Manser v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc.
Decision Date | 24 December 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 84-0014-CV-W-9.,84-0014-CV-W-9. |
Citation | 652 F. Supp. 267 |
Parties | Lawrence D. MANSER, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
H. Lynn Henry, Henry, Henry & Henry, West Plains, Mo., Michael J. Gallagher, Thomas M. Franklin, Wassberg, Gallagher & Jones, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
Wayne H. Hoecker, James L. Moeller, Gage & Tucker, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I, GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT III, AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT IV
Plaintiff Lawrence D. Manser was employed by defendant Missouri Farmers Association as the manager of an exchange operated by defendant in LaPlata, Missouri, from August 1974, until his discharge on January 28, 1982. After his discharge, plaintiff filed the complaint in this case alleging violations of rights protected by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Plaintiff then filed first and second amended complaints adding three state law claims. Defendant now seeks dismissal of Counts I, III and IV of the second amended complaint.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because Count III will be dismissed on other grounds, see section 3 of this Order, the Court will not address that count in this section.
Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is the Court's obligation to view the facts in the light most favorable to the adverse party and to allow the adverse party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 728-28 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979).
If there is no genuine issue about any material fact, summary judgment is proper because it avoids needless and costly litigation and promotes judicial efficiency. Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. Porter, 581 F.2d 698, 703 (8th Cir.1978). However, summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should not be granted, unless the moving party has established his right to judgment beyond controversy. Ozark Milling Co., Inc. v. Allied Mills, Inc., 480 F.2d 1014, 1015 (8th Cir.1973); Oskey Gasoline and Oil Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1285 n. 9 (8th Cir.1976).
Plaintiff alleges in Count I that defendant violated § 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, by demoting and discharging plaintiff in order to prevent him from receiving expense benefits, long term disability benefits and long term sick leave.
Section 510 of ERISA provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 29 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
29 U.S.C. § 1140. Defendant does not dispute that when plaintiff was employed he was covered by defendant's benefit plans and that these plans are employee benefit plans as defined under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) and (3).
Defendant argues that plaintiff should be estopped from bringing this claim because a deputy in the Missouri Division of Employment Security determined that plaintiff was not eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits after his discharge. The deputy stated: Division of Employment Security Deputy's Determination Concerning Claim for Benefits by Lawrence Manser. (Manser deposition Exhibit 10.) Plaintiff did not appeal the deputy's determination. Manser's April 25, 1984, deposition at pp. 208-09. Defendant contends that because the deputy's finding of the reason for the discharge was a "final and binding determination," plaintiff has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in Count I and thus is precluded from asserting in this action that plaintiff was discharged for some other reason.
Collateral estoppel will preclude relitigation of an issue if: 1) the issue is identical to one that was present in a prior adjudication; 2) there was a final judgment on the merits as to that issue; 3) the estopped party was a party to the prior adjudication; and 4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue. Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 279 (8th Cir.1979).
The Division of Employment Security determined that plaintiff was discharged because of "several company violations" revealed during an audit. Defendant does not suggest that the Division considered, much less decided, whether plaintiff was discharged in order to interfere with ERISA protected rights under employment benefit plans. Therefore, the Division of Employment Security did not decide the identical issue presented by Count I of the complaint.
Furthermore, defendant has not established that plaintiff was afforded a "trial like hearing" before the Division, a prerequisite to giving its decision a preclusive effect. See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1559-60, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966).
Accordingly, the Missouri Division of Employment Security's determination that plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for ten weeks will not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating his claim that § 510 of ERISA was violated by his discharge.
Defendant argues that "exhaustion is required" before filing a claim in federal court under § 510 of ERISA and that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided in the benefit plans before filing this suit.
In Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984), the defendant company's former employees brought suit under § 510 alleging that they were discharged for the purpose of being deprived of the opportunity to qualify for the company's benefit and employee welfare plans. The defendant argued that ERISA required terminated employees to exhaust contractual remedies prior to bringing a § 510 claim. Id. at 750.
In rejecting defendant's argument, the Court was persuaded by the difference between a § 510 claim and a breach of contract claim covered by the contractual remedies. A § 510 claim is not a breach of contract action but is Id. at 751.
Furthermore, the Court noted that in resolving a § 510 claim, there is only a statute to interpret; a contract is not involved. Interpreting a statute Id. at 751-52.
The Court in Amaro was persuaded by the reasoning in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) and Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) in which prior arbitration decisions were held not to foreclose actions under Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act:
724 F.2d at 752. Therefore, the Amaro Court held that the former employees were not required to exhaust grievance or arbitration procedures prior to bringing...
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