Quaid v. State
| Decision Date | 02 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 49301,No. 1,49301,1 |
| Parties | James F. QUAID, Jr. v. The STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Joe Salem, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, William M. Weller, Morris H. Rosenberg, Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Was the appellant, a New Orleans attorney, an innocent victim of his client's vindictive vendetta resulting from the latter's belief that the barrister had betrayed ('fingered') him so that his conviction was solely from a concatenation of criminating circumstances? Was the lawyer's interest in this case which involved a burglary of almost $8,000,000 of negotiable bearer municipal bonds legitimately limited to the reward of $100,000 paid him for providing information leading to the recovery of the stolen securities? Or-as charged by the state-was appellant a willing participant with three other indictees in a conspiracy in which his assignment was to handle disposition of such securities as might be the fruits of the plot?
This suspenseful story had its inception from a discussion between three men, LeBlanc, Gaudin, and Alley, concerning 'get rich quick' opportunities such as finding buried treasure or having a lucky number in Irish Sweepstakes prizes. From this developed a plan for burglarizing the Atlanta office of Robinson-Humphrey Co., where Alley was employed. As 'inside man,' Alley provided LeBlanc and Gaudin with safe combinations, a diagram of the firm's layout, and information as to disconnecting the burglar alarm.
On the evening of March 15, 1973, prior to the office building's security guard going on duty, LeBlanc and Gaudin entered the First National Bank Tower. They hid in the men's room on the twentieth floor where the securities establishment had its place of business. Then during the early morning hours of March 16 they used their duplicate keys to make their felonious entry and to accomplish their design of stealing selected municipal engotiables identifiable only by numbers thereon. Again they hid in a rest room until about 7:30 a.m. when, undetected because appearing to be ordinary business people, they left the building with four brief cases containing the stolen securities after which LeBlanc took possession of all of the pilfered goods. Telephone company records showed a long distance call placed by LeBlanc at 7:56 a.m. to appellant's residence.
A few days afterwards LeBlanc made a trip to New Orleans. While there, on March 22, LeBlanc conferred with Quaid. The attorney contended this visit was legitimate and originated in connection with matters in which he was representing LeBlanc which had arisen during the latter's previous residence in Louisiana. Quaid contends his activities in all respects were as attorney-client and not tainted by any illegality. His version is that during this conference on March 22 LeBlanc presented a hypothetical situation creating the possibility of stolen securities being returned to their rightful owner for a monetary consideration. In order to learn the procedures generally used for this purpose Quaid placed a telephone call to an Atlanta friend in the securities business who in turn called a New York City acquaintance to learn if a finder's fee would be paid by an insurer for recovery of lost or misplaced bonds. From this Quaid was told that an Atlanta brokerage firm presently had such an embarrassing situation and that someone from that concern would call him.
After Quaid left his office that same day for Dallas his telephone receiving device recorded a message from Mahoney, an executive with Robinson-Humphrey. One week later (March 29) Quaid called Mahoney. Both before and after March 16, the date of the theft, there were telephone calls between Quaid and LeBlanc and Gaudin according to telephone company records. LeBlanc testified these were concerning disposition of the stolen bonds but Quaid stated these were on the basis of an attorney-client relationship. He explained in detail the other legitimate matters which he was handling as lawyer for Gaudin and LeBlanc to support his position in this respect.
During the period of the investigation, an anonymous telephone call was received by Mahoney on March 26, the caller revealing the safe combination and inquiring as to arrangements for payment if the stolen bonds were returned. The anonymous caller was LeBlanc who then made another such call on the next day wherein he described certain bonds in his possession to indicate the anonymous caller's familiarity with the pilfered securities and offered to return all of the stolen bonds for $350,000. Both telephone conversations discussed obtaining an intermediary to conduct negotiations and return of the bonds so that the anonymous party (LeBlanc) would feel safe in dealing with Mahoney.
