Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

• Citation: 458 Mich. 582,581 N.W.2d 272
• Decision Date: 31 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 2,Docket Nos. 107730-107732,2
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,313 James E. KLINKE, Personal Representative for the Estate of Kimberly Marie Klinke, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, and Chrysler Corporation and John Colone Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., Defendants. Calendar
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 272

581 N.W.2d 272

458 Mich. 582, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,313

James E. KLINKE, Personal Representative for the Estate of Kimberly Marie Klinke, deceased Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant and Chrysler Corporation and John Colone Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., Defendants.

Docket Nos. 107730-107732.

Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 7, 1998.

Decided July 31, 1998.

R. Stephen Olsen and V. Carl Shaner, Ann Arbor, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Dykema, Gossett, P.L.L.C. (by Craig L. John and Mary E. Royce), Bloomfield Hills, for the defendants.

Lee R. Franklin, Detroit, for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.

John P. Raleigh and Susan L. Barnowski, Berkley; Hugh F. Young, Jr., of counsel, Reston, VA, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

Clark, Hill, P.L.C. (by J. Walker Henry and Duane L. Tarnacki), Detroit, for Michigan Manufacturers Association.

Opinion

WEAVER, Justice.

We granted leave to decide whether the Michigan Vehicle Code's seat belt statute, which makes evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt admissible and imposes a five-percent cap on reduction in comparative negligence, is applicable in a products liability action against an automobile manufacturer. We conclude that the Michigan Vehicle Code statute, with its five-percent cap on damages reduction, is not applicable in a products liability action and affirm the Court of Appeals.

I

On June 25, 1988, plaintiff's twenty-three-year-old daughter, Kimberly Marie Klinke, was killed in a one-car rollover accident. Testimony at trial indicated that the left front tire of the decedent's Dodge Colt collapsed while she was traveling at highway speeds. Emergency workers found the decedent with her lap belt on, but with the Colt's shoulder harness behind her, unused.

Plaintiff brought a products liability suit against Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of the vehicle. ¹ Plaintiff's complaint alleged defects in seat belt design and defective manufacture of the left front steering knuckle. The trial judge granted Mitsubishi's motion for summary disposition regarding the claim that the seat belt had been defectively designed, but denied summary disposition regarding the defective manufacture claim.

The defective manufacture claim was tried by a jury. The parties presented substantial testimony about the steering knuckle at trial. Plaintiff's expert testified that there were small fractures in the metal of the steering knuckle. Plaintiff's theory was that the knuckle collapsed, causing the car to roll over and killing plaintiff's daughter.

Defense experts testified that the crash was not caused by the collapse of the steering knuckle, but that the reverse was true: The steering knuckle collapsed as a result of the force of the rollover accident. The defense argued that the crash resulted from a sudden and violent correction in the direction of the vehicle by the driver. Defense experts also testified that, had the decedent worn her shoulder harness, she would not have sustained a head injury.

The jury returned a $5,104,000 verdict against Mitsubishi, but found that the decedent was ninety percent negligent for not properly using her seat belt. The trial judge applied the statutory five-percent cap on comparative negligence for nonuse of a seat belt and awarded plaintiff $4,848,800. M.C.L. § 257.710e(5); M.S.A. § 9.2410(5)(5). ²

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge's decision regarding the seat belt-cap issue, and held that the seat belt cap did not apply in products liability actions. 219 Mich.App. 500, 556 N.W.2d 528 (1996). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for recalculation of damages, consistent with this opinion.

II

The parties call upon us to decide whether the seat belt statute, M.C.L. § 257.710e(5); M.S.A. § 9.2410(5)(5), applies in a products liability action brought under M.C.L. § 600.2949; M.S.A. § 27A.2949.

As always, we first examine the language of the statute itself when interpreting its meaning:

"The cardinal rule of all statutory construction is to identify and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The first step in discerning intent is to examine the language of the statute in question." [Chandler v. Dowell-Schlumberger, 456 Mich. 395, 398, 572 N.W.2d 210 (1998), quoting Shallal v. Catholic Social Services of Wayne Co., 455 Mich. 604, 611, 566 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (citations omitted).]

The Legislature enacted the products liability statute in 1978. ³ It provided:

In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's legal representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. [M.C.L. § 600.2949(1); M.S.A. § 27A.2949(1).]

In 1985, the Legislature adopted a mandatory seat belt law that punished failure to use seat belts, making it a civil infraction for front seat passengers in automobiles not to wear seat belts. M.C.L. § 257.710e; M.S.A. § 9.2410(5). The act also, and for the first time, ⁴ allowed evidence of failure to use a seat belt to be admitted in a court proceeding to prove comparative negligence. It provides:

Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be considered evidence of negligence and may reduce the recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle. However, such negligence shall not reduce the recovery for damages by more than 5%. [M.C.L. § 257.710e(6); M.S.A.s 9.2410(5)(6).]

Shortly after the statute was enacted, this Court held that under the common law, for purposes of comparative negligence, "evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt may raise a factual issue to be submitted for jury consideration." Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987).

III

Defendant Mitsubishi argues that the five-percent cap found in § 710e(4) of the Michigan Vehicle Code does not apply in products liability actions. We agree.

The Michigan Vehicle Code, as set forth in the title of the act, is designed, inter alia, "to provide for civil liability of owners and operators of vehicles...." ⁵ Nowhere in the title of the code does it say that the act provides for the manufacture of motor vehicles or is concerned with the civil liability of manufacturers. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that "express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things." Jennings v. Southwood, 446 Mich. 125, 142, 521 N.W.2d 230 (1994).

The instant case concerns the liability of a manufacturer, rather than the liability of an owner or operator of a vehicle. The decedent's failure to use her seat belt could cause her damages to be reduced, but could not subject her to any liability in this suit. Section 710e both allows consideration of nonuse of a seat belt as evidence of negligence and limits the reduction for such comparative negligence to five percent. If § 710e were applied to the present products liability action, it would affect the liability of the manufacturer. ⁶

It is a well-recognized principle that an act shall not exceed the scope of its title. Maki v. City of East Tawas, 385 Mich. 151, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971). As long ago as 1888 this Court quoted from Judge Cooley's treatise on Constitutional Limitations:

"As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in the act which might, with entire propriety, have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title. They are invested with no dispensing power. The constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so." [In re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396, 403, 38 N.W. 269 (1888).]

We are to construe statutes in a constitutional manner if possible. Gora v. Ferndale, 456 Mich. 704, 710, 576 N.W.2d 141 (1998). As a matter of statutory interpretation, we must not, and under constitutional principles we cannot, apply statutes in the motor vehicle code to cases involving the civil liability of manufacturers. ⁷ Accordingly, § 710e's cap on the reduction for comparative negligence for failure to wear a seat belt, which is part of the motor vehicle code, does not apply in the present action, which involves the liability of a manufacturer. Rather, under Lowe, supra, plaintiff's decedent's failure to properly use her seat belt was properly submitted to the jury, ⁸ which found her ninety percent comparatively negligent. Under § 2949, the jury award should be reduced by the full amount of plaintiff's decedent's comparative negligence.

IV

We note that although the motor vehicle code does not directly apply to products liability actions, some portions of the code may be relevant in products liability actions under other theories of law. Specifically, this Court has held that violation of a safety or penal statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. ⁹ Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 393 N.W.2d 356 (1986). In determining whether the violation is relevant to the facts presented at trial, the court must consider the following factors: "1. the statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation; 2. the plaintiff is within the class intended to be...