Mannweiler v. LaFlamme

• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15009,15009
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Gordon B. MANNWEILER et al. v. Robert S. LaFLAMME et al.

Page 168

653 A.2d 168

232 Conn. 27

Gordon B. MANNWEILER et al. v. Robert S. LaFLAMME et al.

No. 15009.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 3, 1994.

Decided Jan. 31, 1995.

Edward G. Fitzpatrick, Naugatuck, with whom was Jayne Elser Welch, Middlebury, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Vincent T. McManus, Jr., Wallingford, for appellee (defendant).

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.

NORCOTT, Associate Justice.

In this action for a declaratory judgment and for other relief, the plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly: (1) found that there was a common scheme of development; (2) concluded that a purported revocation of the right to restrict certain development was valid; and (3) concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to enforce certain restrictive covenants. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because certain indispensable parties had not been given notice pursuant to Practice Book § 390(d). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.

In 1927, the J.H. Whittemore Company (Whittemore) had recorded in the Naugatuck land records a subdivision map of a tract of land known as the Hop Brook development (Hop Brook), which consisted of six sections divided into fifty-two lots that were delineated on the subdivision map. The parties ¹ in the present case are all owners of property within the development and all derive their title from Whittemore, the common grantor. In May, 1991, the defendants received approval from the Naugatuck planning and zoning commission to subdivide their property and to construct two additional homes in addition to the single residence that already existed on their lot.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs instituted this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the defendants from constructing additional dwellings on their resubdivided parcel. In commencing their action, the plaintiffs served only the defendants and sought no order of notice. The plaintiffs alleged that Whittemore had created, by restrictive covenant, a uniform plan of development, or "common scheme," limiting any development within Hop Brook to one residential dwelling per lot, ² to which all subsequent conveyances were subject. The plaintiffs claimed that the restrictive covenant precluded any further subdivision and the erection of additional houses on the defendants' parcel.

At trial, the defendants contended that the language of the covenant relied on by the plaintiffs does not prohibit the resubdivision of their lot but, rather, expressly permits it. In support of this argument, the defendants pointed to their own deed that contains, in addition to the restrictions in footnote 2, language that evinces Whittemore's 1937 attempt to revoke or amend Hop Brook's restrictive covenants in a deed to Lewis A. Dibble. Dibble is the defendants' predecessor in title. ³ Further, they cited a 1946 warranty deed from Whittemore to Dibble, wherein Whittemore attempted to revoke completely the restrictive covenants and to permit resubdivision by the grantee of four lots in section E of the subdivision. ⁴

After a trial, the court concluded that the original grantor's intention as to the general plan or common scheme was to develop a residential area of single-family homes. The court also found, however, that the plan did not restrict the resubdivision of the defendants' lot. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

The substantive issues in this appeal are whether the trial court properly: (1) concluded that, although a common scheme of development exists, the language of the restrictive covenant does not constitute an enforceable restriction on the number of dwellings that may be constructed on any one lot; (2) declined to declare that the attempted reservation of the right to revoke the restrictive covenants by the original grantor in 1937, and the subsequent revocation in 1946, without consent of all the prior grantees, was void and of no effect; and (3) concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to enforce the terms of the restrictive covenants. Because we conclude that the record discloses a fundamental flaw in the proceedings that deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse the trial court's judgment and do not reach the merits of the appeal. See Serrani v. Board of Ethics, 225 Conn. 305, 306, 622 A.2d 1009 (1993).

Both parties concede that the plaintiffs' amended complaint sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. ⁵ Although the plaintiffs assert that the case was tried to and resolved by the trial court only on the basis of an injunction and that the claim for declaratory judgment was only "ancillary" to the proceedings, our review of the record does not support their contention. Neither the trial court's memorandum of decision nor the judgment file indicates that the declaratory judgment aspect of this case was not determined by the trial court. ⁶ Indeed, the pertinent part of the trial court's memorandum of decision sounds very much like the resolution of the declaratory judgment issue regarding a common scheme. ⁷ We conclude, therefore, that the trial court considered and denied the declaratory relief sought.

In order for a trial court to have jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions, however, it must comply with the notice requirement of Practice Book § 390(d), which provides: "The court will not render declaratory judgments upon the complaint of any person ... (d) unless all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof." After a thorough examination of the record, we are persuaded that the presence of all of the lot owners in Hop Brook is indispensable to a determination of the issues upon the merits and that they were entitled to notice of the underlying action. ⁸

"Parties have been termed indispensable when their interest in the controversy is such that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that its final disposition may be inconsistent with equity and good conscience. ⁹ Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6, 463 A.2d 527 (1983); Standard Mattress Co. v. Hartford, 31 Conn.Sup. 279, 288, 329 A.2d 613 (1974)." Gaudio v Gaudio, 23 Conn.App. 287, 305-306, 580 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990); see also Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives, 214 Conn. 407, 439, 572 A.2d 951 (1990). Joinder of indispensable parties is mandated because due process principles make it "essential that [such parties] be given notice and an opportunity to protect [their] interests by making [them] a party to the [action]." Fong v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 212 Conn. 628, 634, 563 A.2d 293 (1989). The unnoticed lot owners within Hop Brook are classic "indispensable parties" because the resolution of the questions regarding the restrictive covenants and the alleged common scheme of development are relevant to all deeds within the development. See Tri-Mor Bowl, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 51 Ill.App.3d 743, 9 Ill.Dec. 430, 366 N.E.2d 941 (1977); Garnick v. Serewitch, 39 N.J.Super. 486, 121 A.2d 423 (Ch.Div.1956); see also T. Tondro, Connecticut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed.1992) pp. 621-24.

"The purpose of a declaratory judgment action ... is to 'secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties' "; Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 115, 617 A.2d 433 (1992), quoting Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 613, 508 A.2d 743 (1986); and to make certain that the declaration will conclusively settle the whole controversy. See National Transportation Co. v. Toquet, 123 Conn. 468, 481-84, 196 A. 344 (1937). " 'This rule is not merely a procedural regulation. It is in recognition and implementation of the basic principle that due process of law requires that the rights of no [person] shall be judicially determined without affording him [or her] a day in court and an opportunity to be heard.' " Kolenberg v. Board of Education, 206 Conn. 113, 124, 536 A.2d 577, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1236, 108 S.Ct. 2903, 101 L.Ed.2d 935 (1988). Disposition of this case without the presence of all of the lot owners could lead to unacceptable results. For example, the question of whether a common scheme exists could be relitigated in multiple actions by persons not bound by the first declaration. See E. Bouchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.1941) p. 256. Thus, because adjudication of the declaratory claim necessarily implicates the interests of every other lot owner within the development, each must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.

This case is analogous to Sloane-Wheeler Corp. v. Odiseos, 154 Conn. 705, 226 A.2d 508 (1967), in which this court dismissed an action for declaratory judgment for lack of jurisdiction because not all of the landowners in a forty acre tract were represented in the action to adjudicate whether building and use restrictions contained in each parcel's deed were enforceable. The court concluded that "[t]he record fails to disclose that the plaintiffs sustained their burden of proving that all persons having any interest in the removal of the deed restrictions on the lots [in the tract] either were made parties to the action or have had reasonable notice thereof." Id., at 707, 226 A.2d 508.

Since, in this case, the plaintiffs, in their prayer for relief, invoked the declaratory judgment provision of General Statutes § 52-29,...