Manning v. Cigna Corp., Civ. No. H-89-469 (AHN).

• Decision Date: 19 November 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-89-469 (AHN).
• Citation: 807 F. Supp. 889
• Parties: Warren MANNING v. CIGNA CORPORATION, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

807 F. Supp. 889

Warren MANNING v. CIGNA CORPORATION, et al.

Civ. No. H-89-469 (AHN).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

November 19, 1991.

Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr., Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr., P.C., Rocky Hill, CT, for plaintiff.

Timothy F. Woodbridge, Kennedy & Woodbridge, West Hartford, CT, Stephanie A. Middleton, Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

NEVAS, District Judge.

Absent objection and after review, the Magistrate's Recommended Ruling is approved, adopted and ratified. SO ORDERED.

MARGOLIS, United States Magistrate Judge.

RECOMMENDED RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Warren Manning was an employee of defendant, Insurance Company of North America "defendant" or "INA",¹ until his termination on February 10, 1989. He originally commenced this lawsuit in the Connecticut Superior Court in Hartford with an eight-count complaint, dated June 26, 1989, which included claims for breach of an implied employment contract, termination in a manner violative of public policy, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation. On July 26, 1989, defendant removed the action to federal court. (Dkt. # 1).²

After some discovery had been conducted, on August 7, 1990, defendant filed its motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and Local Rule 9(c)(1) Statement of Undisputed Facts "Defendant's Statement", with multiple exhibits.³ (Dkt. ## 13-17). On October 18, 1990, plaintiff filed his brief in opposition and Local Rule 9(c)(2) Statement of Disputed Facts "Plaintiff's Statement", with exhibits.⁴ (Dkt. # 20). On November 16, 1990 defendant filed a reply brief. (Dkt. # 22).

For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion is granted in full.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts apparently are not in dispute:⁵ Prior to February 10, 1989, plaintiff was employed as a unit claim manager, after having been employed by INA, CIGNA and the Aetna Insurance Company for approximately nineteen years.⁶ (Defendant's Statement ¶ 4; Manning Tr. at 14-15, 61). On February 1, 1989, plaintiff's supervisor, Kathleen Brown, Vice President Claims, received a complaint from a receptionist that plaintiff repeatedly had reached towards her chest while she was working and that on previous occasions plaintiff had run his fingers under her skirt and up her thigh and had made unwelcome and inappropriate comments to her; Brown, in turn, notified Wendy Mongeon, Human Resources Manager, of these allegations. (Defendant's Statement ¶ 5; Defendant's Exhs. B-C).⁷

Later that day or the next day, Brown informed plaintiff that allegations of sexual harassment had been made against him, and she advised him to remain at home pending an investigation by the Employee Relations department. (Defendant's Statement ¶ 6; Defendant's Exh. C; Manning Tr. at 87, 89-90). This investigation uncovered complaints from several female employees that plaintiff repeatedly touched or approached them in an offensive and unwelcome manner, including placing his hand down their blouses, touching the buttons or pockets on the front of their blouses, touching their hips, arms, shoulders, and/or waists, asking a female intern to sit on his lap and then blowing on her neck, and inquiring about their sexual activities with their husbands or boyfriends. (Defendant's Statement ¶¶ 7-11, 21-22; Defendant's Exhs. B-C; Okumura Tr. at 5-8, 9, 10-13, 17-23, 42).⁸ Plaintiff had been warned by several supervisors, including Brown, and by numerous female employees, that his conduct was offensive and was not acceptable. (Defendant's Statement ¶¶ 12-20; Defendant's Exhs. B-C; Okumura Tr. at 7, 22-23, 26-29, 41-42).⁹

On February 10, 1989, plaintiff attended a meeting, at which he was terminated by Brown, with the approval of her supervisor. (Defendant's Statement ¶ 24; Defendant's Exh. B; Manning Tr. at 93-94, 108-09). Plaintiff contends that Brown failed to provide him with specific details of the investigation, nor did she give him an opportunity to defend himself. (Plaintiff's Statement ¶¶ 6-7; Manning Tr. at 95-96). Other INA employees became aware that plaintiff was terminated because of complaints of sexual harassment, but the parties differ somewhat as to who was the primary source of such information. (Plaintiff's Statement ¶ 25; Defendant's Statement ¶ 8; Okumura Tr. at 13-14; Manning Tr. at 119-26).

II. DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) adds:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), now Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the summary judgment procedure "not as a disfavored procedural shortcut but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole ..." Justice Rehnquist continued:

Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.

Id. As Justice Rehnquist observed, a party opposing summary judgment may rely upon any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). In Anderson, the Court held that the standard under Rule 56 "mirrors" that "for a directed verdict under ... Rule 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict." 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).

In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), Justice Powell noted that "if the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible — ... — respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary." Rather than resting upon "mere conclusory allegations or denials as a vehicle for obtaining a trial," the non-moving party "must bring to the district court's attention some affirmative indication that his version of relevant events is not fanciful." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir.1980).

The general rule in Connecticut is that "an employment agreement of indefinite duration is terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer." Orton v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., Civ. No. B88-202(TFGD) (D.Conn. June 11, 1990), slip op. at 7 (citing D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 211 n. 1, 520 A.2d 217 (1987)). However, as Judge Dorsey recently analyzed in Kelsey v. Sheraton Corp., 662 F.Supp. 10, 13 (D.Conn.1986):

Recent Connecticut caselaw appears to provide three theories on which a plaintiff may be able to avoid this result in appropriate cases: 1) proof that what appears to be an at-will employment contract is not actually terminable at will because of contract terms which can be implied from the dealings between the parties ...; 2) an action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in the employment contract, even if at-will ...; and 3) an action in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of an important public policy.

(citations omitted). Plaintiff seeks to avail himself of all three of these exceptions.

A. BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT CLAIMS (FIRST AND SECOND COUNTS)

The first two counts of plaintiff's complaint are for breach of contract claims arising out of various employment manuals. In 1987, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that under appropriate circumstances, representations made in an employer's personnel manual "may give rise to an express or implied contract between employer and employee." Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 202 Conn. 190, 198, 520 A.2d 208 (1987). The Connecticut Supreme Court further held that in the absence of definitive contractual language, the question of whether the parties intended an employment manual to constitute part of their contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 471-72, 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); Finley, supra, 202 Conn. at 199, 520 A.2d 208. However, as Judge Cabranes observed in Owens v. American National Red Cross, 673 F.Supp. 1156, 1165 (D.Conn.1987):

Even after Finley, it is clear that the existence of a personnel manual claimed to create a contractual relationship does not automatically create a question of fact which precludes summary judgment. In this case the threshold question is whether, interpreting all inferences in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the manuals issued by the defendant-employer could be found to give rise to an enforceable contract. On a motion for summary judgment, this is a question of law

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