Manor v. State, 24224
| Decision Date | 21 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 24224,24224 |
| Parties | Robert MANOR v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
This is an appeal from a murder conviction and sentence without a recommendation for mercy, and is the second appearance in this court, the first trial having been held to be null and void. See Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866, 148 S.E.2d 305. Many of the facts are the same and reference is made to the above report for a complete study of the case. However, the accused was reindicted, and the present case is entirely different. A re sume of the evidence is hereinafter set out. The accused allegedly broke and entered the dwelling of the deceased where his fingerprints were found and identified. She was found dead shortly after the burglary in a bathtub, having died by reason of drowning, and had multiple cuts and bruises on the face and neck with a fracture of the thyroid cartilage of the neck allegedly caused by pressure. The unsworn statement of the accused made at the former trial was read into the record in which he admitted he had gone to her home to take certain items, she surprised him, he 'grabbed' her, but did not intend to kill her, that she came in and found him, that he got frightened, pushed her aside to get out of the way, that 'maybe she fainted or maybe he knocked her too hard, but I put her in the bathtub and got scared and run,' and he put her in the bathtub to talk to her and ask her forgiveness. He made no statement and offered no evidence during this trial.
The defendant, after conviction, filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently amended to add 37 additional special grounds. The enumeration of errors complain of the overruling of the motion for new trial, as amended, and list 40 alleged errors both in the overruling of the motion and occurring during the trial. Because of the quantity of the alleged errors they will not be set out but will be considered in the various headnotes which reflect the grounds argued in appellant's brief.
Kravitch & Hendrix, Aaron Kravitch, John H. Hendrix, E. H. Gadsden, Savannah, for appellant.
Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Sol. Gen., Andrew J. Ryan, III, Savannah, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
1. Code § 59-112, as amended, is not unconstitutional for any reason assigned because it exempts certain citizens from jury duty and thereby prevents a cross section of the population from being considered as prospective jurors. Rawlins v. State of Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 26 S.Ct. 560, 50 L.Ed. 899. Nor was it error to exclude all jurors who were opposed to capital punishment since these jurors specifically stated they would never consider giving the supreme penalty if they found the accused guilty. Code § 59-806 is not unconstitutional for any reason assigned. Further, Ga.L.1953, Jan.Sess., pp. 256, 257, authorizes jurors in one county judicial circuits to serve not less than 20 days in any calendar year 'without regard to the number of weeks in which the service is rendered' and controls over Code § 59-710 which requires the drawing of separate panels of petit jurors for each week of the court when the superior court is held for longer than one week. None of the challenges seeking to disqualify the jury is meritorious.
2. The admission of the defendant that during the period in which he was committing a crime he physically assaulted the deceased, together with all the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased by violent means was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of murder, and the general grounds of the motion for new trial are without merit. Code § 26-1004; Williams v. State, 222 Ga. 208, 149 S.E.2d 449.
3. After the reindictment of the accused (see Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866, 148 S.E.2d 305), who was then in custody, no new arrest was necessary, and a retaking of his fingerprints for identification and comparison with those found at the scene of the crime would have been a complete duplication of events totally unnecessary since the law does not require the doing of useless things. Nor has the original arrest of the accused been shown to have been illegal as contended. Indeed, the defendant admitted his presence in the home, and the offer of the fingerprints to prove his entry into the home merely corroborates the admissions of the accused. We find no error in admitting the fingerprints regardless of when they were taken. Code § 38-709; Smith v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 324 F.2d 879; United States v. Kelly, 2 Cir., 55 F.2d 67, 83 A.L.R. 122. Further, the reindictment put all questions involving the arrest of the accused out of consideration on this trial, and the attacks on the warrant serve no useful purpose. Nor was the request to charge on the duty of arresting officers or the rights of persons in custody who are subject to interrogation relevant or material to any issue involved. All enumerations of error that the issue of his fingerprints arose out of an illegal arrest are completely without merit.
4. The defendant's claim that he is required to disclose his defenses in that Code Ann. § 27-3001 (Ga.L.1953, Nov.Sess., p.478) requires that the court approve the expenses to be paid defense counsel as a matter of public record is completely unfounded since this disclosure occurs after trial and not before. Nor has there been any showing here that the amount allotted was insufficient to offer an adequate defense or violates the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The motion for continuance based on the above was refused in the broad discretion with which the trial court is vested and no abuse has been shown. Code § 81-1419; Benjamin v. Weintraub, 169 Ga. 770, 775, 151 S.E. 381. There is no merit in the assignments of error involving the denial of this motion.
5. Since the accused admitted an assault in which he pushed the deceased and she either fainted or 'he knocked her too hard' and that he then picked her up and placed her in a bathtub, the nude pictures showing the bruised body in the bathtub were relevant to the case although certainly highly prejudicial to him, and there is no merit in the objection to the allowance of the photographs as being inflammatory since they show the marks on and the condition of the body after her death. Thompkins v. State, 222 Ga. 420(5), 151 S.E.2d 153, and citations therein.
6. The testimony showed the deceased was wearing a seersucker suit on the day she was last seen alive and that she used safety pins frequently to keep her clothing tight because she was very thin; thus the torn scrap of seersucker cloth with a safety pin attached, found in the bathroom with the body, was sufficiently identified to be relevant and material to the issues involved, since the suit was missing. There was no error in allowing the scrap of cloth and safety pin in evidence.
7. Since a new trial was ordered after reindictment because of the conditions surrounding the keeping of the defendant nude in his cell after his arrest, it was no error to refuse to allow defense counsel to question a police officer in regard to whether or not he was nude when he interrogated him since this evidence would serve no useful purpose. The officer did not testify to any admission made during any interrogation, and the defense was properly not allowed to go into this matter. It appears that the only purpose of this cross examination would be a calculated attempt to influence or inflame the jury in favor of the accused because of possible police brutality on matters which were not relevant or material. The court did not err in refusing to allow the inquiry.
8. Code Ch. 38-7 applies to private writings and hence Code § 38-709 requiring that other writings, proved or acknowledged to be genuine which are to be admitted in evidence are to be submitted to the opposite party before he announces himself ready for trial has no application to the introduction of fingerprints as in this case. There is no merit in the failure of counsel to submit any fingerprint data to the defense before the trial.
9. The testimony of a deputy sheriff showed clearly that ...
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