Manigault-Speaks v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-2529 (ABJ) |
| Parties | DENISE DIANE MANIGAULT-SPEAKS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Pro se plaintiff Denise Diane Manigault-Speaks has brought this action against defendants, Alex Azar, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"); Robert Redfield, Executive Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"); HHS employee Cynthia Crooks; and CDC employees Sherri Berger, Dale DeFilipps, Terry-Lynn Rhett-Rainey, Debra Roberts, Eric Lyons, and Whitney Warren (collectively, "defendants"). Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 2]. Plaintiff alleges that she was wrongfully terminated from her job as an Executive Resource Specialist at the CDC's headquarters in Atlanta in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). See Am. Compl. ¶ 21, 9-10. She also alleges that defendants committed a number of torts and other statutory violations when she was terminated. Am. Compl. at 11-22.
Pending before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer plaintiff's Title VII claims to the Northern District of Georgia. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, to Transfer [Dkt. # 8] ( ); Defs.' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 8-1] ( ). For the following reasons, the Court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss the individual employee defendants as well as plaintiff's non-Title VII claims, and it will transfer plaintiff's Title VII claims to the Northern District of Georgia.
Plaintiff alleges that before 2016, she was "co-employed" by the CDC and North American Management in Atlanta, Georgia. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 21. She does not describe what her position was with these employers; nor does she state when her employment began. But she alleges that, at some point during that time, she "actively and openly assisted" a fellow employee file a discrimination and retaliation complaint against the CDC, and she "participat[ed] as a witness and submit[ed] an affidavit which corroborated [the employee's] allegations of misconduct by CDC management []." Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Eventually, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued a decision against the agency for unlawful discrimination and retaliation. Am. Compl. ¶ 21.
In January of 2016, plaintiff applied for the position of "Executive Resource Specialist" within the CDC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 23. A few weeks later, plaintiff was interviewed for the job, and she received an offer of employment from TACG, LLC, a contracting agency, contingent upon a satisfactory background check and approval from the CDC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25. On January 25, 2016, plaintiff learned that she passed the background check and that the CDC had accepted her employment. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges that this entire process was conducted anonymously, and that the CDC was unaware of her identity. Am. Compl. ¶ 28.
Plaintiff commenced her new role as Executive Resource Specialist on March 8, 2016. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges that on March 9, 2016, the CDC learned of her identity, and subsequently "initiated a deliberate regimen of stonewalling . . . delay tactics and gamesmanship"surrounding her employment status. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-29. About three weeks later, on March 22, plaintiff was terminated. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. She alleges that the CDC premised her termination on her lack of "executive recruitment experience" and "experience handling Title 42 matters," Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 33, but that these qualifications were not listed as requirements in the initial job posting, nor were they terms of her employment contract. Am. Compl. ¶ 31.
Plaintiff contends that the real reason for the termination was that she had participated in EEOC complaints against the CDC "over the prior three (3) year period." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 22, 29, 30, 32. She alleges that the executive recruitment and Title 42 experience she was told she lacked were only added to the job description when the position was reposted after her termination. Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff characterizes this new job description as an intentional act by the CDC to exclude her from qualifying for the position and to justify her termination retroactively. Am. Compl. ¶ 32.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 21, 2019. Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. She alleges that defendants' conduct throughout the hiring and firing process constitutes unlawful "willful, [and] wanton" retaliation and harassment in violation of Title VII, and she seeks $6 million in punitive and compensatory damages. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-44. The complaint includes a host of other claims: breach of contract and breach of implied contract; violation of procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act; misrepresentation and deceit; intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"); civil conspiracy; and negligence. Am. Compl. at 9-23.
On April 10, 2020, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuantto Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (3), and (6). Defs.' Mem. at 1. Alternatively, they request that the Title VII claims be transferred to the Northern District of Georgia, since that was the place of plaintiff's employment. Defs.' Mem. at 2, 10-12. Plaintiff opposed the motion, see Pl.'s Opp. to Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 11] ("Pl.'s Opp."), and defendants replied in support of their motion. See Defs.' Reply to Pl.'s Opp. [Dkt. # 13] (Defs.' Reply).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (). "[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is 'an Art[icle] III as well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'" Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003), quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, unlike when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "is not limited to the allegations of the complaint." Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Rather, "a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000), citing Herbert v. Nat'lAcad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment." Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976); see Coulibaly v. Pompeo, 318 F. Supp. 3d 176, 185 (D.D.C. 2018), quoting Hamilton v. District of Columbia, 720 F. Supp. 2d 102, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (). "Where the same set of facts supports a Title VII claim and a non-Title VII claim against a federal employer, the Title VII claim preempts the non-Title VII claim." Coulibaly, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 185, quoting Bergbauer v. Mabus, 810 F. Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Title VII's preemptive effects apply to constitutional claims, common law tort and contract claims, and actions arising under other federal statutes. See Ramey v. Bowsher, 915 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 93, 130-31 (D.D.C. 2016).
Plaintiff brings her first two claims for retaliation and harassment (Counts I and II) under Title VII. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-44. She alleges that the CDC terminated her employment contract after it learned of her identity and involvement in prior EEOC complaints against the agency. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-31. According to plaintiff, this conduct constitutes a violation of Title VII's prohibition on retaliating against employees based on protected behavior. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-37. Plaintiff further contends that the explanations she was given throughout the firing process were pretextual or "fabricated," see Am. Compl. ¶ 29, and that the agency purposefully engaged in "stonewalling . . . delay tactics and gamesmanship," including changing the nature of the jobdescription to exclude her from qualification. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-32. Plaintiff contends that these alleged tactics constitute harassment under Title VII. See Am. Compl. at 10.
The very same set of circumstances forms the basis for the rest of plaintiff's non-Title VII claims. In the contract claims, Counts III and IV, plaintiff alleges that defendants breached her employment contract by not performing their obligations, and for "falsely and fraudulently manufacturing [the] ...
To continue reading
Request your trial