Manning, Commissioner of Finance, v. Sims

• Decision Date: 15 October 1948
• Citation: 308 Ky. 587
• Parties: Manning, Commissioner of Finance, v. Sims et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

308 Ky. 587

Manning, Commissioner of Finance, v. Sims et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

August 13, 1948.

Rehearing Denied October 15, 1948.

1. Constitutional Law. — The sharp separation of powers of government must be preserved carefully by the courts, and judicial powers must not be permitted to encroach upon legislative powers. Const. sec. 27.

2. Constitutional Law. — When power of Legislature to enact law is called into question, court should proceed with greatest possible caution and should never declare law invalid until after every doubt has been resolved in its favor.

3. Constitutional Law. — A statute should be held valid unless it clearly offends limitations and prohibitions of Constitution, and burden is on one questioning validity of statute to sustain his contentions.

4. Constitutional Law. — The propriety, wisdom, and expediency of legislation is exclusively a legislative question.

5. Officers. — The allowance of reasonable expenses incurred in discharge of official duties of officer is neither "salary, compensation nor emolument" of office within constitutional prohibition against change in compensation during the term. Const. sec. 235.

6. Judges. — The statute providing for payment of $100 monthly to circuit judge for postage, telephone, supplies, stationery, stenographic assistance, law clerk hire, and books and periodicals and for payment of actual expenses incurred by Court of Appeals judges and commissioners in going to and returning from state capital and for payment of $150 monthly in lieu of such expenses to Court of Appeals judges and commissioners establishing temporary place of abode at state capital, is not violative of constitutional prohibitions against changing "salary, compensation or emolument" of public officers during term of office and limiting compensation for official services of all public officers except the governor to $5,000 per year. Acts 1948, H.B. 254, secs. 1-3; Const. secs. 235, 246.

7. Judges — Circuit judges and Court of Appeals judges and commissioners are not required by law to absorb expenses of their offices without charge to the commonwealth or to continue to absorb such expenses.

8. Judges. — The scope of judicial examination into action of Legislature in making lump-sum appropriation in lieu of actual expenses incurred by judges is narrow, and legislative declaration of nature and purpose of allowance is binding on courts and will be upheld unless from the act itself and without extraneous aid the court can say without hesitation that the legislation is in fact and in truth a device to increase compensation. Acts 1948, H.B. 254, secs. 1-3; Const. secs. 235, 246.

9. Judges. — Statute prescribing monthly lump sum to be paid to circuit judges and Court of Appeals judges and commissioners in lieu of actual expenses is not unconstitutional as device to increase compensation of judges, in absence of anything showing that legislative estimates are plainly in excess of any amount of expenses which can be incurred by judges. Acts 1948, H.B. 254, secs. 1-3; Const. secs. 235, 246.

10. Constitutional Law. — The judiciary can inquire into Legislature's expense allowances of public officers and condemn allowances which exceed official expenses or reasonable estimates thereof. Const. secs. 235, 246.

11. Statutes. — The statute authorizing monthly expense allowances to circuit judges and Court of Appeals judges and commissioners is not a revision, amendment, or extension of statute dealing generally with expense accounts of state officers and employees, but is new legislation complete in itself and was not defective because expense account statute was not published therein. Acts 1948, H.B. 254, secs. 1-3; KRS 45.180; Const. sec. 51.

12. Statutes. — Legislation applying to and operating uniformly upon members of any class of persons requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in matter covered by legislation is "general" and not "special or local." Const. secs. 59, 60.

13. Statutes. — Classification is within power of legislative branch of government, and, so long as classification is not manifestly arbitrary and unjust, the courts will not disturb it. Const. secs. 59, 60 14. Statutes. — The statute authorizing monthly expense allowances to circuit judges and Court of Appeals judges and commissioners is not unconstitutional as special legislation. Act 1948, H.B. 254, secs. 1-3; Const. secs. 59, 60.

15. Constitutional Law; Judges; States. — The statute authorizing monthly expense allowances to circuit judges and Court of Appeals judges and commissioners is not violative of constitutional provisions that no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man except in consideration of public service, and that General Assembly shall neither audit nor allow any private claim against commonwealth. Acts 1948, H.B. 254, secs. 1-3; Const. secs. 3, 58.

