Manderscheid v. Laz Parking of Tex., LLC
| Decision Date | 15 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-13-00362-CV,01-13-00362-CV |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PHILLIP MANDERSCHEID, Appellant v. LAZ PARKING OF TEXAS, LLC, and BOOT MAN, INC. D/B/A PREMIER PARKING ENFORCEMENT, Appellees |
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas
After a justice court determined that there was probable cause to boot Appellant Phillip Manderscheid's car, Manderscheid appealed to the county court at law, which dismissed his case for want of prosecution after Manderscheidrefused to proceed to a non-jury trial. Manderscheid raises seven issues, including complaints about the county court at law's failure to permit Manderscheid to conduct the boot-hearing appeal before a jury.1 For its part, Appellee Boot Man, Inc. contends that we should dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Manderscheid did not timely file his request for a boot hearing under section 2308.456(a) of the Texas Occupations Code.2 We hold that we have jurisdiction to consider Manderscheid's appeal, and we affirm.
Manderscheid parked in a private lot owned by LAZ Parking in downtown Houston without paying the mandatory parking fee. According to Manderscheid, the parking signs indicating the cost of parking were difficult to read and improperly maintained, and he assumed parking was free. Boot Man, Inc. placed a boot on Manderscheid's car along with a sticker with its contact information on the car's driver-side window. When Manderscheid returned to his car, he called Boot Man to remove the boot.
Manderscheid paid Boot Man $113.25 to remove the boot, and the Boot Man employee informed Manderscheid that he could request a hearing to protest the booting. He also gave Manderscheid a receipt detailing the necessary steps tofile a hearing request. Among other things, the notice set forth the justice court's contact information and stated that Manderscheid must deliver his hearing request to the justice court before the 14th day after the date his car was booted, excluding weekends and holidays. Manderscheid requested a hearing, but not before the 14-day deadline.
The justice court held a hearing nevertheless. It found that probable cause existed to boot Manderscheid's car, and it denied his request for reimbursement of the $113.25 he paid for the boot's removal. Manderscheid appealed to the county court at law. On December 4, 2012, the county court at law notified the parties that a bench trial was set for January 14, 2013. On December 11, 2012, Manderscheid filed a jury demand and paid the jury fee.
On the day of trial, the county court at law denied Manderscheid's request for a jury on the ground that he did not have a right to a jury trial in an appeal from a boot hearing. Manderscheid refused to put on his case without a jury and, after warning Manderscheid that his failure to proceed would result in dismissal, the county court at law dismissed the cause for want of prosecution. Manderscheid moved for a new trial on the ground that he was entitled to a jury trial. The county court at law denied his motion, and Manderscheid appealed.
Before turning to the merits, we address Boot Man's assertion that Manderscheid's failure to timely request a hearing in justice court deprives us of jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction "is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case" and therefore cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-45 (Tex. 1993). We review the existence of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
The Texas Towing and Booting Act establishes a procedure by which one may challenge the booting of his vehicle. It states: "The owner or operator of a vehicle that has been . . . booted without the consent of the owner or operator of the vehicle is entitled to a hearing on whether probable cause existed for the . . . booting." TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2308.452 (West 2012). Subsection 2308.456(a) establishes a timeframe in which to request such a hearing: the party challenging the booting "must deliver a written request for the hearing to the court before the 14th day after the date the vehicle was . . . booted, excluding Saturdays, Sundays,and legal holidays." Id. § 2308.456(a) (West 2012). The request must be delivered to the justice court having jurisdiction over the county in which the parking facility is located, and "a person who fails to deliver a request in accordance with Subsection (a) waives the right to a hearing." Id. §§ 2308.453 (West Supp. 2014), 2308.456(d) (West 2012).
Boot Man contends that subsection 2308.456(a), which establishes a 14-day deadline to request a boot hearing, is jurisdictional. It argues that the justice court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct the boot hearing, because Manderscheid failed to request a hearing within the 14-day deadline.
Manderscheid's car was booted on June 26, 2012. Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and the July 4th holiday, Manderscheid had until July 17, 2012 to request a hearing. See id. Manderscheid filed his request on July 20, which was 3 days late, and the justice court conducted the hearing despite Manderscheid's untimely request.3 See id. The question we must decide is whether Manderscheid's failureto meet section 2308.456's 14-day deadline deprived the justice court of jurisdiction to conduct the boot hearing.
We begin with the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to make a statute jurisdictional and are mindful that this presumption may only be overcome with clear legislative intent. See City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393-95 (Tex. 2009) (). Statutory interpretation principles guide our evaluation of whether a statute's requirement is jurisdictional. See Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. 2014) (citing City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009)).
"We must determine whether the Legislature intended a jurisdictional bar." Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392 (). We may consider the following relevant factors in determining whether a statutory requirement is jurisdictional: (1) the plain meaning of the statute; (2) the presence or absence of specific consequences for noncompliance; (3) the purpose of the statute; and (4) the consequences that result from eachpossible interpretation. Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392 ().
We address the first two factors—the statute's plain meaning and the presence or absence of specific consequences for noncompliance—together. Section 2308.456 creates a mechanism by which a person whose car has been booted may request a hearing to challenge the propriety of the booting or the charges imposed or collected in connection with the removal of the boot. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2308.456(a). The words of the statute indicate that such protests should be lodged and adjudicated quickly. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2308.456(a) (); id. § 2308.458(a) (West 2012) (). But the statute does not expressly state that a failure to meet either deadline deprives the justice court of jurisdiction to conduct the hearing. Rather, subsection 2308.456(d) states a different consequence for the failure to file a hearing request within 14 days: a "person who fails to deliver a request in accordance with Subsection (a) waives the right to a hearing." TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2308.456(d) (emphasis added). The statute does not include any consequence for failure to hold a hearing within 21 days.
Texas courts have held that statutes with similar provisions are not jurisdictional, even if the plain meaning of the statute suggests a jurisdictional bar. In Texas Department of Public Safety v. Shaikh, 445 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 21, 2013, no pet.), this Court held that Texas Government Code subsection 411.180(b) is not jurisdictional even though it states that a hearing shall not be held more than 60 days after the date of the request. Id. at 190. The Shaikh court reasoned that this was so because "the statute does not contain any explicit language indicating that failure to comply with the timing requirement deprives either the justice court or the county court at law of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 188. Similarly, in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Guerra, 970 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied), the Austin Court of Appeals held that the Department of Public Safety is not precluded from holding a license suspension hearing even if it fails to comply with the Transportation Code's requirement that the hearing "shall be held" within 40 days after the driver receives notice of the suspension. Id. at 648-50. The Guerra court found significant the Legislature's failure "to attach a consequence to a situation where a hearing is held outside the 40 days of the notice of [driver's license] suspension" and noted that the Legislature "could have easily provided consequences for noncompliance." Id. at 649; see also Crosstex Energy, 430 S.W.3d at 392-93 (...
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