Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-11724-RWZ
| Decision Date | 10 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-11724-RWZ |
| Parties | ELIZABETH MANNING, et al. v. BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER CORPORATION, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
March 10, 2011
ZOBEL, D.J.
Named plaintiffs Elizabeth Manning, Lisa Rivers, and Rhonda Williams filed this class action in Massachusetts Superior Court against numerous corporate entities associated with Boston Medical Center, a hospital located in Boston, and two individuals. Boston Medical Center Corporation, Boston Medical Center 403B Retirement Plan, the president and CEO of Boston Medical Center Elaine Ullian, and the senior human resources director James Canavan, are named in the caption.1Some 16 other entities are identified as "defendants" in the body of the complaint. (Compl. 6-7, Docket # 7 Ex. 2 at 3.)
The complaint alleges, in the most general terms, that plaintiffs worked for at least one of the defendants in some unspecified capacity at some unspecified time. They were not, it states, compensated for work performed during their 30-minute lunch breaks and both before and after their shifts, nor for mandatory training. No dates aregiven and no specific training is identified. There are eleven counts: (1) violation of the Massachusetts Wage Payment Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148; (2) violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1A; (3) and (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of implied contract; (6) money had and received; (7) quantum meruit; (8) fraud; (9) negligent misrepresentation; (10) equitable estoppel; (11) promissory estoppel; (12) conversion; and (13) failure to keep accurate records.
Defendants removed the action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction because, they assert, the state law claims are completely pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Now pending is their motion to dismiss and plaintiffs' motion to remand.2
In the usual case, the existence of federal question jurisdiction is determined by application of the "well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). An independent corollary of this rule is the at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), exerts this extraordinary preemptive force. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The statute "governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). Its preemptive reach therefore extends beyond breach of contract claims to reach state law torts that present "questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
Plaintiffs do not explicitly refer to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in the complaint, but they do state that "[d]efendants entered into an express contract with Plaintiffs and Class Members that was explicitly intended to order and govern the employment relationship between defendants and Plaintiffs and Class Members." (Compl. ^ 107; see 108-09, 116.) While the complaint fails to contain any identifying information about this contract, it is apparent from the briefing that it is a CBA. Defendants explain that the terms of employment for named plaintiffs are governed by one or more of five CBAs, which are attached to an affidavit filed insupport of the motion to dismiss (Ex. 1-5 to Aff. of C.J. Eaton, Docket # 15), and plaintiffs have not identified any alternative "express contract."
The CBAs contain numerous provisions addressing base pay rates, mandatory rest breaks, pay on holidays, on-call hours, and both daily and weekly overtime pay, among other relevant topics. (See Defs.' Mem. in Supp. 20-21 & nn.29-43 (citing CBA terms).)3 There is no single, uniform definition of work or wage rate; the wage due, if any, depends upon how the employee's responsibility is characterized and may vary throughout the workday.
The two breach of contract counts are expressly founded on rights created by the contract. The remaining claims, which are pled in terms of misrepresentation, quasi-contract, or accounting causes of action, similarly assert a failure to pay wages due for work performed--insofar as the court can discern a legal theory from the nebulous allegations in the complaint--and will thus require both interpretation of the CBA provisions categorizing hours and the associated wage and a determination of how those CBA terms integrate with other statements by the defendants. (See CBA integration clauses, Ex. 1 at Art. XXXVII; Ex. 2 at Art. 38; Ex. 3 at Art. 30; Ex. 4 at Art. 27; Ex. 5 Art. XXX, Docket # 15.) Accordingly, the claims are completely preempted and fall within this court's jurisdiction.4 Compare Adames v. Exec. Airlines, 258 F.3d 7(1st Cir. 2001) (), with Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994) ().
For the reasons set forth in the related case Manning v. Boston Medical Center Corp., 09-cv-11463 (Feb. 28, 2011), the vague, conclusory allegations in the complaint do not meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. In addition, to the extent claims in this suit are premised, in part, on communications other than the contents of the CBAs, none of those statements are identified in the complaint. The complaint fails to state any claim.
Plaintiffs are also exempt from the coverage of the Massachusetts statutes invoked in Counts I and 2 which, respectively,...
To continue reading
Request your trial