Manchester v. State
| Decision Date | 30 July 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 7540.,7540. |
| Parties | MANCHESTER. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Motion to Rehear Denied Oct. 4, 1930.
The evidence authorized the verdict; and, there being no argument upon the three general grounds of the motion for new trial, these may be treated as being abandoned by counsel for plaintiff in error, who admits that the only question before the court was whether the accused should have been given a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death.
Where the solicitor general declines the offer of one indicted for murder to plead guilty on the condition that the accused shall receive a recommendation of mercy and a life sentence, it is incumbent upon the state, in the absence of a confession containing a plenary admission of guilt, to prove all the essential facts in support of the allegations of the indictment. It was therefore not error, upon announcement of counsel that the defendant "stands mute on arraignment, and at the proper time he will make his confession and ask the jury to recommend him to the mercy of the court, " for the judge to require the state to prove every essential allegation in the indictment and to instruct the jury on the issue of the defendant's guilt, the law of murder, presumption of innocence, malice, deliberation, and the defendant's statement.
An instruction to the jury as to fixing punishment in a capital case, as follows: (construed with the context in instructions very full on the subject of recommendation to mercy) does not limit the jury to their judgment of what is right under the law as to fixing punishment, nor does it withdraw from the jury's consideration the fact that the jury has a right, as a matter of grace, to recommend mercy without any consideration of what the law is.
It was not error to refuse to charge the jury: "The granting of mercy by the jury in cases of conviction of murder is a mere matter of grace that comes after guilt is established, " where the same matter was sufficiently covered by the charge given in the case.
The testimony relating to the childhood experiences of the deceased was irrelevant and immaterial. However, as its admission was not harmful to the defendant, the same does not warrant the grant of a new trial.
The objections to testimony referred to in the sixth division of the opinion are without merit,
The power to order a mistrial for improper argument of counsel is very important, and the court's prerogative in this respect should be liberally exercised in all cases where counsel abuse their privilege of argument. However, the grant of a mistrial is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and this discretion will not be interfered with unless manifestly abused.
The court did not err in disregarding the assignments of error in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth grounds of the motion for new trial, since the alleged newly discovered evidence was merely cumulative and impeaching.
The court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Bibb County; H. A. Mathews, Judge.
Earl Manchester was convicted for murder, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
The indictment charged Earl Manchester with murder, and Sarah Elizabeth Powers with being accessory before the fact of murder. Manchester was tried, convicted without a recommendation, and sentenced to death by electrocution. The crime is alleged to have been committed May 27, 1929. On the trial was introduced a written statement, identified by the sheriff as having been freely and voluntarily made by the defendant in jail. No objection was made to it, and it bore the defendant's signature and the attest of a notary public. The sheriff testified he had questioned the defendant about the crime, that the defendant had told him part and later sent for him and said he wanted to tell it all; that The statement, dated May 30, 1929, was to the effect that two weeks previously the defendant saw an advertisement in the paper for a young man to apply for a job, and mailed a letter in answer thereto; that he received a reply asking him to call by telephone, and he was told to call at the house, which was the place where Mrs. Powers lived; that he called and talked to this woman a while, and she told him she had a proposition to be looked after, and she would give him $1,000 to do it; that she wanted him to knock James Parks in the head, and he told her he would not do it; that the woman continued telling him how easy it was, how many murders there were, and how little likely they would be prosecuted, and kept the defendant coming back for further talks and he finally told her he would think it over; that pursuant to these visits he told her he would try, and she said she would get the boy to come there; that she would get defendant new clothes, and he must move to her house and board free; that when he returned on appointment the boy, Parks, was there and he went out with him that night, but his nerve failed him and he did not have the heart to kill the boy; that on a later occasion they went to Tuft Springs, Mrs. Powers having told him "not to fetch the boy back"; that she said, "if I brought him back she would be ruined after all the money she had put in it"; that he could see no reason why he should do it, except the money, and he went back and made excuse to Mrs. Powers that he could not, whereupon she asked him if he could get somebody else to do it; that defendant said he would try, went up town, and did try by offering a boy $200 to do the crime, but "he got mad and said he couldn't do anything like that"; that ; that the woman had told, him "there would be lots of money for me"; and that this statement by defendant was made freely and voluntarily.
The defendant's statement to the jury did not conflict with the confession in any material way, though it was more complete in detail. It recited $500 as the sum the woman offered at first, which was later raised to $1,-000. In the statement defendant declared that the boy appeared sleepy when they went out the last time, lay down and went to sleep, a train woke him, and he asked what time it was, defendant telling him they had been there only fifteen minutes, and deceased going back to sleep, saying he could not keep his eyes open. In the statement defendant said: The state's contention was that Mrs. Powers procured the defendant to kill Parks in order that she might collect on a double indemnity insurance policy for $7,-000 she had caused to be issued on Park's life. There was evidence tending to uphold the contention, testimony of an insurance agent, and the policy itself showing it was made payableto Park's estate and assigned to Mrs. Powers. In his statement to the jury the defendant said: "She got a telegram from Parks, and she says this is the boy she wanted me to kill, and I says why, and she said she had taken out insurance on his life and she did it for the purpose of getting the insurance money."
The case is before this court upon exception to the overruling of a motion for a new trial. Besides the general grounds, there are thirteen special grounds which are summarized as follows:
(1) On arraignment, and in the presence of the entire panel of jurors, counsel for the defendant stated: The state thereafter introduced In evidence a written confession to the crime, signed by the defendant, and the defendant made a statement which admitted the killing and in which mercy was prayed. In his charge, the court submitted the issue of defendant's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Quaid v. State
...to preservation of the right of fair trial, the discretion (of the trial judge) will not be interfered with.' Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121(7), 132, 155 S.E. 11, 17.' Trammell v. Atlanta Coach Co., 51 Ga.App. 705, 710, 181 S.E. 315, Defendant was not prejudiced by the presentation of the......
-
Vaughn v. State, 46957
...misstatement, and we will proceed with the trial.' The defendant was not thus deprived of his right to a fair trial. Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 155 S.E. 11; Gore v. State, 124 Ga.App. 398, 184 S.E.2d 24; Andrews v. State, 222 Ga. 689, 152 S.E.2d 388; Salmon v. Salmon, 223 Ga. 129, 15......
-
Brown v. Wilson
...exercised in all cases where counsel abuse their privilege of argument by prejudicing the case of the opposite party. Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121 (7), 155 S.E. 11. No fixed rule may be laid down as to when improper remarks or conduct of counsel in the trial of a case are or are not suf......
-
Morris v. State
......See, in this connection, Peek v. State, 155 Ga. 49 (3), 116 S. E. 629; Manchester" v. State, 171 Ga. 121 (6), 155 S. E. 11; Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315 (5), 91 S. E. 72; Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243 (2b), 80 S. E. 1016; Wilson v. State, 173 Ga. 275 (2), 160 S. E. 319; Taylor v. State, 174 Ga. 52 (7), 162 S. E. 504; Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78 Ga. 288 (3). \xC2"......