the enumerated taxes and fees, including "excise, privilege, franchise, income, license, permit, registration and similar taxes and fees." Quite obviously, ad valorem taxes are not included within the list of enumerated taxes. The seven enumerated taxes and fees are followed by the clause "and similar taxes and fees." We must determine whether an ad valorem tax on a leasehold interest in real estate is a tax "similar" to the seven categories of taxes and fees.

The principle of ejusdem generis is relevant. "Under this rule, where the enumeration of specific things is followed by a more general word or phrase, the general phrase is construed to refer to a thing of the same kind or species as included within the preceding and more confining terms." Halifax Area Council on Alcoholism v. City of Daytona Beach, 385 So.2d 184, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Soverino v. State, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla.1978). If the legislature had intended general words such as "similar taxes" in Section 624.520, Florida Statutes, to be used in an unrestricted sense, it would not have mentioned a specific class of taxes in the statute. Soverino, supra, at 273; see also, 2A Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47.17, et seq.

An ad valorem tax is definitely not of the same "species" as an excise, privilege, franchise, income, license, permit, or registration tax. This is indicated by Hi-Octane Terminal Company v. Panama City, 164 So.2d 39, 40-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), in which this Court cited a discussion on this issue by the Florida Supreme Court in City of DeLand v. Florida Public Service Co., 119 Fla. 804, 161 So. 735 at 738 (1935) (emphasis supplied):

All taxes, other than polls, are either direct or indirect property taxes. A direct tax is one that is imposed directly...

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    ...conclude that the school district's power of taxation in this area is expressly authorized by the constitution. Cf. Mallard v. Tele-Trip Co., 398 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla.1981) (use of word "shall" in article VII, section 9 mandates legislature to authoriz......
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