Manifold v. Ragaglia

• Decision Date: 28 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 25811.,25811.
• Citation: 94 Conn.App. 103,891 A.2d 106
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Kaylee MANIFOLD et al. v. Kristine D. RAGAGLIA, Commissioner of Children and Families, et al.

891 A.2d 106

94 Conn.App. 103

Kaylee MANIFOLD et al. v. Kristine D. RAGAGLIA, Commissioner of Children and Families, et al.

No. 25811.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 21, 2005.

Decided February 28, 2006.

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Carolyn A. Signorelli, assistant attorney general, with whom were Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Maite Barainca, assistant attorney general, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Thomas C. Simones, with whom, on the brief, were Timothy A. Bishop, Stratford, and Stephen Burnham, law student intern, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

LAVERY, C.J., and HARPER and FOTI, Js.^*

HARPER, J.

The defendants, Kristine D. Ragaglia, the commissioner of the department of children and families (commissioner), and Richard Days, Nancy Liebenson-Davis, Antonio Donis and Daphne Knight, all employees of the department of children and families (department), appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion for summary judgment.¹ The defendants claim that the court improperly denied summary judgment because (1) the court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss, rather than the standard for summary judgment, to the defendants' claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendants intended to inflict emotional distress or whether their conduct was extreme and outrageous so as to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. We agree with the defendants' first claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction to treat the defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment. We decline to address the defendants' second claim because the defendants have failed to provide us with an adequate record.

Our Supreme Court set forth the facts relevant to the disposition of the defendants' appeal in Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 862 A.2d 292 (2004). "On April 21, 2001, an anonymous caller from the office of the plaintiffs'² pediatrician at the Norwich Pediatric Group contacted the department to report that Kathleen Welch, a speech therapist with the Birth to Three Program, had noticed numerous bruises on both Matthew [Manifold] and Kaylee [Manifold], and a rash on Matthew [Manifold] while she was conducting a home based therapy session. In particular, Welch noticed that both children had bruises in the same location on their foreheads. [The children] were two and three years old, respectively, at this time.

"On April 24, 2001 . . . Days, a department social worker, made an unannounced visit to the plaintiffs' home. Days informed [the children's parents, Michael Manifold and Billie Jo Zaks] of the reason for the visit, and they consented to his examining the children. He noted that both children were dirty and had bruised foreheads, while Matthew [Manifold] also had extensive bruising on his entire back and a rash on the front and back of his torso. Upon questioning by Days, [Michael] Manifold explained that he had not taken Matthew [Manifold] to the pediatrician because he thought the rash was from Matthew [Manifold's] recently having eaten $50 worth of chocolate. [Michael] Manifold explained to Days that his son bruised easily, and that he had sustained the bruises while roughhousing with his sister and playing with his new toy trucks and the family dog. Later that day, Days accompanied the plaintiffs to the office of their family pediatrician at the Norwich Pediatric Group.

"Upon their arrival, Days asked whether Richard Geller, the family's regular pediatrician, could examine the children to determine whether there was reasonable cause to suspect that they had been abused. Geller stated that he was unable to examine the children at that time and that they should not have been brought to his office; he advised Days to take the children to the emergency room at [William H. Backus Hospital (Backus)] if an immediate examination was needed. Days then made an appointment with Geller for the following morning, but transported the plaintiffs to the . . . Backus emergency room for a more immediate evaluation.

"At . . . Backus, [physician Robert] Creutz examined both children, and ordered an X ray of Matthew [Manifold]. The X ray revealed no fractures, but Creutz stated in the notes of his examination that Matthew [Manifold] had a rash and bruises on his head and chest, as well as three large bruises on his back. The report also noted that Matthew [Manifold] had bruises on his legs, knees, thighs and both buttocks. The parents told Creutz that the bruises were the result of roughhousing with the dog and his sister, as well as a fall. Both parents denied causing the injuries, and told Creutz that no one ever had struck Matthew [Manifold], except for `pats on the bottom.' On the basis of the number and size of the bruises, Creutz concluded, however, that the bruises were typical of inflicted, rather than accidental, injuries, and he recommended further investigation of the injuries' source. He testified at his deposition that he did not order any blood tests to determine whether a blood disorder contributed to the bruising because the physical findings alone raised a sufficiently high suspicion of child abuse to require that it be ruled out, even if the blood test result was positive.

"Creutz explained the results of the examination to Days, who in turn discussed them with other department personnel. Shortly thereafter, Jorge Osorio, a department supervisor, authorized a ninety-six hour hold of the children pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g(d). The children then were taken into department custody with the assistance of local police, and were placed in a licensed foster home. The department subsequently applied for and obtained orders of temporary custody of the children from the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Driscoll, J., on April 25, 2001.

"On April 25, 2001, Days met the children and the foster mother at the office of the Norwich Pediatric Group. At that time, Nancy Cusmano, a pediatrician, examined both children. Cusmano ordered blood tests for Matthew [Manifold], stating that a normal blood test would indicate a high probability of abuse. Upon receiving the results of the test, however, Cusmano informed Days that Matthew [Manifold's] blood test showed some abnormalities, including a very low blood platelet count that generally causes clotting difficulties. She said that this condition could explain both the bruising and the rash. . . . Cusmano referred Matthew [Manifold] to Joseph McNamara, a hematologist at Yale-New Haven Hospital (Yale), for further evaluation. Thereafter, McNamara diagnosed Matthew [Manifold] with idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura, a blood disorder, and admitted him to Yale for treatment. The following day, April 26, 2001, McNamara advised Days that the marks and bruising were consistent with the blood disorder. Matthew [Manifold] subsequently was discharged from Yale. In light of this new information, the court granted the department's motion to vacate the orders of temporary custody. The department returned the children to the parents' custody later that same day, and Days relayed the Yale discharge instructions to them.

"The neglect petitions that were filed with the court on April 25, 2001, however, remained active, although the department amended them to remove the initial allegations of physical abuse. The case was transferred to the department's division of protective services for further monitoring and study. A social study subsequently was filed with the court, and the neglect petitions were withdrawn in October, 2001." Id., at 413-16, 862 A.2d 292.

The plaintiffs instituted this action against the defendants in April, 2002. They brought claims alleging both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.³ Although the defendants appear to claim in their brief that the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress claim has been eliminated,⁴ we find no support for their contention in the record. The claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress both remain the basis of the plaintiffs' action.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that they were protected by common-law sovereign immunity for actions in their official capacities and by statutory immunity, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165, for actions in their individual capacities.⁵ The court, Martin, J., denied the defendants' motion, concluding that the facts, as alleged in the complaint, could demonstrate that the defendants acted beyond the scope of their authority, which would prevent them from being protected by sovereign immunity in their official capacities. The court also determined that the facts, as alleged in the complaint, could support a finding that the defendants acted "wantonly, recklessly or maliciously," which would expose them to liability in their individual capacities under § 4-165.

The defendants then filed a motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss in light of our Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003), and Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 828 A.2d 542 (2003). Relying on those decisions, the court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the claims against the defendants in their official capacities that sought monetary damages. The court, however, again denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining claims, which sought declaratory relief and an injunction against the defendants for actions in their official capacities and monetary relief for actions in their individual capacities.

The defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, with which they submitted affidavits, deposition...