Manning v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp.
| Decision Date | 21 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-10833-ADB |
| Parties | RYAN MANNING, Plaintiff, v. WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., JOHN P. MACKEY, DAVID J. FILIPPONE, and GREG PALLADINO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Ryan Manning (“Plaintiff”) brings federal and state law claims against Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. (“Whole Foods”), John P. Mackey (“Mackey”), [1] David J. Filippone (“Filippone”), and Greg Palladino (“Palladino, ” together with Whole Foods and Filippone, “Defendants”) alleging that a policy that requires all customers to wear a mask while shopping at Whole Foods' stores violated his rights. [ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”)]. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. [ECF No. 20]. For the reasons set forth below Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
The following facts are taken primarily from the complaint, [Compl.], the factual allegations of which are assumed to be true when considering a motion to dismiss, Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). As it may on a motion to dismiss, the Court has also considered “documents incorporated by reference in [the complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)).
In early 2020, the spread of the highly contagious novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”) upended daily life and led businesses to take steps to prevent its spread. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Whole Foods instituted a policy that required all customers to wear face coverings while shopping in order to protect employees, shoppers, and communities from COVID-19 (the “Mask Policy”). [ECF No. 21-1 at 19-21]. Whole Foods provided masks to those customers who did not have them and also allowed customers with medical or other exemptions to wear a face shield or undergo a brief medical screening in lieu of wearing a mask. [Id.].[2]
On January 4, 2021, when the Mask Policy was in place, Plaintiff entered a Whole Foods store in Dedham, Massachusetts without wearing a mask. See [Compl. ¶¶ 1-2].[3] Plaintiff asserts that his religious beliefs prevent him from wearing a mask because he believes that masks “are part of a satanic ritual” and that “he cannot slowly commit suicide by lowering his immune system and depriving himself of oxygen.” [Id. ¶¶ 52-54].
When Plaintiff entered the store, a staff member told him that he needed to wear a mask, but he refused, claiming that such a request was unconstitutional. [Compl. ¶¶ 2-3]. Eventually, Palladino and Filippone, who are alleged to be the “manager” and “head manager” of the Dedham store, approached Plaintiff and reiterated that, per store policy, he would need to wear a mask while shopping. [Id. ¶¶ 7-8]. After this exchange, Plaintiff exited the store and called the police. [Id. ¶ 13]. Officer John Rinn responded to Plaintiff's call. [Id. ¶ 14]. Plaintiff explained to him that his rights were being violated and he “wanted to make a citizen's arrest.” [Id. ¶¶ 1517]. At this point, Filippone offered to go shopping for Plaintiff, but Plaintiff refused. [Id. ¶¶ 18-19]. Plaintiff also rejected Filippone's offer to allow Plaintiff to shop if he underwent a health screening and temperature check. [Id. ¶¶ 23-24]. Plaintiff told Filippone that he had “no right to give Plaintiff a health screening.” [Id. ¶ 24].
On May 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed his eight-count complaint alleging that Defendants: (1) violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Count One), [Compl. ¶¶ 64-68]; (2) violated 18 U.S.C. § 242, (Count Two), [id. ¶ 69]; (3) discriminated against him in a place of public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, (Counts Three and Five), [id. ¶¶ 70-74, 76]; (4) conspired to interfere with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, (Count Four), [id. ¶ 75]; (5) engaged in “unauthorized or unregistered practice of medicine” in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Ch. 112 § 6, (Count Six), [id. ¶¶ 77-79]; (6) harassed him, (Count Seven), [id. ¶¶ 80-84]; and (7) falsely imprisoned him, (Count Eight), [id. ¶¶ 85-87]. On June 24, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. [ECF Nos. 20, 21]. Plaintiff opposed the motion on July 9, 2021. [ECF No. 22].
A motion to dismiss for lack of constitutional standing is properly brought as a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012). The party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating its existence. Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998). Dismissal is appropriate only when the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true and given all reasonable inferences, do not support a finding of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 251 (1st Cir. 2009). A challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed before addressing the merits of a case. See Acosta-Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 712 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2002)) (“Federal courts are obliged to resolve questions pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction before addressing the merits of a case”).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2019). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but the complaint must set forth “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The alleged facts must be sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
“To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability.” Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 4445 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A determination of plausibility is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” Id. at 44 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.” Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011)). “The plausibility standard invites a two-step pavane.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45). First, the Court “must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).” Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Second, the Court “must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a ‘reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz, 676 F.3d at 224).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must generously construe the arguments in his complaint and briefing. Bahiakina v. U.S. Postal Serv., 102 F.Supp.3d 369, 371 (D. Mass. 2015) . However, a pro se litigant still must comply with procedural and substantive law. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). Dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to state an actionable claim. Muller v. Bedford VA Admin. Hosp., No. 11-cv-10510, 2013 WL 702766, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2013) (citing Overton v. Torruella, 183 F.Supp.2d 295, 303 (D. Mass. 2001)).
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish that he has standing to bring suit. [ECF No. 21 at 8-9]. The doctrine of standing is rooted in Article III of the Constitution, which confines federal courts to the adjudication of actual “cases” and “controversies.” See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1st Cir. 1992). Standing consists of three elements: “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, as revised (May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Where, as here, the question of standing is based on the pleadings, Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing sufficient factual matter to plausibly demonstrate his standing to bring the action, ” Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 731 (1st Cir. 2016), taking all of the facts (and any inferences that follow) in the plaintiff's favor, Gustavsen v. Alcon Lab'ys., Inc., 903 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70-71 (1st Cir. 2012)).
To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, ...
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