Manning v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety
| Decision Date | 07 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 81234,81234 |
| Citation | 876 P.2d 667,1994 OK 62 |
| Parties | Stephen L. MANNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the District Court, McClain County, Noah Ewing, Judge.
In an appeal to the District Court from an administrative hearing officer's decision in a driver's license revocation proceeding, judgment went to the driver (plaintiff). The Department of Public Safety (defendant) appeals. Driver seeks this appeal's dismissal for untimeliness.
DISMISSAL MOTION DENIED
Jose Gonzalez, Purcell, for appellee.
Lisa McLaughlin-Molinsky, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
The question presented for our decision today is whether a trial judge's directive that a party's counsel prepare a journal entry extends appeal time's commencement until that memorial's filing, even though the record contains an earlier-filed, judge-signed writing terminating the proceeding and clearly indicating the relief afforded. We answer in the negative. When judgment is pronounced with all the parties present, appeal time commences as soon as a judge-signed memorial which clearly shows the relief afforded is filed. 1 Because we clarify a point of appellate procedure that until now may have been obscure and hence presented a trap for the unwary, we allow this appeal to stand by giving today's pronouncement prospective effect in accordance with the teachings of Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Company, Okl., 394 P.2d 515, 520 (1964). 2
All the parties were present when the trial judge in this case reversed on appeal an administrative hearing officer's revocation of This appeal was brought by defendant-appellant [the Department of Public Safety or Department] on March 8, 1993, less than thirty days after the February 5 plaintiff-prepared journal entry was filed but more than thirty days after the earlier judge-signed memorialization of the decision below was filed on January 13. The driver seeks this appeal's dismissal as untimely. 7 The Department's counsel urges that (a) she did not know the January 13 writing had been filed until after this appeal was commenced and (b) the trial judge's directive to counsel that a journal entry be prepared effectively postponed appeal time until February 5.
the plaintiff-appellee's [driver's] license. 3 No issues were reserved or taken under advisement. The trial judge memorialized his ruling in longhand upon a form which had been printed and bore the label "court minute," signed the writing 4 and then handed a copy to each party present in court. Filing and entry upon the judgment roll must be assumed to have followed de cursu 5 this terminal writing of January 13, 1993. 6 Before the parties left the courtroom, the trial judge directed that plaintiff's counsel prepare a journal entry. The latter instrument, containing the same terms as the trial judge's earlier handwritten memorialization, was filed on February 5, 1993
AN INSTRUMENT'S MEANING AND EFFECT DEPEND UPON ITS CONTENT
Judgments, 9 orders 10 and minutes 11 are facially distinguishable instruments. Recognizable by their content, appearance and substance, each of these writings has a distinct legal identity. 12
Early jurisprudence gives us Webster's definition of court minute: "a small portion;" "a short sketch or note;" "a brief summary." 13 Minutes are no more than abbreviated memoranda of what takes place in court, made by the court's authority. 14
Never a fit substitute for the judge's recordable memorialized entry, 15 minutes are by definition incomplete. Casual examination of a minute usually reveals that a recordable order or judgment is intended to follow. In sum, record entry 16 of judgment may never be accomplished by a clerk's minute or by an unsigned, initialed or incomplete abstract of proceedings placed on a minute form later posted on the appearance docket. 17 Rather, it is accomplished by the filing of a memorial that meets the 12 O.S.1991 § 24 18 recordation criteria (the judge's full signature and a clear indication of the relief afforded). The filing of the recordable The content and substance of the January 13 entry is that of a judgment and not that of a minute. If the four corners yielded no more than an unsigned or initialed recitation of the events that transpired at trial, 21 our conclusion might be different. The instrument in contest clearly vacates the driver's license revocation, judicially determining the parties' rights in the action. By application of the § 681 22 standards, the earlier entry is the recordable 23 judgment. It precludes all further inquiry into the issues joined by the pleadings. 24 Nothing remains to be done. 25 Our facial examination of this instrument does not reveal any indication that the judge intended a more complete instrument to follow. 26 In short, the January 13 entry is the filed judgment 27 which may not be transmuted into a minute, either by its pre-printed "minute" label or by the judge's oral directive that counsel prepare a journal entry.
