Maloney v. Pac

• Citation: 183 Conn. 313,439 A.2d 349
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 17 March 1981
• Parties: Mary MALONEY v. Stanley J. PAC et al.

Page 349

439 A.2d 349

183 Conn. 313

Mary MALONEY v. Stanley J. PAC et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 12, 1980.

Decided March 17, 1981.

James A. Wade, Hartford, for appellant (defendant Legislative Regulations Review Committee).

Christopher M. Royston, with whom, on the brief, was Robert N. Wienner, Hartford, for appellant (defendant Balf Company).

Frank Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Pamela R. Hershinson, Hartford, with whom was Robert B. Shapiro, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Alexander A. Goldfarb, Corp. Counsel, and James F. Meehan, Sp. Asst. Corp. Counsel, Hartford, with whom on the brief, were Dennis L. Pieragostini and James J. Szerejka, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Hartford, and Paula Zeiner, Bloomfield, for appellee (defendant city of Hartford).

Before BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY, ARMENTANO and WRIGHT, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment that General Statutes § 4-170, ¹ permitting the legislature to veto administrative regulations, is unconstitutional. The plaintiff, Mary Maloney, brought an action against the state traffic commission and its members, and the city of Hartford and its acting city manager, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the legislative veto of action taken by the state traffic commission. The Legislative Regulations Review Committee of the legislature (LRRC) and the Balf Company were added as defendants by order of the trial court. The defendant city of Hartford cross claimed against the state traffic commission and the LRRC. From a judgment for the plaintiff on her complaint and for the city of Hartford on the cross claim the LRRC and the Balf Company have appealed. ²

This litigation arises out of traffic problems on parts of two streets in the city of Hartford. In early 1976 the state traffic commission, acting pursuant to General Statutes § 14-298, ³ adopted ⁴ § 14-298-270 of its regulations, prohibiting through truck traffic on Stone and Brookfield Streets between Flatbush and New Britain Avenues in Hartford. This action had been requested by the city manager of Hartford, who is, under the Hartford charter, the traffic authority of that city. His request, in turn, was the result of complaints by residents of Stone Street of heavy truck traffic and resulting noise, pollution, and safety hazards.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-170, this traffic regulation was then submitted to the Legislative Regulations Review Committee (LRRC), a joint committee of the General Assembly consisting of eight representatives and six senators, for review. On April 20, 1976, that committee disapproved the regulation as "in conflict with the original intention of the law" because based upon traffic engineering reports prepared by the city of Hartford rather than by the state department of transportation. The regulation was never formally rescinded but the state traffic commission forwarded to the acting city manager of Hartford a copy of the LRRC's statement of disapproval on May 18, 1976. Signs which forbade through truck traffic on Stone and Brookfield Streets, and had been posted after the July, 1975, action of the state traffic commission, were thereafter removed.

The plaintiff, Mary Maloney, a resident of the immediate vicinity of Stone Street, thereupon brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging her own injury due to vibration, dust, noise, fumes, and gravel from the trucks which, the trial court found, used the Stone-Brookfield Streets route before the regulation was adopted and after the signs were removed but not while the trucks were banned therefrom. She alleged that General Statutes § 4-170 violates both the federal and state constitutions and that the removal of the signs was therefore illegal; she sought a judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of General Statutes § 4-170 and an injunction requiring the replacement of the signs.

In its consideration of the issues presented, the trial court, O'Brien, J., was bound by the earlier determination of the Superior Court, Covello, J., that the traffic regulation adopted was a regulation within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-170 and thus subject to review by the LRRC. ⁵ State v. Deep, 181 Conn. 284, 435 A.2d 333 (1980). Thus the issue of the statute's constitutionality was squarely presented at trial. After trial, the court held General Statutes § 4-170 unconstitutional and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and for the city of Hartford on its cross claim. The court thereupon enjoined the state traffic commission to resume the action that it had undertaken prior to the legislative veto by the LRRC. The LRRC and the Balf Company have appealed.

On this appeal the appellants attack the trial court's conclusions: (1) that the plaintiff has standing to bring this action, (2) that a justiciable question is presented, and (3) that the action taken by the LRRC pursuant to § 4-170 violates the federal and state constitutions. The appellee city of Hartford joins the plaintiff in urging that the trial court's judgment be affirmed, but on an alternative ground. The city argues that the constitutional question need not be reached because the action taken by the state traffic commission is not a regulation under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes §§ 4-166 to 4-189; and therefore is not subject to the disapproval of the LRRC.

I

We address first the question of the plaintiff's standing to maintain this action. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she had suffered direct injury from the removal of the signs. She cited: the breakage of windows by vibration; deterioration of furnishings by dust; disturbance of sleep, peace and quiet, and health by noise; hindrance of breathing by fumes and dust; and a hazard from gravel and concomitant street deterioration. She alleged that these conditions constituted a nuisance that would continue absent the injunctive relief she sought. The trial court found that she had in fact suffered personal injury from the noise and vibration of the trucks.

The defendants challenge the trial court's holding that the plaintiff has standing to maintain this action by emphasizing that the court also found that the plaintiff had standing because of injuries which were aesthetic, conservational, or recreational. We need not now decide whether the court was correct in viewing Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 400 A.2d 726 (1978), which relied upon statutory standing, as equally supporting common-law standing for such injuries. For this case it is sufficient to note the trial court's unchallenged finding of personal injury "from the noise and vibration of the trucks." We need only determine whether this direct personal injury to the plaintiff is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that she has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute involved.

Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e. g., Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 39 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. ⁶ Such a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"; Shaskan v. Waltham Industries Corporation, 168 Conn. 43, 49, 357 A.2d 472 (1975); Baker v. Carr, supra, 204, 82 S.Ct. 703, provides the requisite assurance of "concrete adverseness" and diligent advocacy.

As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great. We have held that standing existed although the injury alleged was "extremely small." Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 432, 101 A.2d 294 (1953); Beard's Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534, 30 A. 775 (1894). The injury need not be primarily economic. In nuisance cases, we have held it sufficient for the plaintiffs to allege annoyance, discomfort, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment, unpleasant sights and odors, and a loss of sleep due to such odors. Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 176 Conn. 33, 404 A.2d 889 (1978). The fear of possible future criminal activity has been held sufficient to permit litigation of the question whether a residence for former criminals constituted a nuisance. Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966). A genuine likelihood of civil incarceration would confer standing. See Kuser v. Orkis, 169 Conn. 66, 73, 362 A.2d 943 (1975) (dictum). Of course, there must be a logical nexus between the injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). That, however, is not the basis of the defendants' attack upon the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff has standing, nor could it be where the connection between the injury alleged and the claimed illegal action is obvious and direct.

We therefore find no error in the determination that the present plaintiff has standing to challenge the legality of the action taken by the LRRC. Her personal injury gave her a sufficiently direct interest, under the facts of her particular case, to remove this litigation from the impermissible realm of general speculation about unproven hypothetical situations. Stern v. Stern, supra; Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 152-53, 251 A.2d 49 (1968); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 470-71, 217 A.2d 698 (1966).

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