Manner v. Schiermeier
| Decision Date | 27 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. ED96143,ED96143 |
| Parties | NATHANIEL JAMES MANNER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. NICHOLAS BRIAN SCHIERMEIER, CON-TECH FOUNDATIONS, LLC, HELMET CITY, INC., and JAFRUM INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants, AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants/Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
NATHANIEL JAMES MANNER, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
NICHOLAS BRIAN SCHIERMEIER,
CON-TECH FOUNDATIONS, LLC, HELMET CITY, INC., and
JAFRUM INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants, AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
and AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants/Respondents.
No. ED96143
Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
Date: December 27, 2011
Plaintiff sought $400,000.00 in underinsured-motorist benefits under the terms of four vehicle liability insurance policies for injuries suffered in a collision while driving his Yamaha motorcycle. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurers, and plaintiff appeals. The issue on appeal is whether the owned-vehicle exclusion in the underinsured-motorist coverage endorsement attached to three of the policies applies to exclude underinsured-motorist coverage. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
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On September 25, 2004, plaintiff, Nathaniel Manner, who was operating a 1983 Yamaha motorcycle, was struck and injured by a vehicle operated by Nicholas Schiermeier (the driver). The driver had insurance with a liability limit of $100,000.00 per person. The driver's insurance policy limits of $100,000.00 were tendered to and accepted by plaintiff with the permission of defendants, American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin (American Standard) and American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family) (collectively, the defendant insurers). For purposes of this case, it was stipulated that plaintiff's damages were $1,500,000.00.
Prior to the accident, plaintiff had requested and obtained insurance on the Yamaha from American Standard. Plaintiff was the named insured and policyholder of an insurance policy issued by American Standard that listed the Yamaha on the declarations page (the Yamaha policy). At that time of the accident, plaintiff had paid for the Yamaha, either in whole or in part, and he was in the process of getting title switched to his name.
In addition, at the time of the accident, plaintiff also owned a 2002 Ford Ranger and was the policyholder of an insurance policy issued to him by American Standard that listed the Ford Ranger on the declarations page (the Ford Ranger policy). Plaintiff also owned a 1992 Ford F150 and was the policyholder of an insurance policy issued to him by American Family that listed the Ford F150 on the declarations page (the Ford F150 policy). Furthermore, at the time of the accident, plaintiff's father, James Manner, was the owner of a 1999 Suzuki Motorcycle and was the policyholder of an insurance policy issued by American Standard that listed the 1999 Suzuki on the declarations page (the Suzuki policy). Each of the four policies had an identical underinsured-motorist (UIM) coverage endorsement attached to it.
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Plaintiff filed a lawsuit to recover damages for his injuries, naming the driver, Con-Tech Foundations, LLC, Helmet City, Inc., and Jafrum International, Inc., as defendants. He subsequently entered into settlements with the driver, Helmet City, Inc., and Jafrum International, Inc., and dismissed his claims against all defendants. Plaintiff then filed a motion to substitute the defendant insurers as defendants and filed a fourth amended petition to obtain damages in the amount of UIM coverage under the three insurance policies issued to him and the one policy issued to his father by the defendant insurers. Plaintiff and the defendant insurers filed separate motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurers, without designating the ground on which its decision was based.
Plaintiff appeals from this judgment.1 After briefing, the issues on appeal were narrowed to the question of whether the owned-vehicle exclusion in the UIM endorsements excludes UIM coverage by the Ford Ranger, Ford F150, and Suzuki policies. We affirm the entry of summary judgment with respect to the Ford Ranger and Ford F150 policies because the owned-vehicle exclusion in those policies excludes UIM coverage. We reverse and remand with respect to the Suzuki policy because a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether plaintiff was a "resident" of his father's household as required in the owned-vehicle exclusion in the UIM endorsement for that policy. We also reverse and remand with respect to the Yamaha policy
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because whether it provides UIM coverage or not depends on whether the owned-vehicle exclusion in the Suzuki policy applies.
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. ITT Commercial Finance v. Mid-Am. Marine, 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 377. "'When the underlying facts are not in question, disputes arising from the interpretation and application of insurance contracts are matters of law for the court.'" Grable v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.W.3d 104, 106 (Mo.App. 2009) (quoting Federal Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 162 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Mo.App. 2005)). The interpretation of an insurance policy and the determination of whether coverage and exclusion provisions are ambiguous are questions of law that we review de novo. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. banc 2010).
I. Ford Ranger, Ford F150, and Suzuki Policies
The primary issue in this appeal is the application of the owned-vehicle exclusion in the UIM endorsements attached to the Ford Ranger, Ford F150, and Suzuki policies. If this exclusion in any one of these policies applies, then there is no UIM coverage for that policy, and that policy may not be stacked with any policy providing coverage. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that the owned-vehicle exclusion in each policy is not applicable.
The same owned-vehicle exclusion is attached to each of the policies and reads as follows:
EXCLUSIONS
This coverage does not apply for bodily injury to a person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, a motor vehicle that is not insured under this policy, if it is owned by you or any resident of your household.
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Plaintiff specifically argues that the terms "person" and "owned," as used in the owned-vehicle exclusion in the three policies' UIM endorsements, are ambiguous and must be construed in his favor. Alternatively, in the case of the term "owned," he argues that it involves a disputed issue of material fact. He also argues that the term "resident," as used in the owned-vehicle exclusion in the UIM endorsement in the Suzuki policy, involves a disputed issue of material fact.
Because there are no statutory requirements for UIM coverage in Missouri, the existence of such coverage is determined by the contract between the insured and the insurer. Ritchie v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009); Rodriguez v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. banc 1991). De novo review requires that we apply well-settled principles of contract interpretation to these insurance policies. Gavan v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 242 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Mo. banc 2008).
If an insurance policy is unambiguous, the rules of construction are inapplicable, and absent public policy to the contrary, the contract will be enforced as written. Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. banc 1992). Courts may not create an ambiguity to distort the language of an unambiguous policy or enforce a construction that they find more appropriate. Id. "[T]he absence of a definition for a key term does not necessarily render the policy ambiguous." Eldridge v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 270 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Mo.App. 2008).
A policy provision is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions, or if it is duplicative, is indistinct, or causes the policy's meaning to be uncertain. Martin v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. banc 1999); Krombach, 827 S.W.2d at 210.
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We will give ambiguous language "the meaning that would ordinarily be understood by the layman who bought and paid for the policy." Krombach, 827 S.W.2d at 210. When provisions of an insurance policy are ambiguous, we construe them against the insurer. Burns, 303 S.W.3d at 509; Krombach, 827 S.W.2d at 210. "Ambiguous provisions of a policy designed to cut down, restrict, or limit insurance coverage already granted, or introducing exceptions or exemptions must be strictly construed against the insurer." Krombach, 827 S.W.3d at 210-11.
When an insurance company relies upon a policy exclusion to assert noncoverage, it must establish undisputed facts sufficient to prove the exclusion is applicable. Oakley Fertilizer v. Continental Ins., 276 S.W.3d 342, 351 (Mo.App. 2009).
A. "Person"
Plaintiff first contends that the term "person" as used in the owned-vehicle exclusion is ambiguous because the word "person" is not defined in the policies, and the policies do not indicate whether the term "person" includes an "insured person." Plaintiff argues that this ambiguity requires a construction in his favor that "insured person" and "person" are mutually exclusive, and therefore the exclusion does not apply to...
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