Mangin v. Kellogg
| Decision Date | 07 June 1912 |
| Citation | 124 P. 651,22 Idaho 137 |
| Parties | WILLIAM MANGIN, Appellant, v. C. E. KELLOGG, Respondent |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
CANCELLATION OF DEED-CONSIDERATION, SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE-REFORMATION OF CONTRACT.
(Syllabus by the court.)
1. Where M. entered into an agreement with E., whereby he agreed to convey certain real estate to E., and in consideration thereof J. agreed to move upon the real estate and take up his residence there and to support and maintain M. during his lifetime, and M. was to have the rents and profit from one building on the premises and to retain a life estate in the property conveyed, and in consequence of such agreement a warranty deed was made from M. to E. with the understanding and agreement that the same should subsequently be so changed as to reserve a life estate in the property and to conform to the stipulations and agreements; held, that in an action by M. to cancel and set aside the deed of conveyance, and on proof of all the facts and circumstances entering into the agree- ment and its terms and provisions, a court of equity should so reform the conveyance as to reserve a life estate to M. and to provide the terms and conditions of the agreement so entered into, and that J. should be brought into the case and that both E. and J. should be bound by the judgment and decree.
2. Record examined in this case and held, that the judgment should be reversed and the cause should be remanded, with direction to the trial court to make an order bringing into the case as a party defendant Joe Kellogg, and that after he is so brought in and a hearing is had, or he admits the facts previously shown with reference to his promises and obligations in the matter, a decree be entered binding upon him as well as the other defendant, and that the deed of conveyance be so reformed as to comply with the terms and provisions of the original agreement and understanding.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Canyon County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.
Action to cancel deed of conveyance. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Reversed and remanded with directions. Costs awarded in favor of appellant.
Griffiths & Griffiths, and B. W. Henry, for Appellant.
Where a father conveys property to his son, or other relative, on condition of his support for life, and the support thereof is rendered impossible of realization, equity will restore the father to his position as owner of the property, and cancel all records that might otherwise be used to his prejudice, on the theory that they are void, and in order to clear away those things which, though void in fact, might, either presently or in the future, be used by the holders thereof wrongfully. (Glocke v. Glocke, 113 Wis. 303, 89 N.W 118, 57 L. R. A. 458; Lewis v. Wilcox, 131 Iowa 268 108 N.W. 536; Larkin v. Mullen, 128 Cal. 449, 60 P 1091; Richter v. Richter, 111 Ind. 456, 12 N.E. 698.)
The limited estate which was intended to have been conveyed is now supported by no consideration. And the absolute estate which was mistakenly conveyed was at all times without any consideration whatever. Transactions between parent and child are always closely investigated in equity. (2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., sec. 928; Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 24 L.Ed. 260; Spargur v. Hall, 62 Iowa 498, 17 N.W. 743; Bispham's Prin. Eq., sec. 234; Thorn v. Thorn, 51 Mich. 167, 16 N.W. 324.)
Under circumstances similar, but much less impelling, courts have invariably granted relief. (Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 5 S.Ct. 383, 28 L.Ed. 934; Jacox v. Jacox, 40 Mich. 473, 29 Am. Rep. 547; Frazier v. Miller, 16 Ill. 48; Oard v. Oard, 59 Ill. 46; Sands v. Sands, 112 Ill. 225; Odell v. Moss, 130 Cal. 352, 62 P. 555; Stringfellow v. Hanson, 25 Utah 480, 71 P. 1052.)
John F. Nugent, and G. W. Lamson, for Respondent.
The relief prayed for in the complaint is the cancellation of the deed, and from the facts herein stated there is absolutely nothing in this suit that would warrant a court of equity in granting such relief. (Turner v. Gumbert, 19 Idaho 339, 114 P. 33; Kelly v. Perrault, 5 Idaho 221, 48 P. 45; Curtis v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Idaho 629; 13 Cyc. 574; County of Ada v. Bullen Bridge Co., 5 Idaho 818, 75 P. 760; Miller v. Kettenbach, 18 Idaho 253, 138 Am. St. 192, 109 P. 505.)
A court of equity will not interfere to decree the cancellation of a written instrument unless some special circumstance is shown to exist establishing the necessity of a resort to equity to prevent irreparable injury. (San Diego Flume Co. v. Souther, 90 F. 166, 32 C. C. A. 548, 104 F. 706, 44 C. C. A. 143; Insurance Co. v. Reals, 79 N.Y. 202; Ryerson v. Willis, 81 N.Y. 277; Johnson v. Murphy, 60 Ala. 288; Kimball v. West, 15 Wall. 377, 21 L.Ed. 95; Atlantic Delaine Co. v. James, 94 U.S. 207, 24 L.Ed. 112.)
The deed should be reformed so as to express the agreement and the intention of the parties, and a court of equity has jurisdiction to so decree in this suit, as it has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and should finally determine the controversy in order to avoid the possibility of future litigation as well as the expense of the administration of Mrs. Mangin's estate. (Pence v. Sweeney, 3 Idaho 181, 28 P. 413; Burke v. Wells-Fargo Co., 7 Idaho 42, 60 P. 87; Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 92 P. 78, 13 L. R. A., N. S., 579; Smith Canal Co. v. Colorado etc. Co., 34 Colo. 485, 82 P. 943, 3, L. R. A., N. S. , 1148.)
Although the pleadings make no reference to any mistake, a court of equity would be justified in decreeing a reformation of the deed to accord with the intentions of the parties, and thereby settle this controversy finally. (Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Idaho 87, 96 Am. St. 256, 53 P. 211; Kemper etc. Dry Goods Co. v. Kennard Grocery Co., 68 Mo. 290; 13 Cyc. 572.)
This action was commenced by the appellant for the purpose of securing the cancellation of a deed previously executed by him and delivered to C. E. Kellogg, the respondent. Appellant is an elderly man, some eighty years of age, and the respondent is his stepson. The appellant and respondent's mother were married when the respondent and his three brothers, Warren, Joe and George, were small boys. The Kellogg children, of whom respondent is one, were reared by appellant and were treated by him as his own children. He lived in Jordan Valley, Or., for many years, and he and his wife there acquired considerable property. They thereafter sold their property and purchased property in Nampa, Idaho, where they resided at the time of the death of appellant's wife, the mother of respondent. On the day of the funeral of Mrs. Mangin, and during the late afternoon of that day, which was about the 21st of July, 1909, Mangin and C. E. Kellogg, the respondent, had a discussion over the disposition of certain lots owned by appellant in the city of Nampa on which was situated two residences. It appears that Ed, the respondent, had done more for his stepfather and mother than had any of the other boys, and the old gentleman felt that he was under more obligations to Ed than to any one of the others, and so he agreed that if it was satisfactory with all the boys he would deed the property here in controversy to Ed and retain therein a life interest to himself, upon the condition and in consideration of Joe and wife coming to Nampa and occupying one of the houses on the premises and caring for and supporting the old man during the remainder of his life, and that the old man should have the rents from the house, which they designated the "big house" and which was the house that was not to be occupied by Joe and his wife.
It seems quite clear from the evidence,--and, indeed, is not disputed, --that the foregoing is substantially the understanding and agreement had between them. In pursuance of the terms of that agreement, during the same afternoon, the appellant Mangin went in company with Joe, Ed, Warren and George to the office of E. R. Brace, in the city of Nampa who was a real estate broker and notary public, and stated substantially the terms of their agreement and asked Brace to draw a deed to that effect. Brace advised them that he did not feel competent to draw such a deed; that he was not sufficiently familiar with conveyancing to draw a...
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