Manning v. Hammond

• Decision Date: 03 November 1958
• Docket Number: No. 40891,40891
• Parties: Ida MANNING et al. v. Savannah HAMMOND.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 51

106 So.2d 51

234 Miss. 299

Ida MANNING et al. v. Savannah HAMMOND.

No. 40891.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Nov. 3, 1958.

Jones & Stratton, Brookhaven, for appellants.

J. P. Patterson, R. G. Turnage, Monticello, for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice.

The appellants, who are heirs at law of Evan Lenoir, deceased, brought this suit in the Chancery Court of Lawrence County against the appellee, Savannah Hammond, seeking to have set aside and cancelled a certain deed dated October 26, 1955, executed by Evan Lenoir to Savannah Hammond and conveying 120 acres of land in Lawrence County. It was charged in the original bill that at the time of the execution of the deed, the grantor was mentally incapacitated to execute the same, and further that the deed was procured as the result of fraud and undue influence practiced upon the said Evan Lenoir by the said Savannah Hammond.

The defendant, Savannah Hammond, answered the original bill, denied that a confidential relationship existed between her and Lenoir at the time of the execution of the deed in question, denied the alleged mental incapacity of Lenoir, and denied that said deed was procured by her through fraud and undue influence practiced upon Lenoir.

The chancellor, after a full hearing, found from the evidence that a confidential relationship existed between Lenoir, the grantor, and Savannah Hammond, the grantee, at the time of the execution of the deed in question, but further found from the evidence that the defendant, Savannah Hammond, had met the burden of proof devoling upon her to rebut the presumption of the deed's invalidity arising out of the confidential relationship of the parties, and he thereupon dismissed the original bill, and from his decree of dismissal this appeal is prosecuted.

The sufficiency of the evidence to support the chancellor's finding that a confidential relationship existed between the parties to the deed is not brought into question on this appeal and we do not pass upon that question and it is not necessary that we do so in view of the conclusion which we have reached. We may say, however, that we question the sufficiency of the evidence to establish such confidential relationship and we do not want to be understood as approving the same. Broadly speaking, a confidential relationship exists where a trust is reposed on the one side and a dominant influence is exercised on the other. 26 C.J.S. Deeds Sec. 63, p. 772. The proof fails to show that Lenoir reposed any trust in the appellee with respect to the handling or disposition of his property or the transaction of his business or business affairs and fails to show that the appellee exercised a dominant influence on Lenoir with respect to his property and the disposition thereof or the transaction of his business or business affairs.

Assuming the correctness of the chancellor's finding that a confidential relationship existed between the parties, the appellants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the chancellor's finding that the appellee had meet the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of the deed's invalidity arising by reason of the existence of a confidential relationship between the grantor and the grantee in the deed. In passing upon this contention, we review briefly the essential facts as disclosed by the proof.

Evan Lenoir was an elderly negro man who had lived in Lawrence County all of his life. During his lifetime he had accumulated land and money of substantial value. He was something over 90 years of age when he died. He had never married and lived alone until his home burned in November 1954. He sustained burns in the fire which necessitated his hospitalization for two or three days. Upon his discharge from the hospital he went to the home of Ida Manning, one of the appellants, where he stayed for a few days, and was then taken to the home of Hattie Smith on a Saturday evening and put out there, and on Sunday following, he was carried to the home of Avis Mae Manning, and then later taken to the home of Savannah Hammond, who, with her husband Mose Hammond, lived on a 40 acre tract belonging to Evan Lenoir. There he was ministered to and cared for by Savannah and Mose Hammond until his death on or about November 2, 1955. On January 31, 1955, he conveyed to Savannah Hammond the 40-acres of land on which he was then living with Savannah and Mose Hammond. The validity of this deed is not questioned and it is not here involved.

Lenoir handled his own business and business affairs and was considered a good business man. He was mentally capacitated to the date of his death and was a man of strong will. In October 1955, he sent word to an attorney to prepare a deed conveying to Savannah the 120 acres of land here involved. The deed was prepared and returned to Lenoir. Lenoir then sent for an officer to come and take his acknowledgment to the deed. The officer, Mr. Lunn Turner, Circuit Clerk of Lawrence County, finally came to take the acknowledgment. Lenoir signed the deed under date of October 26, 1955, in the presence of Mr. Turner, the Circuit Clerk, and in the presence of several of his friends and relatives, including his brother. He than acknowledged the deed and it was delivered to Savannah. Rudolph Manning, a nephew of Lenoir, testified that Lenoir knew what he was doing when he signed the deed. Mr. Turner, the Circuit Clerk who took the acknowledgment, testified that he talked to Lenoir about the deed and asked him if he wanted it read to him and Lenoir told him he did not but that he knew what was in it and wanted to sign it. Mr. Turner further testified that Lenoir knew what he was doing when he signed the deed.

There are some inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony but the fact as to the mental capacity of Lenoir at the time he executed the deed and the fact that he was acting independently and of his own free will were abundantly established by the evidence. The proof shows affirmatively that the idea of conveying the land to Savannah Hammond originated in the mind of Lenoir and that in executing the deed he was acting independently and of his own free will and was the dominant spirit in the transaction. The proof further shows that the execution of the deed by Lenoir was not suggested or solicited by Savannah, and that Savannah never by any act or suggestion or solicitation or persuasion undertook to influence Lenoir to convey the property to her.

The legal principles applicable to the facts of this case are well established. In 26 C.J.S. Deeds Sec. 58, p. 749, it is said: 'Deeds between persons sustaining a fiduciary or confidential relationship will be closely scrutinized for fraud or imposition and where the dominant person takes advantage of such relationship and by fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, or concealment procures the execution of a deed by the latter, the instrument may be set aside.'

In Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455, 49 So.2d 713, 716, the Court said: 'It is well established in Mississippi and elsewhere that where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between parties to the deed, and where the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises a presumption of undue influence, or, as is sometimes said, a deed is prima facie voidable in such cases.'

In Gillis v. Smith, 114 Miss. 665, 75 So. 451, and in Burnett v. Smith, 93 Miss. 566, 47 So. 117, this Court held that 'there can be no undue influence unless it is such as to take away the free agency of the grantor.' In Burnett v. Smith, supra [93 Miss. 566, 47 So. 118], the Court said: 'Not every influence is undue, and undue influence cannot be predicated of any act unless...