memorial begins the 12 O.S.1991 § 990A's 19 countdown for commencing an appeal. 20
APPEAL TIME'S TRIGGER IS A LAW-DRIVEN MECHANISM WHICH MAY
This court stands committed to the view that, once an appealable event has occurred, a trial judge is utterly without authority to extend appeal time by any means or in any manner, direct or oblique; 28 neither may the nisi prius judge allow the parties to control the time of a judgment's issuance. Appeal time's trigger is a law- If a trial judge (1) pronounces judgment in court, (2) writes, signs and delivers to counsel a recordable memorial setting forth all the terms of his ruling and (3) the clerk files it de cursu as required by law, the filing date inexorably sets appeal time in motion. 30 The signed instrument becomes the judgment in the case by operation of law. 31 Extant jurisprudence condemns the creation of more than one memorial of the same ruling and teaches that only the first is effective. 32 All later memorials of the same ruling, though includable as a legitimate part of the appellate record for our review, are nonetheless void on the face of the judgment roll. 33
driven mechanism which is beyond the reach of human tinkering. 29
The case scenario here is clear and undisputed. The trial judge announced his decision, set forth the granted relief in a memorial, signed it and handed a copy to each party. All parties hence had immediate notice of his decision. It would be an act of supererogation also to require the trial judge to caution counsel that the recordable memorial would be filed. Filing and entry are ministerial acts that follow de cursu 34 the signed writing's delivery to the clerk. 35 For purposes of triggering appeal time, the January 13 writing becomes the filed judgment in the § 990A sense. 36 It reserves no issues; it is not vacated and stands unmodified. In short, the later February 5 journal entry does not extend appeal time in the face of the earlier-filed January 13 terminal memorial that meets the § 24 recordation criteria.
OUR LAW GIVES TO TRIAL JUDGES THE DUTY TO EFFECT A
A judgment issues from the court and not from the attorneys or the court clerk. 37 A trial judge has the duty to draft, sign and record a judgment within a reasonable time after its rendition or pronouncement. 38 It has become customary for the Appellant's petition in error, brought more than thirty days after the January 13 filing, is tardy. Under the teachings of Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Company 40 and its progeny, 41 this court on several occasions has saved an appeal from dismissal in order to keep obscure procedural snares, ambiguous legislative enactments or misleading jurisprudence from becoming treacherous pitfalls. Since the rule we announce for this case clarifies appellate procedure which until now may have been less than crystal-clear, today's holding on a not-so-easily-divinable point of statutory law shall be prospective. 42
trial courts to delegate a journal entry's preparation to counsel for the prevailing party. This practice does not divest a judge of his/her long-standing prerogative to memorialize and sign the judgment. Nor does this custom rob of any legal effect a facially recordable, judge-prepared and subscribed judgment, which fails to gives any indication that it was not intended as judgment. Once filed, the latter becomes the judgment, as it did in this case, irrespective of the judge's directive that counsel prepare a journal entry. 39
Were we to hold that plaintiff's later memorialization -- which sets forth the same terms as the trial judge's earlier writing--triggered appeal time in this case, our pronouncement would not only be far from sound, it would also represent a sharp break from past jurisprudence teaching that a trial judge cannot extend the time for an appeal. 43 Extant case law, which bars a trial judge from abdicating to counsel the control over a judgment's issuance, may not be ignored. When, as here, the trial court's judgment is pronounced in open court, appeal time runs from the filing of the first memorialization which substantively meets the § 24 recordation criteria. 12 O.S.1991 § 990A ( OKL.SESS.LAWS 1993, Ch. 351 § 18, effective October 1, 1993). That entry may not effectively be postponed by a trial judge's direction that a party also prepare a journal entry. 44 Mindful of the uncertainty created by the trial judge's directive that plaintiff's counsel prepare another journal entry and by the recent changes in legislation, we give today's pronouncement prospective application. It will operate with effect from the date this opinion is promulgated.
DISMISSAL MOTION DENIED
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