Mann v. Jackson
Decision Date | 29 March 1892 |
Parties | MANN et al. v. JACKSON. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
(Official.)
Report from supreme judicial court, Penobscot county.
Bill in equity by William E. Mann and another against Helen S. Jackson to obtain a construction of the will of William Mann, deceased.
A. W. Paine, for plaintiffs.
C. H. Bartlett, for defendant.
This is a bill in equity brought for the purpose of obtaining a judicial construction of the following will:
After the death of the testator, Helen S. Mann married, and is the defendant in this suit.
The language of the second item of the will is specially brought in question. The plaintiff says that the defendant's "life estate" in the homestead was terminated by her marriage, while the defendant contends that the clause limiting her exclusive title by her marriage is void, as being a condition in restraint of marriage, and that she is entitled to the sole use and occupation of the homestead during her natural life.
It is undoubtedly an established rule of law that, even with respect to devises of real estate, a subsequent condition which is intended to operate in general and unqualified restraint of marriage, or the natural effect of which is to create undue restraint upon marriage and promote celibacy, must be held illegal and void, as contrary to the principles of sound public policy. It appears from the early English cases that this doctrine was borrowed by the English ecclesiastical courts from the Roman civil law, which declared absolutely void all conditions in wills restraining marriage, whether precedent or subsequent, whether there was any gift over or not. But the courts of equity found themselves greatly embarrassed between their anxiety on the one hand to follow the ecclesiastical courts, and their desire on the other to give more heed to the plain intention and wish of the testator as manifested by the whole will. Thereupon the process of distinguishing commenced for the purpose of preventing obvious hardships arising from the application of that technical rule to particular cases. As a result there has been ingrafted upon the doctrine a multitude of curious refinements and subtle distinctions respecting real and personal estate, conditions and limitations, conditions precedent and conditions subsequent, gifts with and without valid limitations over, and the application of the rule to widows and other persons. Indeed, it may be said of the decisions upon this subject with even more propriety than was observed by Lord Mansfield in regard to another branch of law, that "the more we read, unless we are very careful to distinguish, the more we shall be confounded." The whole subject as to what conditions in restraint of marriage shall be regarded as valid and what as void would seem to be involved in great uncertainty and confusion both in England and in this country. There is clearly discernible, however, through all the decisions of later times, an anxiety on the part of the judges to limit as much as possible the rule adopted from the civil law. "The true rule upon the subject is," says Mr. Redfield, 2 Redf. Wills, *290, § 20, and note. See, also, Id. 297, and 2 Jarm. Wills, 569. Beyond the general proposition first stated, the cases seem finally to resolve themselves for the most part into the mere judgment of the court upon the circumstances of each particular case. 2 Redf. Wills, *297, § 31; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 933; Coppage v. Alexander's Heirs, 2 B. Mon. 313, and note to same, 38 Amer. Dec. 153.
But the rule was so far modified and relaxed that conditions annexed to devises and legacies restraining widows from marrying have almost uniformly been pronounced valid. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. supra. From the numerous decisions upon the subject in the United States, the conclusion is fairly to be drawn that such conditions will be upheld in the case of widows, whether there is a gift over or not. 2 Jarm. Wills, p. 564, note 29; 2 Redf. Wills, 296; Schouler, Wills, 603. See, also, recent cases of Knight v. Mahoney, 152 Mass. 523, 25 N. E. Rep. 971, and Nash v. Simpson, 78 Me. 142, 3 Atl. Rep. 53.
In 2 Redf. Wills, 296, the author says: "We apprehend there is no substantial reason, either in law or morals, why a man should be allowed to annex an unreasonable condition in restraint of marriage, one merely in terrorem, in case of a wife, more than of a child or any other person, in regard to whose settlement in life he may fairly be allowed to take an interest; but the...
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