Manning v. Feidelson

Decision Date17 February 1940
Citation136 S.W.2d 510,175 Tenn. 576
PartiesMANNING v. FEIDELSON et al.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; R. B. C. Howell Chancellor.

Injunction suit by Cleo Manning against Charles N. Feidelson, trustee and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

John H Lechleiter, of Nashville, for complainant.

Warren Woods, of Atlanta, Ga., and George H. Cate, of Nashville, for defendants.

McKinney Justice.

The bill seeks to enjoin defendant trustee from distributing a $20,000 fund in his hands so as to exclude complainant and the class of employees that she represents.

The trustee filed a plea in abatement alleging that he was acting in his capacity as Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board; hence the court was without jurisdiction of his person. His counsel also moved for a dissolution of the injunction. The chancellor sustained the plea in abatement and dissolved the injunction. The parties have treated this as a dismissal of the bill, although the decree does not so recite, and such is its effect. The complainant duly perfected her appeal to this court and has assigned the action of the chancellor for error.

The most serious question which confronts us is whether the state courts have jurisdiction of the subject matter. If not, any decree entered by the state courts would be void. Sheffy v. Mitchell, 142 Tenn. 48, 50, 215 S.W. 403; Board of Directors v. Bodkin Bros., 108 Tenn. 700, 69 S.W 270; Baker v. Mitchell, 105 Tenn. 610, 59 S.W. 137; White v. Buchanan, 46 Tenn. 32, 6 Cold. 32. Jurisdiction in such a case cannot be waived. Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S.W. 423; In re Southern Lumber & Mfg. Co., 141 Tenn. 325, 210 S.W. 639; Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 99, 158 S.W. 480. Neither can it be conferred by consent. Harmon v. Tyler, 112 Tenn. 8, 83 S.W. 1041; Board of Directors v. Bodkin Bros., supra; Ridley v. Halliday, 106 Tenn. 607, 61 S.W. 1025, 53 L.R.A. 477, 82 Am.St.Rep. 902; Galyon v. Gilmore, 93 Tenn. 671, 28 S.W. 301; Houser v. McKennon, 60 Tenn. 287, 1 Baxt. 287. Objection for want of such jurisdiction can be made at any time and is fatal whenever presented. Agee v. Dement, 20 Tenn. 332, 1 Humph. 332; Baker v. Mitchell, supra; Ridley v. Halliday, supra.

The Washington Manufacturing Company, a corporation, prior to May 1, 1937, operated three textile manufacturing plants in Nashville. On that day complainant and all of the employees of said three plants were notified that they had been closed and that their services had been dispensed with.

Thereafter a complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Board against said Washington Manufacturing Company charging it with violating the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., with respect to its employees. On January 19, 1938, said Board, in an elaborate finding of facts, concluded, as a matter of law, that said Washington Manufacturing Company had been guilty of unfair labor practices and, among other things, it was ordered to:

"(c) Make whole all the Nashville employees who were employed by the respondent on April 30, 1937, for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the closing of the Nashville plants on May 1, 1937, by payment to each of them, respectively, of a sum equal to that which each of them would normally have earned as wages during the period from May 1, 1937, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, such sum to be calculated in the manner set forth in section V of this decision, less the amount, if any, which each has earned during said period."

On March 31, 1939, a compromise agreement was entered into, which provided that the Washington Manufacturing Company should pay "to the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board for the Tenth Region in trust for distribution to such employees and in such amounts as he shall deem just the aggregate sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00), Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be paid thirty (30) days after approval by the Board of this stipulation, and Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be paid sixty (60) days after approval by the Board of this stipulation."

It is conceded that all stipulations or agreements have to be approved by the Board. In this cause the stipulation was approved by the Board on April 13, 1939. That, in conjunction with the former order of the Board, constituted its final decision as to the settlement of the controversy. The $20,000 was paid to the defendant trustee and by him deposited in bank. Before he undertook to distribute the fund the bill herein was filed on August 9, 1939, in which it is averred that the Washington Manufacturing Company had in its employ three classes of laborers: namely, (1) members of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, (2) members of its rival, "Independent Union or Association," and (3) persons who were not members of any labor organization. Complainant belongs in this latter class. The bill alleges that the defendant trustee has construed said compromise order to mean that the $20,000 should be distributed solely to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, since it was this union that preferred charges against the Washington Manufacturing Company. The court is asked to construe said stipulation or order and decree the proper parties to participate in the distribution of the fund. In other words, the request is, in effect, that we construe the order of the Board. We have been cited to no authority that confers upon us such power. It was stipulated that the Washington Manufacturing Company was engaged in interstate commerce. The title of the National Labor Relations Act is as follows:

"To diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations Board, and for other purposes." 49 Stat. 449.

The act establishes a simple, expeditious and inexpensive procedure for settling "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of...

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5 cases
  • First American Trust v. Franklin-Murray Development Co.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • May 2, 2001
    ...are so important that appellate courts must address them even if they were not raised in the trial court. Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 578, 136 S.W.2d 510, 510-11 (1940); Morrow v. Bobbitt, 943 S.W.2d at 392; Gillespie v. State, 619 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. The first principl......
  • Moore v. Teddleton, No. W2005-02746-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 11/7/2006), W2005-02746-COA-R3-CV.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • November 7, 2006
    ...that appellate courts must address them even if they were not raised in the trial court." Id., (citing Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 578, 136 S.W.2d 510, 510-11 (1940); Morrow v. Bobbitt, 943 S.W.2d 384, 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Gillespie v. State, 619 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tenn. Ct. Ap......
  • In re Estate of Trigg
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • May 30, 2012
    ...deemed so important that appellate courts may address them even if they were not raised in the trial court. Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 578, 136 S.W.2d 510, 510–11 (1940). Accordingly, Tenn. R.App. P. 13(b) permits the issue of a court's subject matter jurisdiction to be raised for......
  • Oliver v. Local or Subordinate Lodge No. 656, Intern. Broth. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of America
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • December 2, 1944
    ... ... discourage membership in any labor organization.' ...          The ... case of Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 136 ... S.W.2d 510, is directly in point, and in the course of that ... opinion, Judge McKinney said for the Court ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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