Mankus v. Warren
| Decision Date | 30 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | A20-0515 |
| Parties | Myles John Sterling Mankus, Respondent, v. Melanie Marie Warren, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed
St. Louis County District Court
James Perunovich, Law Offices of James Perunovich, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)
Hannah N. C. Forti, Prebich Law Office, Hibbing, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal from an order establishing custody and parenting time, appellant mother argues that the district court erred because it made clearly erroneous findings of fact, abused its discretion by awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody, and abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in awarding parenting time. We affirm.
Appellant Melanie Marie Warren and respondent Myles John Sterling Mankus are the mother and father of a six-year-old child, L.L.M. Although appellant and respondent were never married, the parties have signed and filed a recognition of parentage. DNA testing has confirmed that respondent is L.L.M.'s biological father. The parties lived together for the first three years of L.L.M.'s life, but separated in September of 2017. For the next 19 months, the parties voluntarily shared parenting time and caregiving responsibilities equally.
On May 1, 2019, however, respondent petitioned for an adjudication of paternity, sole legal and physical custody, and child support. Appellant answered and counter-petitioned, requesting joint legal and sole physical custody. After a trial, the district court adjudicated respondent as the father of L.L.M. and issued an order awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody and setting a parenting schedule.
The district court's award of parenting time can be summarized as follows: L.L.M. will reside primarily with respondent during the school year, with appellant having parenting time on alternating weekends. Appellant's weekends include extended weekends as allowed by L.L.M.'s school schedule and also include Monday mornings if she can get L.L.M. to school. Appellant will also have parenting time every Wednesday evening after school until 8:00 p.m. or on another night as the parties agree. L.L.M. will reside primarily with appellant during the summer, with respondent having parenting time on alternating weekends. Respondent will have additional parenting time of one week each, non-consecutive, in the months of June, July, and August. Finally, the parties willalternate holidays, except that appellant will always have parenting time on Mother's Day and her birthday, and respondent will always have parenting time on Father's Day and his birthday.
In response to the district court's order, appellant moved for amended findings of fact and for a new trial. After a hearing, the district court issued an order denying appellant's motion. This appeal follows.
The bedrock principle underlying all child custody decisions is that the best interests of the child must be protected and fostered. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Minn. App. 2009). A court's analysis of parenting time disputes likewise focuses on what is in the best interests of the child. Hansen v. Todnem, 891 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. App. 2017), aff'd on other grounds, 908 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. 2018). Minnesota law supplies 12 factors that the district court must consider and evaluate in determining issues of custody and parenting time in the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2018). Nevertheless, the district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting time and custody questions and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 2017).
Appellant argues that the district court erred because it (1) made clearly erroneous findings of fact, (2) abused its discretion by awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody of L.L.M., and (3) abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in awarding parenting time as it did. For the reasons that follow, appellant's arguments fail.
First, appellant argues that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact. The district court's findings of fact underlying a parenting-time decision will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (). "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). In reviewing findings of fact, appellate courts give deference to the district court's opportunity to evaluate witness credibility. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). Finally, there is scant if any room for an appellate court to question the district court's balancing of best-interests considerations. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000).
Appellant points to three findings of fact included in the district court's assessment of the best-interests factors that she claims are clearly erroneous.
Appellant argues that it was clearly erroneous for the district court to find that L.L.M.'s "physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangement on the child's needs and development," did not favor either party. On this factor, the district court found:
Appellant argues that these findings are clearly erroneous in two respects. First, appellant contends that the district court's finding that respondent is capable of providing for L.L.M.'s cultural and spiritual needs is clearly erroneous, because "[t]he record contains no evidence that Father intends to or has any capability to provide for the child's cultural and spiritual needs." Respondent's testimony, however, provides a basis for concluding that he is capable of providing for L.L.M.'s cultural needs by fostering relationships with family members. Respondent also testified that he intends to provide for L.L.M.'s spiritual needs by taking him to church services. Appellant admitted at trial that she herself has not yet involved L.L.M. in any Native American cultural or spiritual activities. This undercuts her argument that the district court should have found that this factor favored her. As such, appellant has failed to establish that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous in this respect.
Second, appellant argues that the district court's finding on this factor is clearly erroneous because the district court's "findings, order and memorandum fail to explain how mother's nominal parenting time will permit her to 'involve [L.L.M.] in some traditional Native American activities.'" The parenting time schedule ordered by the district court results in appellant having the majority of the parenting time during the summer and a minimum of four overnights per month during L.L.M.'s school year. Appellant has offered no reason why this amount of parenting time will be insufficient topermit her to involve L.L.M. in Native American cultural and spiritual activities. In fact, appellant admitted at trial that she does not foresee respondent's custody and parenting time being an impediment to L.L.M.'s involvement in such activities. Appellant has failed to establish that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous in this respect.
In sum, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that L.L.M.'s "physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangement on the child's needs and development" did not favor either party.
Next, appellant argues that it was clearly erroneous for the district court to find that the history and nature of each parent's participation in providing care did not favor either party. On this factor, the district court found that, "[d]uring the time that the parties were living together the respondent provided the majority of the caregiving for [L.L.M.]," but that
Appellant argues that this finding is clearly erroneous in two respects. First, appellant contends that the district court could only have found that this factor did not favor either party by ignoring the history of the parties' participation in providing care. This argument rests on appellant's calculation that, because she was found to be the primary caretaker for the first three years of L.L.M.'s life, while the parties were found to have divided caretaking responsibilities evenly in the two years between their separation and thedate of trial, she had provided more caretaking overall. Appellant goes on to assert that, given this disparity in caretaking time, the district court must have...
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