On April 6 Quaid went to Atlanta and presented Mahoney with an employment contract providing for payment of $500,000 upon recovery of the bonds. Mahoney then informed him Robinson-Humphrey had meanwhile obtained coverage from Lloyd's of London so that payment would not exceed $100,000.00 for information leading to recovery of their bonds. Mahoney also informed appellant he had received an anonymous call from someone wanting to sell the bonds for $350,000. When Quaid left Mahoney's office, he called LeBlanc and confirmed this and thereupon told LeBlanc to 'Go to hell.' Quaid then flew to New Orleans and upon arrival there first sought to contact the Atlanta Police Department but upon being unable to do so, called Mahoney and gave him a telephone number of LeBlanc and the type of car LeBlanc was driving. As a result, LeBlanc was arrested April 7th and all of the bonds with the exception of $150,000 were recovered. Thereafter, $100,000 was paid to Quaid by Robinson-Humphrey Company.
In the interim LeBlanc had gone to New Orleans and while in Quaid's office threatened he would implicate Quaid unless Quaid paid him $50,000. Threats were also made to Quaid's wife.
LeBlanc finally concluded that he 'had been fingered' by Quaid and proceeded on April 17th to make a confession in return for a promise of a reduced sentence. In this confession he implicated Quaid, Alley and Gaudin. He also surrendered the remaining securities.
Upon being arrested, Alley made a full confession as to his participation. He implicated Quaid only indirectly, this being his statement that when the conspiracy originated he had been told by his confederates there was a New Orleans attorney, name never mentioned, who would make the necessary arrangements to dispose of the bonds and who would receive an even split with the other three conspirators on such amounts as might be derived from sale or disposal of the bonds.
Other pertinent facts will be discussed in the opinion.
Alley and LeBlanc pleaded guilty and testified as witnesses for the state in the trial jointly of the other two coindictees, each of whom was represented by his personal counsel. Each was found guilty by independent verdicts. After the jury had deliberated for 45 minutes on sentencing and reported a division of 7 to 5, the trial judge discontinued their deliberations and sentenced each to 10 years. The trial court's action in this respect is enumerated as one of twelve assignments of error presented by Quaid's appeal. The companion appeal by Gaudin was dismissed under our Rule 14(a) for failure after notification to file briefs and enumerations of error.
1. Appellant's able attorney ardently argues a reversal is required under enumerations of error 1 and 2, these being on general grounds that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it. The basis of this argument is that the testimony of LeBlanc as an accomplice is not sufficiently corroborated to satisfy the rulings of Ivey v. State, 91 Ga.App. 455, 85 S.E.2d 829, Wiggins v. State, 80 Ga.App. 258, 55 S.E.2d 842, and Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 52 S.E. 1. In an eloquent argument covering 28 pages appellant's advocate analyzes the extensive testimony developed during the five days trial to show absence of the requisite element, namely: corroborating circumstances which in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice directly connect the defendant with the crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty.
In Pitts v. State, 128 Ga.App. 434, 435, 197 S.E.2d 495, this court states the general principle: '(T)he law specifically lays down the rule that if the accomplice is corroborated in material parts of his testimony, then he may be believed by the jury as to other material parts as to which there is no corroboration.' That opinion further gives the rules with reference to the extent of corroboration which is required. Omitting the citations which are contained therein we re-state these rules to be:
(1) It is not essential that the testimony of the accomplice should be corroborated in every material particular.
(2) It is not required that this corroboration shall of itself be sufficient to warrant a verdict, or that the testimony of the accomplice be corroborated in every material particular.
(3) Such corroborating circumstances need not be enough to amount to another witness or sufficient to support one to that extent.
(4) Slight evidence of corroboration connecting defendant with the crime is sufficient.
(5) The sufficiency of corroboration of the accomplice is entirely a matter for the jury.
Although the three judges comprising this division dissented from the majority opinion in the Pitts case, our disagreement was not with these controlling legal principles, but with the application thereof to the facts, because we regarded the evidence there insufficient to sustain the conviction.
In the case at bar we find that the supporting evidence satisfies these five tests. Such corroborative testimony may be summarized thusly: Telephone company records...
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