Malsch v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2005
• Docket Number: 1031854.
• Parties: William Earl MALSCH and Andrew Stuart Leyda v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

916 So.2d 600

William Earl MALSCH and Andrew Stuart Leyda v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.

1031854.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 17, 2005.

Annesley H. DeGaris of Cory, Watson, Crowder & DeGaris, P.C., Birmingham, for appellants.

Christopher S. Rodgers and J. Patrick Strubel of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLC, Birmingham, for appellee.

NABERS, Chief Justice.

William Earl Malsch and Andrew Stuart Leyda sued Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. ("Bell Helicopter"), and other defendants based on injuries they suffered as a result of a helicopter crash that occurred in February 2002. Bell Helicopter moved to dismiss the action on grounds of forum non conveniens pursuant to § 6-5-430, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Malsch and Leyda appeal. We affirm.

I.

On February 14, 2002, a United States Marine Corps helicopter crashed while on a night-vision training mission in the Chocolate Mountains in California. Four crew members, including Malsch and Leyda, were aboard the helicopter when it crashed. Malsch and Leyda were severely injured; the two other crew members died. On January 5, 2004, Malsch and Leyda sued Bell Helicopter, the manufacturer of the helicopter, and numerous other entities alleged to have been involved in the production and maintenance of the helicopter or its parts in the Superior Court of California, San Diego County.

Because there was a question regarding the timeliness of the California action — specifically whether it was subject to a one- or two-year statute of limitations — Malsch and Leyda thereafter filed substantially identical actions in both Mississippi and Alabama, both of which have unambiguous two-year statutes of limitations for the action.¹ The Alabama action, filed on February 12, 2004, in the Madison Circuit Court, alleged negligence and/or wantonness, a product-liability claim based on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, breach of warranty, and negligent failure to warn.

On March 17, 2004, Bell Helicopter moved the Madison Circuit Court to dismiss the Alabama action pursuant to § 6-5-430, Ala.Code 1975, the forum non conveniens statute. After hearing oral argument on the issue, the court granted Bell Helicopter's motion and dismissed the action against Bell Helicopter on July 21 2004.² Malsch and Leyda moved the court to modify its order; the court denied the motion. Malsch and Leyda appealed.

Meanwhile, in the California action, Bell Helicopter filed a response alleging that Malsch and Leyda's action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340 (West 1982), because, it argued, the one-year statute of limitations was the controlling statute at the time of the accident. In November 2004, Malsch and Leyda moved the Superior Court in San Diego County for a judgment on the pleadings seeking to strike Bell Helicopter's statute-of-limitations defense and to obtain a ruling that their action was instead controlled by Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1 (West 2005), which had become effective on January 1, 2003 — after the accident, but before the running of the then one-year statutory period of limitations — and which extended the statutory limitations period in which to file a personal-injury claim to two years. The Superior Court granted Malsch and Leyda's motion and held that their action was subject to the two-year limitations period in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1.

Bell Helicopter requested that Superior Court certify its ruling on the statute-of-limitations issue for immediate appeal; however, the court declined to do. Therefore, Bell Helicopter's appeal of this issue, if the trial court enters a final judgment in favor of Malsch and Leyda, will not be heard until after the trial is completed. Malsch and Leyda accordingly claim that the statute-of-limitations issue in California may not be completely resolved for "several years."

II.

Alabama's forum non conveniens statute, § 6-5-430, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"Whenever, either by common law or the statutes of another state or of the United States, a claim, either upon contract or in tort[,] has arisen outside this state against any person or corporation, such claim may be enforceable in the courts of this state in any county in which jurisdiction of the defendant can be legally obtained in the same manner in which jurisdiction could have been obtained if the claim had arisen in this state; provided, however, the courts of this state shall apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens in determining whether to accept or decline to take jurisdiction of an action based upon such claim originating outside this state; and provided further that, if upon motion of any defendant it is shown that there exists a more appropriate forum outside this state, taking into account the location where the acts giving rise to the action occurred, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the interests of justice, the court must dismiss the action without prejudice. Such dismissal may be conditioned upon the defendant or defendants filing with the court a consent (i) to submit to jurisdiction in the identified forum, or (ii) to waive any defense based upon a statute of limitations if an action on the same cause of action is commenced in the identified forum within 60 days of the dismissal."

Under this statute, a defendant seeking dismissal of an action on the basis of forum non conveniens must show, first, that the plaintiff's claims arose outside of Alabama, and second, that an alternative forum exists. Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala.1995). If that alternative forum is a more appropriate forum based on the location of the acts giving rise to the action, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the interest of justice, then the trial court is compelled to dismiss the action without prejudice. Ex parte Kia Motors America, Inc., 881 So.2d 396, 400 (Ala.2003). In reviewing the dismissal of an action pursuant to § 6-5-430, we must determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in dismissing the action. Donald v. Transport Life Ins. Co., 595 So.2d 865, 867 (Ala.1992); Ex parte General Nutrition Corp., 855 So.2d 475, 478 (Ala.2003).

III.

In this case, the appellants, Malsch and Leyda, do not dispute that their claims arose outside Alabama; rather, they argue that Bell Helicopter failed to establish the existence of an alternative forum outside Alabama.³ While Malsch and Leyda acknowledge that they presently have a forum available to them in California, they argue that the California Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court of California might, in a future appeal by Bell Helicopter, rule that their action is subject to the one-year statute of limitations in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340 rather than the two-year statute of limitations in Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1. Malsch and Leyda argue that such a ruling would, in effect, mean that California had never been an available forum for them. For this reason, Malsch and Leyda argue that the Madison Circuit Court's order dismissing their case should be made contingent on either: (1) Bell Helicopter's agreeing not to appeal the Superior Court's ruling on the statute-of-limitations issue; or (2) the California Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court of California's affirming the Superior Court's decision on that point of law. Only then, Malsch and Leyda argue, will it have been sufficiently established that California is an available forum for their action.

Malsch and Leyda's argument is not persuasive. The California Superior Court has already issued a well-reasoned order deciding the statute-of-limitations issue in Malsch and Leyda's favor. That order states, in pertinent part:

"The Court finds that this case is governed by [Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1], the two-year statute of limitations rather than the one-year statute of limitations provided by [Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340]. The amendment applies retroactively to this action and serves to extend the statute of limitations because the limitations period had not expired prior to the filing of [Malsch and Leyda's] action. `It is the settled law of this state that an amendment which enlarges a period of limitation applies to pending matters where not otherwise expressly excepted.'... [Mudd v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 463, 183 P.2d 10 (1947)]."

The court also had sufficient confidence in its decision that it denied Bell Helicopter's request to certify the order for immediate appeal. Accordingly, we may conclude that the court saw no "controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion." See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 166.1 ("Upon the written request of any party or his or her counsel, or at the judge's discretion, a judge may indicate in any interlocutory order a belief that there is a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, appellate resolution of which may materially advance the conclusion of the litigation.").

While Malsch and Leyda acknowledge that the order of the California Superior Court strongly indicates that the two-year statute of limitations applies to their claims and that California is accordingly a presently available forum, they claim in the brief to this Court not to have full confidence in that decision because Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 335.1 "is so new that it has not yet been addressed by any California appellate court." However, while that statement may have been true at the time they filed their appeal, it is no longer the case. In Andonagui v. May Department Stores Co., 128 Cal.App.4th 435, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 (2005), an opinion issued on April 13, 2005, the California Court of Appeals considered this issue and reached the same conclusion as did the Superior Court in the present case, stating, in pertinent part:

"A new statute that enlarges a statutory limitations period applies to actions that are not already barred by the...