16. Officers. — Constitution does not restrict power of legislature to make allowances for expenses of state officers. Const. sec. 235.

17. Constitutional Law. — The presumption in favor of constitutionality of statute is strong.

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.

Hubert Meredith for appellant.

Herman G. Handmaker, Samuel M. Rosenstein and Charles I. Dawson for appellees.

Charles I. Dawson, Thomas S. Dawson and A.E. Funk, Attorney General, for intervening petitioner.

Before Leslie W. Morris, Special Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY SPECIAL CHIEF JUSTICELEARY.

Affirming.

This controversy requires the court to measure certain provisions of House Bill 254 of the 1948 General Assembly of Kentucky (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the limitations of the Kentucky Constitution (particularly, Sections 3, 51, 58, 59, 60, 235, and 246) and to declare whether or not there is a conflict.

It is the first three sections of the Act which form the arena of debate. The full text of these three sections are appended to this opinion. Other sections of the Act, which create and replenish the fund from which payments, if permissible, are to be made are not in controversy.

The Act has been called the Judicial Expense Act and its title denominates it as "An Act providing for the payment of certain expenses to the Judges and Commissioners of the Court of Appeals and the circuit judges of the Commonwealth."

As will be observed from a reading of the title and the appended sections, the Act deals with the entire judiciary of the Commonwealth above the level of magistrates; county and quarterly courts. Section 1 of the Act deals with circuit judges and provides for the monthly payment from the State Treasury of "the sum of $100.00, which sum is hereby declared to be the equivalent of the minimum sum that each (circuit) judge will expend each month, in the performance of his official duties, for postage, telephone service, supplies, stationery, stenographic assistance, law clerk hire, and books and periodicals."

As it relates to Judges of the Court of Appeals and Commissioners of the Court of Appeals, the Act (Sec. 2) deals alternatively. If the Judge or Commissioner "continues, during his term of office, to actually reside at his place of legal residence in the district from which he was elected or appointed he shall be paid out of the State Treasury, his actual and necessary traveling expenses in going to and returning from the State Capital, and his actual and necessary food and lodging expenses for each day that he remains at the State Capital in the performance of his official duties." But, if a Judge or Commissioner of the Court of Appeals "in order to facilitate the work of the court, and to avoid the expense, delay and inconvenience of frequent travel to and from the place of his legal residence to the State Capital, shall establish a temporary place of abode at the State Capital, or in a place convenient thereto, he shall be paid out of the State Treasury, each month, the sum of $150.00 which is hereby declared to be the reasonable equivalent of the travel, food and lodging expenses which such judge would incur, in the performance of his official duties, if compelled to travel to and from the place of his legal residence."

Acting pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, the Judges and Commissioners of the Court of Appeals certified to the appellant (defendant below) Commissioner of Finance, that each of them had established a temporary place of abode at the State Capital or at a place convenient thereto, which was not their legal residence and requested payment according to the terms of the Act. The Commissioner of Finance, doubtful of the validity of the Act, refused to make the payments provided for therein without judicial determination that the Act was valid.

The Judges^* and Commissioners of the Court of Appeals (and two circuit judges suing in a representative capacity) brought suit in the Franklin Circuit Court alleging the passage of the Act, the provisions thereof, the legal residence of the judges and Commissioners of the Court of Appeals (none of which were the State Capital), the establishment by the Judges and Commissioners of temporary places of abode at the State Capital or in places convenient thereto, the request made upon the Commissioner of Finance and his refusal to act in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Attorney General of Kentucky intervened in behalf of the Judges and alleged that the Act in question did not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky. The Attorney General has filed a brief in this court in support of the Act.

The court was asked to declare that the Act was constitutional, to permit the plaintiff circuit judges to sue on behalf of all circuit judges in Kentucky similarly situated, and to declare that the Commissioner of Finance has power and authority to issue his warrants against the fund and in the amounts provided in the Act.

Special counsel was engaged to represent the...