Mallory v. Hetzel
Decision Date | 26 August 2016 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:12-CV-1011-WHA [WO] |
Parties | JACQUES G. MALLORY, #191 525, Mallory, v. WARDEN GARY HETZEL, III, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff Jacques Mallory, a state inmate, challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him during his incarceration at the Easterling Correctional Facility, in Clio, Alabama.1 The defendants are Warden Gary Hetzel, Classification Specialist Larry Anglin, and Correctional Officer Lorenzo Greene. Mallory alleges that on October 16, 2012, defendant Greene subjected him to excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Following the altercation, Mallory claims that he received a disciplinary for assault on a correctional officer as a "cover up scheme" in response to Greene's actions. Mallory seeks damages and injunctive relief.
Defendants filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary materials addressing Mallory's claims for relief. (Docs. 14, 16). The court informed Mallory that it may consider defendants' special report as a motion for summary judgment, and granted Mallory an opportunity to file a response to defendants' report; Mallory did so.(Docs. 18, 19). Defendants' special report is construed as a motion for summary judgment, and the matter is ripe for consideration.
For the reasons discussed below, upon consideration of the pleadings, the parties' briefs, and the evidence of record, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED and all claims resolved in favor of the defendants.
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ( ); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence to support some element on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.
Defendants have met their evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to Mallory to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-594 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a Mallory's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment, and the facts pled in the complaint are treated as affidavit testimony for purposes of this recommendation. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to survive defendants' properly supported motion for summary judgment, Mallory must produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250 (internal citations omitted). Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs likewise cannot create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) ( ); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) ( ); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) ( ).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and establishes the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 ( ); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) ( ).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Mallory's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of the principles of production and proof in a civil case.
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